Called. No one appears on either side.
2. This happens to be a request made by Mr. Jacob Issac, District Judge, Vehari in his Memo.No,33/Ahlmad, dated 12-12-1988 addressed to the Registrar of this Court, for transfer of a civil suit, brought by some Muhammad Ismail and others for specific performance of agreement, pending in the Court of Mr. Abdul Karim Langah, a Civil Judge 1st Class at Vehari.
3. All that this letter conveys is that in consequence of issuance of Notification No,312-88/G-33/241, R&G-SI, dated 17-2-1988, file of the above-referred suit sent by him to the District Judge, Sahiwal 'for disposal' has been declined by him to be taken without an order of transfer passed by this Court. It is thereupon that the District Judge at Vehari has come to the belief that this Court may have to pass an order of transfer on the basis of his request which, in his own words, is reproduced hereunder:- "(2) It is, therefore, requested that the above-noted case may kindly be withdrawn from the Civil Court of this District and transferred to the District and Sessions Judge, Sahiwal for disposal as the case pertains to Revenue Estate which has been re-attached to Sahiwal District.
(3) The file of the case is submitted herewith."
4. His request for transfer of suit is only ill-conceived and is not sustainable on the premise in his view. Facts and circumstances of the case will be adverted to in the sequel but it seems necessary to first attend to some aspects of its form.
' It is incontrovertible that one District Judge cannot accept a case directly from another without an appropriate order passed by the High Court to whom both may be subordinate. Learned District Judge at Sahiwal has rightly refused to accept the case and the reason stated by him in that behalf, unexceptionable as it is, could not, by any stretch, have been taken either to be an advice to the Judge at Vehari to make a move for transfer or even a suggestion that this Court may pass a desired order of transfer at the initiative of a District Judge.
' It is highly deplorable that the District Judge at Vehari has set out to execute his unilateral contemplation for securing transfer of suit without either caring to apprise himself as to which may be the Court having the power under the law to try the relevant suit or what may be the powers of the respective District Judges in such C a situation and how may this Court have to be moved. His ignorance has only added to the disappointments leading to the passing of judgments in Abdul Raheem v. Noor Khan PLD 1987 Lah. 558 and Muhammad Saleem and 13 others v. Cooperative Farming Society Ltd. And 3 others PLD 1987 Lah.510 which he does not seem to have cared to even go through. For his own advantage he may now read them.
' Ordinarily, one mistake committed, whether innocently or ignorantly, has to suffice for providing an experience of lifetime and the return received from Sahiwal ought to have given rise to a curiosity in the mind of the District Judge at Vehari to apprise himself of the law to be able to know where, if at all, lay the wrong and how may he have proceeded in the matter but he did not act any wisely in setting out to add so much thereto by moving this Court without realising even his own limitations. Real difficulty is that instead of taking pains to acquaint themselves of the law, the subordinate Judges have somehow come to believe that the High Court can be used by them as a kind of ready-referencer and they set out to forward their problems without first making efforts of their own to find their solutions or even concerning themselves with the legal norms and forms. The Code of Civil Procedure contains elaborate provisions with regard to civil jurisdiction exercisable by different Courts and whereas the appellate and revisional powers of this Court get attracted only to those cases which have been decided below, those exercisable by it in pending cases are to be found detailed in section 113 thereof; but, as regards transfer from one Court to another of the cases pending below, sections 24 and 150, C.P.C. Alone are in point whereof the last mentioned section visualizes transfer of business of a subordinate Court, which situation may arise upon a Court ceasing to exist or being abolished to be replaced by another one either wholly or in part in consequence of change of the limits of its territorial jurisdiction or otherwise in the process of law; giving rise to a variety of situations in all of which it is the business in bulk of the former Court which becomes liable to be transferred to the successor Court but the matter of transfer of individual cases will fall only under section 24 which can either be invoked by a party to the relevant case or may be resorted to by this Court of its own motion. Why then may a District Judge have to take upon himself the liability of a party to initiate for transfer of a case an, that too by means of a casually drawn-up letter addressed to the Registrar? A subordinate Judge is not authorised to, on his own, send over to this Court the file of any pending case and in situations of difficulty arising in pending cases only properly drawn up references under section 113 of the C.P.C. Read with Order XLVI, Rule 1 thereof can be made so that the mere sending up of the files of pending cases with the letters addressed to the Registrar of this Court, by even leaving the facts to be ascertained by it just on its own, does not happen to be within the contemplation of any law. By way of precedent, mention seems appropriate to be made here of a somewhat similar request for transfer out of District of a suit pending before a Civil Judge, sent up to this Court by Mr. Abdul Majid Tiwana, District Judge, Toba Tek Singh (As his Lordship then was) in a letter addressed to the Registrar in the course of his dealing with an application of a party for transfer of the said suit, the files whereof had also been sent by him. His letter was registered in the office as Civil Reference No,2/ C of 1984.
