' NAZIR AHMED BHATTI, J.--Muhammad Yaqoob Sethi petitioner herein was ar employee of the National Bank of Pakistan. He had put in 31 years of service and was Senior Vice-President of the Bank at Peshawar when on 14-5-1984 he was retired from service with effect from 14-5-1985 after availing of leave preparatory to retirement for one year. The petitioner has challenged his retirement by the writ petition in hand on the grounds inter alia that rule 17 of the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the rules), where under he has been retired, has been wrongly pressed into service inasmuch as that when the petitioner completed 25 years of service on 15-6-1978 instead of retirement he was promoted to the post of Senior Vice- President and since no action under the said rule was taken against him when he had completed the said 25 years' service, he could not be retired under the rule. His further contention is that his retirement tan amounted to compulsory retirement for which a separate provision existed in the rules; that he had been condemned unheard against the principle of natural justice; that he had excellent record of service and the impugned action was illegal.
2. In his written comments to the writ petition, the respondent No, 1 inter alia stated that the petitioner was not compulsorily retired and that it was a retirement according to the rules.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged two fold grounds in support of the writ petition; firstly, his contention was that even if action against the petitioner had to be taken under rule 17 of the rules, that could be taken immediately when the petitioner had completed 25 years of service and once he had crossed the limit of that service, the provisions of rule 17 could not be taken advantage of by the respondents; and secondly, in any case the discretion to retire the petitioner under the said rule could only be exercised honestly and reasonably and in the interest of the hank.
4. In so far as the first point is concerned the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the text of clause (a) of sub-rule (1) of rule 17 of the rules according to which every employee shall retire from service on such date after he had completed twenty five years of service as the competent authority may in the interest of the bank direct. The learned counsel has contended that according to the said provisions of rule 17 of the rules the action of retirement of the petitioner could only be taken as soon as he had completed 25 years of service but if he had crossed that limit of service, then such action could not be taken against the petitioner thereafter.
We cannot subscribe to this contention of the learned counsel for the simple reason that he has failed to appreciate the purport of the word 'after' used in this provision, which empowers the competent authority to retire any employee on any date after he has completed twenty five years of service. It would simply mean that the competent authority has been armed with the power to retire in the interest of the bank any employee on any date after he has completed twenty five years of service. The contention of the learned counsel could be valid and worth consideration only if for the word 'after' used in this provision of rule 17 of the rules the word 'on' was used. In that case the power vested with the competent authority to retire an employee on completion of twenty five years of service would no longer be available then the employee had crossed that limit and had put in more than twenty five years of service. We are of the considered opinion that the action of the competent authority to retire an employee is not restricted to the date on which he completes twenty five years of service but he can be retired from service at any time 'after he has completed twenty five years of service
5. In so far as the second point is concerned we do not find that the impugned action of the respondent No, 1 was mala fide in any respect. It is noteworthy that it is one of the terms and conditions of service of an employee of the bank that he can be retired at any time after he has completed twenty five years of service and if so such action is taken then he will retire on completing 50 years of age. It shall be seen that there is not only no question of mala fide in the action taken to retire an employee after he has completed twenty five years of service but it is a normal term and condition of his service and this action is taken in the interest of the bank. The question of exercise of this power honestly and reasonably does not arise in this respect because such action would tantamount to be a normal practice under the terms and conditions laid down in the rules of service. Even otherwise the petitioner has not in his writ petition alleged any mala tide in the impugned action.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner at the far end of his arguments contended that this provision of the rules was held to be inconsistent against the injunctions of Islam and Sunnah in the judgment of learned Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court reported as PLD 1987 SC 304.
We have very anxiously considered this argument of the learned counsel but we are unable to accept this contention as well for the reason that the aforesaid judgment of the learned Shariat Appellate Bench pertains to the Civil Servants Acts of the Provinces and of the Federal Government only and also that the provision was not found to be inconsistent but it was ordered that if any action is to be taken thereunder then a show-cause notice has first to be served upon the concerned Government servant. Moreover, this judgment will not have retrospective effect for the reason that the learned Shariat Appellate Bench had directed the concerned Governments to amend the laws to provide for the provision of show-cause notice within 6 months from the date of judgment which was 11-3-1987 failing which the said provision shall cease to have legal effect.
However, in the case in hand the impugned action was taken against the petitioner on 14-5-1984.
7. For the aforesaid reasons we have arrived at the conclusion that there is no merit in this writ petition and we would order its dismissal. However, in the circumstances we will make no order as