The relevant facts for the decision of this revision petition are that petitioner No.l filed a suit under Section 9 of Specific Relief Act for possession of the suit property. It was alleged that he has been dispossessed from the property illegally by respondent and 2 others, who contested the suit. The trial Court framed issues, recorded respective evidence of the parties and decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 9-5-1985. The defendant filed a revision petition in the Court of District Judge Muzaffargarh. The same was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 18-1-1988. The defendants thereafter invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court through Writ Petition No.439 of 1988, which was dismissed by my learned brother Mr. Falak Sher J., vide judgment dated 27-6-1988.. The defendants did not pursue the matter any further against the judgment and decree in the suit under Section 9. It is presumably for the reason that in the meanwhile respondent had filed a suit for declaration on 24-1--1988. The main suit was accompanied by petition for grant of temporary injunction. The petitioners resisted the suit as well as application for grant of interim relief but Mr. Jahangir Ali Sheikh, Senior Civil Judge, Muzaffargarh, who basing his decision on the case reported as AIR 1922 Bombay 216 (probably this officer is not aware that it is AIR and not A.R.
Because he has referred to it as A.R. At least at two places in the judgment). The petitioners impugned this order through an appeal in the Court of District Judge, who made over the appeal to Mr. Akhtar Naqi Naqvi, Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh who dismissed. The appeal vide judgment dated 2-10-1988. This way the petitioners were constrained to file the present revision petition, which was admitted to hearing and notices issued to the respondent, who has entered appearance and defended the orders of Courts below.
1 2. Heard the learned counsel for parties. Learned counsel for petitioners has argued that their suit under Section 9 was decreed after obtaining written statement, recording the evidence and hearing arguments. This is not all. The judgment and decree was maintained upto the level of this Court, therefore, there was no justification, whatsoever, to deprive the petitioners of fruits of the decree in his favour. It is argued that grant of injunction amounts to setting aside the decree in favour of the petitioners without any trial. It is maintained that the Courts below miserably failed to justify the issuance of injunction. The learned counsel has particularly referred to following passage of judgment of the lower appellate Court:-- "I find no force in this argument of the appellant's because a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act does not decide the title of a particular party and what is to be decided is whether the plaintiff was in possession of the property immediately before he was dispossessed and that suit is decided without prejudice to the claim of either party regarding title. This is a regular suit in which the respondent has sought declaration of his title. For a prima facie proof, he has produced a copy of registered sale-deed. Admittedly, the respondent is m possession of the suit land. Hence the appellant has not only a prima facie case in his favour, balance of convenience also lies in his favour, hence the learned trial Court committed no illegality in accepting the application of stay."
3. Learned counsel for petitioners thereafter has drawn my attention to the judgment of this Court in the writ petition and particularly concluding para dealing with the alleged sale-deed dated 15- 3-1979 in favour of respondent. The arguments in nutshell was that the document was prima facie forged and fabricated document. The relevant portion of judgment of my learned brother Mr. Falak Sher, J., reads as under:-- "Having dismissed the petition, I am impelled to observe that the matter of registration of the conveyance deed needs thorough examination and scrutiny, inter alia, within the contemplation of the provisions enshrined in the Stamp Act and the Registration Act; pursuance thereto, Registrar/Collector, Muzaffargarh is directed to have a detailed inquiry conducted in the matter and proceeded in accordance with law."
4. It is added that the case now set up by the respondent in his present suit was not precisely his defence in -the suit filed by the petitioner No. 1. It is, therefore, concluded that the defence is an after thought and sale-deed prima facie clearly a forged and fabricated document.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent has argued that since the respondent has filed the suit, therefore, it is in the interest of justice that his possession may not be disturbed in the meanwhile. He has referred to the case of Abdul Aziz v.Mst. Daulat Bibi and 3 others PLD 1973 Lah.125 to argue that there are observations by my learned brother Aftab Hussain, J., in the judgment to the effect that the operation of the decree can be stayed. He has particularly referred to the following passage:- "The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Mari v. Santaya AIR 1922 Born. 216 and a case of Indian jurisdiction, AIR 1955 Tripura 13, for the proposition that a suit for permanent injunction can be filed on the basis of title in a case where a decree under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act has already been passed. These cases are clearly distinguishable as they relate only to the frame of a suit and not to the question of issuance of a temporary injunction."
