The facts which have given rise this application, as stated by the apple--cant in his petition, are that on the 21st of January 1973 respondent No. 2. Who is the Game Warden appointed under, -the Sind Wildlife Protection Ordinance, 1972 (Sind Ordinance No. V of 1972) fined the petitioner a sum of Rs. 2,000 and, although there is no order that he should be so fined, there is however a receipt for this amount, signed by respondent No. 2. It is the case of the applicant, and indeed I don't think that the point is really capable of any dispute, that no fine or other punishment can be imposed except by a Court. Under section 5(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code all offences under any law other than the Pakistan Penal Code, are to be enquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with according to the Criminal Procedure Code but "subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiry into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences". There is, admittedly, in the Ordinance no such pro--vision as would entrust the trial of the offences to any person who is not a Court within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed section 30(2) of the Ordinance makes this expressly clear when it says: "(2) No Court inferior to that of a Magistrate of the first class or a. Mobile Court of a special Magistrate set up under this Ordinance shall take cognizance of an offence under this Ordinance."
Whether or not the action of respondent No. 2 was therefore legal the obvious question immediately arose whether an application under section 439, of the Criminal Procedure Code, which the petitioner moved, was maintain--able and the office raised this objection and learned counsel's reply was that since the Code of Criminal Procedure applied therefore it bad to be followed by respondent No. 2 who was a Game Warden. The learned Single Judge, before whom this case then was, was of the view that, nevertheless, even assuming that what learned counsel contended was correct, the remedy to-- the petitioner might be by way of an appeal but not by means of a revision application upon which learned counsel for the petitioner took up the position that the Game Warden was not a Magistrate at all. It naturally then followed that the Code of Criminal Procedure would not apply so as to give a right of appeal and the learned Judge pointed out this to learned counsel who asked for time to study the position. When the matter, next came up before the same learned Judge, learned counsel pointed out that the Game Warden was authorised to compound certain matters under section 3Y of the Ordinance but in that case the maximum money that he --could accept by way of compensation was Rs. 500 as is laid down in section 33 of the Ordinance. He therefore asked that the application be treated as one under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and, this prayer being allowed, the matter has now come up before me for final hearing.
2. The main contentions that the learned counsel has made before me in regard to the merits of the case are first that the Game Warden could, not be regarded as a Court and that therefore his action is entirely illegal. Indeed he did say that his order and the conviction of the applicant is illegal but I hesitate to use these expressions because I am unable to see either an order for a conviction in this case. On the facts, as they are put by learned counsel, however, though it is only fair to say that respondent No. 2 was present in person and wished to give a somewhat different version of the facts which would possibly make his action legal. I am fully in agreement with learned counsel that the action was wrong. As I have said before the money which the respondent No. 2 could accept as compensation could not exceed 500 rupees and, if he is to be regarded as a Court, then the penalties which are provided by section 28 of the-- Ordinance, though they extend even to imprisonment, are limited, so far as fine is concerned, to a maximum of only 1,000 rupees which he clearly exceeded in the present case.
3. Nevertheless I am wholly unable to see how I can allow this application or interfere with the order in the exercise either of revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the in here powers of this Court preserved by section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel conceded that section 439 would not apply but vehemently argued that under section 561-A I was authorised to pass any order that would be conductive to justice provided that it was in some manner connected with the investigation into or trial of a penal law. I regret my entire inability to take so large a view of the powers conferred by section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. That provision reads-- thus: -- "561-A. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the' inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends, of Justice."
Now it is to be observed, in the first place, that in itself the provision does not purport to confer any power upon the High Court but merely preserves the inherent power of the High Court which, the section assumes, already vests in that Court. But more important is the fact that the power preserved is only "to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or other--wise secure the ends of justice".
Obviously the present is not a case of giving any effect to any order already made under this Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court, and the petitioner's case must come, if at all, under the last clause which is for the purpose of securing the ends of justice. A power so widely put must, I think, be interpreted in the context of the Code in which it finds place. This, I think, must have relation to some proceedings in the Court itself or in one of the Courts subordinate thereto and I am entirely unable to agree that in any and every matter in which it appears to High Courts that injustice is being committed section 561-A will authorise the High Court to pass order if it is otherwise not competent to do. It cannot for example, acting, I think, under this section interfere in purely civil disputes:
4. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on a case reported as G. Kanhai Sharma v. Muhammad Abdul Lalif (AIR 1963 Manipur 49). It is true that the proceedings which were quashed in this case were not the proceedings of a criminal Court but the distinguishing feature, and I venture to think the; conclusive distinguishing feature, of the case was that the Court which was a revenue Court was acting under section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when that fact is kept in mind it is quite easy to understand and to agree with the following observations upon which the reliance was placed before me: --- "(6) For the respondent certain decisions were cited to show that section 439, Cr. P. C. Dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of this Court will not apply to the present proceedings and that therefore this Court cannot act in the exercise of such revisional jurisdiction in dealing with this matter. But the petitioner has not invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The application has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and section 561-A, Cr. P. C. Article 227 of the Constitution which gives to this Court the power of Superintendence over all Courts and tribunals within its jurisdic-- petition will certainly apply in this case and if it is found that any Court or tribunal seeks to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, the High Court has the power to interfere. I think even section 561-A, Cr. P. C. Will apply in the present case.
Section 561-A does not limit the inherent power of the High Court to interfere with the orders only in criminal cases. It says that the High Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Cr. P. C. Or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. Where, therefore, a Revenue Court seeks to hold an enquiry under section 476, Cr. P. C. Which it has no jurisdiction to do, the High Court certainly has the power of interference with such an order under section 561-A, Cr. P. C. It is clearly necessary that the S. D. C. Should not be allowed to hold the enquiry which he has no jurisdiction to entertain. Further the matter of the genuineness or otherwise of the document in question is being decided in proceedings in the civil Courts. The stage to hold pro--ceedings under section 476, Cr. P. C. Will be after the civil Court has adjudicated on the genuinen2ness of the document in question. The order of the S. D. C. Dated 6-9-1961 is, therefore, set aside and the proceedings under section 476, Cr. P. C., pending before the S. D. C. Are quashed."
I do not think therefore that this case has ^ny relevance or advances the case of the applicant before me.
5. Respondent No. 2 before me was anxious to explain the position and wanted to show that the sum of Rs. 2,000 that he had collected was not merely for one act committed by the petitioner himself but also one each by several of his companions. This may or may not be true but in view of the conclusions that I have reached, I find no necessity to enter into an examination of this question. Howsoever the question is looked at, I can find no merit in this application, which I dismiss.
S. A. H.