IHSAN-UL-HAQ CHAUDHRY, J.--This is an appeal by MDA, who has succeeded the original appellant Multan Improvement Trust Multan. The relevant facts for the disposal of this appeal are that the appellant acquired land for establishing Timber Market at Multan. The award was announced on 1-8--1970. The land-owners were not satisfied with the compensation awarded to them. Therefore, they moved the Land Acquisition Collector for a reference under Section 18 f the Land Acquisition Act. II is surprising that the appellant also moved an application. The Collector enhanced the price on 30,000 per acre to Rs. 63,200 per acre while dismissed the applications moved by the MDA and Province under section 22-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The judgment of the Tribunal is dated 24-11-1974. The appellant feeling aggrieved by this order filed present appeal.
The same was admitted to regular hearing and notices were issued to the respondents: The appeal came up for hearing on 21-1-1989 and we have our doubts about the competency of the appeal. Therefore, we asked the learned counsel for the parties to address arguments firstly as to the competency of the appeal.
2. We have heard today Mr. M.Z. Khan Burki, Advocate, for the respondents who has argued that the appeal is not competent because acquiring authority has no right of reference and appeal. He, in support of his argument, has referred to cases of Pit Khan through his legal heirs v. Military Estate Officer and others PLD 1987 SC 485; Karachi Development Authority v. Haji Ghulam A.I etc. NLR 1985 (Revenue) 44, Sheikh Muhammad Saeed and others v. Deputy Commissioner, Karachi PLD 1969 Kar.
314; WAPDA through its Chairman v. Aurangzeb Khan and 17 others PLD 1975 Pesh.
1. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant has nothing to refer to argue that the appeal is, competent. It was sufficient for us to dismiss the appeal with this observation, but feeling that since in spite of clear legal position off and on the opposite view is canvassed in the Courts, which consume lot of time of the concerned Courts. In order to clarify the position, we have decided to deal with the legal position at, length. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of Pir Khan. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:-- "From a perusal of the above provisions, it is manifest that section 50(2) expressly and in terms controls section 18 and takes away the right from the local authority or company for whom the land is being acquired to demand a reference under section 18. According to subsection (2) of section 50 a local authority or a company is only conferred the right to appear in proceedings before the Collector or the Court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation but a reference under section 18 by them is barred (vide the proviso to subsection (2) of section 50). It is, therefore, manifest that whatever may have been the object of the law, in view of plain language of section 50(2), there is no alternative but to give effect to it.
Hence, so far as a local authority or a company is concerned, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector becomes final; it has neither the right to ask for a reference under section 18, nor on a parity of reasoning, a right to prefer an appeal against a decision made upon a reference under section 18 of the Act by the Court.
The above legal position was firmly established by the decisions of the Courts of this country see The Pabna Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Kaliprashad Bhattacharrya and another PLD 1960 Dacca 461, Kasimbhai and another v. The Deputy Commissioner, Dadu and others PLD 1968 Kar. 126 and WAPDA through its Chairman v. Aurangzeb Khan and others PLD 1975 Pesh 1, but the learned Judges in instant case have departed from this view on the ground that the situation has changed on account of this Court's judgment in H.M. Saya & Co Karachi v Wazir A.I Industries Ltd., Karachi and another PLD 1969 SC 65. In this case, it was held that a party which was adversely affected by an order passed in a suit or proceeding was competent to file an appeal against it even if it had not been impleaded as a party therein.
The upshot is that the preliminary objection with regard to the non-maintainability of the appeal before the High Court had force and it rejecting it the learned Judges of the High Court were in error. This appeal against the said erroneous determination, therefore, succeeds and is allowed, with costs. The result is that the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 23-12-1979 is set aside and that of the Senior Civil Judge dated 16-5-1974 restored."
The contrary view was once again canvassed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Behram Khan and 54 others v. Military Estate Officer and 2 others 1988 SCM R 1160 but was rejected.
The relevant portion reads as under:-- "The result is that no ground exists for reconsidering our earlier judgment in the case of Pir Khan v.
Military Estate Officer Abbottabad and others PLD 1987 SC 485. These appeals must, therefore, succeed and are allowed with costs. The judgment and decrees dated 23-12-1979 passed by the High Court are set aside".
3. There is unbroken chain of case-law starting with the judgment in case of Municipal Corporation, Pabna v. Jogendra Naram Buikut (4 Indian Cases 3,92 ---13 CWN Cal. 116, Faqir Chand v. Municipal Committee, Hazara (1913) 47 P .R. 225, Collector and Chairman, District Board, Gujranwala v.
Hiranand AIR 1929 Lah. 10, Nehal Chand and others v. District Board, Mianwali AIR 1936 Lah. 564 to the effect that it is not open to the Provincial Government, company or corporation for whose benefits any land is acquired to challenge the' award or ask for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, nor the Act gave them right of appeal. The same view was maintained even after partition of the Sub-continent. The leading judgments are in cases of Pabna Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Kaliparshad Bhattacharyya and another PLD 1960 Dacca 461 and Kasimbhai and others v. Deputy Commissioner Dadu and others PLD 1968 Kar. 126.
4. The result is that we uphold preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal as incompetent with costs.