While the trial Court has referred to the case of Mari alias Linguppa Doddatamma Markundi v.
Santaya Ramkrishna Pai Kolle AIR 1922 Bombay 216 but it is not relevant as it was not a case a/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act.
6. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments of learned counsel for parties. Now I proceed to deal with the same. It is admitted position that the suit of the petitioner under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act was decreed on 8-5-1985 and all efforts of the respondents to get the said judgment and decree set aside did not bear any fruit. Now if the operation of the said judgment and decree is suspended then it will not only deprive the petitioner No.l of the fruits of the decree in his favour but also amount to frustrating the very purpose of enacting Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The object of this Provision is to discourage citizens from taking the law into their own hands, however good their title may be.
6. The matter is all the more serious, if looked from the angle that the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge dated 8-5-1985 was confirmed in the writ petition, therefore, any interference with the same is nothing but amounts to gross contempt of this Court, if not of revisional Court.
7. Now considering the prima facie case, the very fact that this Court has held in writ petition that the findings of two Courts below are rather unexceptionable, was sufficient to hold that the plaintiff has no prima facie case. This is not all. On the other hand, this Court has further held that the sale- deed dated 15-3-1979, alleged basis of the suit, was a document of highly doubtful origin. But the Civil Judge and Additional District Judge in face of these findings have held that this sale-deed proved a prima facie case in favour of plaintiff. The orders of the two Courts cannot be justified. The claim in the suit is not the same as was the defence in the suit by the petitioners. This also makes the sale-deed a doubtful document.
8. The learned counsel has referred to the case of Abdul Aziz v. Mst. Daulat Bibi and 3 others PLD 1973 Lah. 125 but it was clearly held in that case as under:- "Section 9 provides that the decree against trespass can be challenged by a title suit for possession. The Legislature did not confine itself to providing for filing of a title suit but further provided that such title suit would be for possession. It is, therefore, amply clear that while enacting this provision the Legislature had in contemplation that a decree under Section 9 will not be frustrated in any manner and the trespasser shall be dispossessed."
While in the case of Dhuronidhur Sen v. Agra Bank (1978) 4 Cal. 380), it was held:- "but for one Judge to issue an injunction against a decree-holder to restrain him from executing the decree of another judge exercising co--ordinate jurisdiction, upon the ground that the proceedings by which the decree was obtained were altogether illegal, is as far as I am aware, a proceeding entirely without precedent and one which seems to me very dangerous to introduce. It has already been found difficult enough to bring litigation in this country to a termination, and if we were to grant this injunction, I am very much afraid that advantage would be taken of the precedent to prolong litigation very much further."
The respondent could only defend his title but not possession in the face of decree in favour of petitioner No.l. Both the Courts below have no jurisdiction to set aside the decree passed by Civil Court, the Court of equal jurisdiction and confirmed by the revisional Court. Moreso when the same has, also, been upheld by this Court in Constitutional jurisdiction.
9. The relief of injunction should have been disallowed to the respondent No.l because he has not come with clean hands in view of the findings of the trial Court and confirmed by the District Judge and this Court, that he obtained the possession of the suit property illegally. Now to allow him injunction is to pay him premium for his own illegal acts. As I understand this is not purpose of the law rather in such cases injunction has to be refused. This is not all. The plaintiff continuously defied the decree by resorting litigation in different forums. The decree was not passed for decoration purpose or for mental satisfaction of the decree-holder. The object was to discourage and to deal with a strong hand the parties resorting to illegal action and brutal force rather seeking their remedy under law but these two officials have not only frustrated the purpose of law but also helped the persons guilty of unlawful and illegal activities.
10. The result is that I allow this petition, with costs, set aside the orders of the Courts below and dismiss the application of temporary injunction filed by the petitioners.