This writ petition has been filed to call in question the revisional order of the Collector/Deputy Commissioner, Lahore dismissing the petitioner-husband's revision under section 9(2) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, as time---barred.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner's wife Yasmin (respondent No. 1) moved an application before the Chairman, Arbitration Council, Pir Makki Lahore for grant of maintenance under section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, in August, 1982. The petitioner was proceeded ex parte as he was held to be in default despite service through citation in the newspaper, vide order, dated 18-3-1984. Thereafter, the Arbitration Council allowed maintenance in favour of the respondent-wife by order, dated 10-4-1984.
3. The petitioner-husband filed a revision petition before the Collector/Deputy Commissioner, Lahore on 18-9-1984 and with this also filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay in filing the revision petition. This revision petition was dismissed for default in appearance by order, dated 3-12-1985. The learned revisional authority observed that the counsel for the petitioner was present in the morning but thereafter he disappeared. The petitioner was absent whereas the counsel for the respondent-- wife was present.
4. The petitioner thereafter on 11-1-1986 filed an application for restoration of the revision petition.
This application was again dismissed on 3-6-1986 for default in appearance by the learned Collector, Lahore district, Lahore. The revisional authority took the view that the revision petition was dismissed on 3-12-1985 while the application for restoration was filed on 11-1-1986. There was no cogent ground available in the application for allowing restoration. The application was, therefore, rejected.
5. The learned counsel appearing in support of the writ petition contended that the proceedings against the petitioner were ex parte before the Arbitration Council and, therefore, he was condemned unheard. It is however, not denied that the petitioner was served through citation in the newspaper which amounts to substituted service and has been held to be as good a service as by any other mode.
6. The learned counsel next wished to argue the matter on merits in so far as the quantum of maintenance amount was allowed. I am afraid, it will not be possible to go into this question for the simple reason that the final order in the field is that of the revisional authority. The revision petition of the petitioner was time-barred and the same was dismissed for default in appearance.
Thereafter an application was submitted for restoration of the revision petition which again dismissed for default in appearance of the petitioner or his learned counsel. The revisional authority has found no cogent ground for allowing restoration. The application was accordingly dismissed. I must observe that in the course of the proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution this Court is primarily to be concerned with the lawful authority of the person passing the impugned order. There can be no denial of the fact that the learned District Collector was possessed of the authority to dispose of the revision petition and same was the position of the Arbitration Council. The proceedings before the authorities below, therefore, were not coram non judice.
7. The conduct of the petitioner throughout shows negligence and, therefore, in exercise of the High Court's discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction he cannot, as a matter of right, ask for interference when no satisfactory explanation has been offered before the tribunals below or before this Court.
It is by now well-settled that the conduct of a petitioner in writ jurisdiction constitutes a valid ground for refusing discretionary relief if he is found guilty of gross negligence, unclean conduct or sharp practice, etc.
8. In the circumstances of the case I find no merit in the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs.