MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-The dispute in this petition for special leave concerns property bearing S. No. 390-C, measuring about 19 marlas 2 sarsai situate in Mohallah Jhaggi, Rawalpindi City. By Deputy Settlement Commis--sioner's order dated 20-j-1962, this property was transferred as "building site" under Scheme VI to the petitioners both of whom are non-claimants. Earlier, on 11-5-1960, one Hussain Muhammad a claimant and predecessor---in-interest of respondents 1 to 3, was transferred under Scheme No. 1, the adjoining residential property bearing S. No. R/300. Both these properties belonged to the same evacuee owner and a dispute arose as to the demar--cation of their boundaries. Husain Muhammad claimed that what has been transferred to the petitioner purporting to be "building site" under Scheme VI, was in fact courtyard appurtenant to the house transferred to him. On a miscellaneous application the matter was taken to the additional Settlement Commissioner, who vide order dated 1-4-1964 remitted the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner "to sort it out" and give his findings "on the points in issue" leaving the aggrieved party to seek redress by appeal or revision as the case may be. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner after inquiring into the matter came to the conclusion that R/300 and R/300-C were two distinct properties, though belonging to the same evacuee owner and were therefore, rightly transferred to Husain Muhammad and the petitioners respectively. This order in dated 28-91964.
2. Hussain Muhammad filed an appeal against the above order before Additional Settlement Commissioner. One Mst. Badar-ud-Duja auction-- purchaser of another adjoining residential property bearing S. No. R/294 (though not a party to the earlier proceedings before the D. S. C.) also filed an appeal alleging that R/300 and R/300-C were integral part of the house transferred to her by auction sale. Both these appeals were disposed of by the Additional Settlement Commissioner by a single order dated 13-1-1968. It was held by him that property R/300 was "part and percel" of house No. R/294 which measured about 8 marlas in areas. He got a plan prepared on which the property transferred in favour of Mst. Badar-ud---Duja was marked as ABCFF and LAMNO, A copy of this plan is Annexure `H' on this file. The result was that a substantial portion of what was transferred as residential property R/300 to Husain Muhammad was found to be part of property R/294. On the basis of this finding, it was also held that the transfer of portion FCHIKLMNO purporting to be part of house No. R/300 "was not correct" and accordingly its transfer in favour of Husain Muhammad was cancelled. To this extent the appeal filed by Mst. Badarud Duja was accepted. Her claim, however, to any portion of what was transferred as building site R/300-C and delineated as OPQR in the plan Annex. `H' was found "not justified" and therefore his claim negatived with regard thereto.
3. As regards to the remainder portion of properties S. Nos. R/300 and R/300-C, the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner directed as follows:--- "Property No. H/300 is occupied by Hussain Muhammad and Abdul Karim and both applied for its transfer under Nos. R/300 and R/300-C. Their applications were not considered simultaneously as a result of which two separate transfer orders were passed in respect of one and the same property.
In these circumstances both the orders passed in favour of Husain Muhammad and Abdul Karim are set aside and the case of property No. R/300 is remanded to the learned Dy. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi for fresh decision after hearing both the parties i. e. Husain Muhammad and Abdul Karim."
4. Against the above order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, three revisions, one each by each set of contestants, namely, Mst. Badar-ud-- Duja; petitioners herein, and Husain Muhammad were filed. These revisions were dismissed by the learned Settlement Commissioner by order dated 19-4-68. He concurred with the various findings of fact reached by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. It is important to point out that the above direction by the Additional Settlement Commissioner for a de novo consideration of the respective claims of the petitioners herein and Husain Muhammad for the transfer of properties S. Nos. R/300 and R/300-C in the absence of any further challenge before a higher forum, be-- came final. With this ended the first round of litigation between the parties.
5. On remand, the matter was examined by another Deputy Settlement Commissioner, who after inspection of the spot and examination of the relevant record came to the conclusion that although the two petitioners herein had raised some kucha construction on the plot, but that was done after the deci--sion of the learned Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and (that) the construction raised much after the year 1959 does not fall within the meaning of Settlement Scheme VI". As a result, the petitioners were found ineligible for the transfer of R/300-C under Scheme VI. It seems that before the Deputy Settlement, Commissioner the petitioners also claimed in the alternative the transfer of the property S. No. R/300-C under Scheme VIII which had come into force in the meantime. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, declined to consider the petitioners' claim on the alternative basis because he felt that the scope of his inquiry was confined to direction in the remand order by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. Accordingly, he ordered the transfer of property R/300-C to the heirs of Husain Muhammad (who had died in the meantime) on the basis of CH form filed by him. This was, however, subject to the rider that the heirs of Husain Muhammad will be entitled to three times the plinth area and on payment of the additional price for the remainder open land under rules bearing on the subject. The order of the Deputy Settlement Com--missioner is dated the 13th October 1979.
6. Each set of contestants before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner appealed against his order to the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The learned Additional Settlement Commissioner also inspected the spot and generally concurred with the conclusions reached by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that there was only "a sort" of kucha construction . . . . . . . . . . Raised after the year 1959 over property R/300-C, and that, therefore, the petitioners were not eligible for the transfer under Scheme VI. The learned Additional Settlement Commissioner also found the appeal filed by the heirs of Husain Muhammad as barred by limitation but they had not applied for condonation of delay. Accord--ingly, both the appeals were dismissed by order dated 7-9-1971.
7. Against the above order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, each party filed a revision which too, were dismissed by the Settlement Commissioner, vide his order dated 9-6-1972. The learned Settlement Commissioner also maintained the findings relating to the temporary character of the construction over Plot S. No. R/300-C and further that it was raised after the remand order by the Additional Settlement Commissioner in the first round of litigation.
8. Having exhausted their remedies on the Settlement side the petitioner called in question the last mentioned order by the learned Settlement Com--missioner, by Writ Petition No. 684/R of 1972, which was dismissed in limine by a learned single Judge by order dated 14-11-1972.
9. The petitioners new seek leave to appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge. Their learned counsel has assailed the findings reached in the two rounds of litigation before the Settlement Authorities and also upheld by the learned single Judge. On the basis of this Court's Judgment in .The case of Mahmuda Tehsin (PLD1965S C657), it was contended that the Settlement Authori--ties had wrongly applied the definition of "permanent building" in Scheme VI to non-suit the petitioners in regard to their claim for the transfer of property No. R/300-C under Scheme VI. It was held by this Court in the precedent case that the expression "permanent building" as used in paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Act LXVIII of 1958 must be under--stood in its ordinary grammatical meaning, and that the attempt made to -restrict its meaning by defining it in paragraph 1(3) of Chapter 1 in Scheme VI was ultra vires paragraph 13 of the Schedule. In the instant case, however, it has been found at various levels by the Settlement Authorities in the two contested rounds of litigation between the parties that the construction raised over the site in dispute was subsequent to 1959, and that the nature of construction by any standard was temporary and not at all permanent, even judged in the ordinary sense of the expression. This being finding of fact cannot be assailed either in writ jurisdiction .And much less in this Court in special appellate jurisdiction.
10. There is no force in this petition which is hereby dismissed.