He was called upon to "establish in writing the propriety of his act, indicating also the provision of law whereunder he had sent up to the High Court a matter pending on his own file." Such type of a reference was held incompetent and was declined by the order dated 23-12-1985 reproduced hereunder:-- "Report of the learned District Judge, Toba Tek Singh has been perused. While conceding that there is no direct provision in the law to authorise him to send up to this Court the transfer application pending in his Court, he has referred to Section 151 of the C.P.C. Which, in his view, is a "residuary provision" of law and "confers" inherent powers on Courts. Therein he has misunderstood the section which provides:- 'Nothing in this Code shall he deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court'.
' Clearly enough, it contemplates a pre-existing power in the Court which it declares to have been left unaffected by the C.P.C. It is not a residuary provision but is a saving clause and does not even purport to confer any new power on any Court. Since an inferior Court has never enjoyed a power to transfer proceedings from its file to a higher Court, therefore, this section cannot be invoked to spell out that such a power may have been conferred by it. Moreover, such a practice cannot be countenanced for the reason that it will open up a flood-gate for the subordinate Courts to transfer their pending files to the superior Courts."
' The exercise of entering up a reference under the C.P.C. Excludes the possibility of the High Court being used a ready-at-hand type of source or a kind of 'get-through guide' for conveniently obtaining accurate solutions. Scheme of the law envisages that Judges below may first make their own efforts to find solutions to their problems and then they may refer the precise points of genuine difficulty for opinion of this Court by also stating their own views about the matter in doubt.
If this provision is truly followed in its letter and spirit then there will scarcely be an occasion for some point having to be got resolved from the High Court. It is essential that subordinate Judges may themselves grapple with their problems and be not enabled to shirk their responsibilities by leaving their work to be done by this Court on the basis merely of their letters sent here in utter disregard of the law. This already over- burdened Court can ill-afford to cater for such question-answer enterprises and hence this practice of entertaining irregularly sent up requests should be forthwith discontinued.
' Letter of District Judge, Vehari was incapable of soliciting any action and was liable to be simply returned as being aimless but the office seems to have entertained it as a transfer application on the basis of what clearly happens to be an ultra vires Office Order issued by the then Registrar of this Court on 9-12-1944 as bearing No,231/IX-D-6, whereunder, in utter disregard of the law explained above, he required the Gazette Branch of this Court to entertain letters containing requests for transfer of civil or criminal cases received from District Judges or other judicial or executive officers "for being forwarded to the concerned miscellaneous branch on the civil or criminal side for further action as in judicial cases". It could not be the contemplation that District Judges may resort to this facility without regard either to the exigencies of the matter or even to the legal requirements of their objectives. Since orders of the Registrar continue to be binding on the officials of this Court until they are rescinded, therefore, they cannot have much erred in entertaining this letter on the basis of that Office Order which deserves to be treated as obsolete in the light of experience inasmuch as it has opened up a 'pupil-teacher' type of channel for the subordinate Judges. However laudible an object may have led to the issuance of this Office Order, it will be forthwith stopped to be honoured so that a habit may be enabled to be developed in the Judges of the subordinate judiciary to themselves find their way to the problems because they have to shoulder greater responsibilities in the future. They may, if it be so essential, proceed in the manner laid down under section 113 and Order XLVI of the C.P.C. Instead of sending up queries to this Court by means merely of letters addressed to the Registrar, a course provided by the aforementioned Office Order.
7. Now coming to the facts forming the basis of the request of the Vehari Judge for transfer of the suit to Sahiwal. The land in dispute in that suit is situated in Chak No,81/12-L, of Tehsil Chichawatni which fell in District Sahiwal. By virtue of Notification No,24087/144-R&G,S.I. Issued by the Government of Punjab on 10-2-1987, this village was detached from District Sahiwal and assigned to a newly-created District of Vehari. It so happened that almost a year later, the above Notification was rescinded on 17-2-1988 by means of Notification No,312-88/G-33/241-R&G.S.I. The relevant suit was instituted on 13-7-1987, during the interregnum of the two Notifications and with the land in suit being assigned back to the District of Sahiwal, the District Judge at Vehari seems to have been led to think that the suit with regard to such land should also be processed there but why and under which law may he have entertained such a belief, has been left by him to be only imagined.
8. Section 16 of the C.P.C. Makes provision for suits relating to immovable property and the forum for such suits is provided to be the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate. Since, on the day of filing of the suit (13-7-1987) land forming subject-matter thereof was situated in the District of Vehari, therefore, the suit was rightly maintained in the Civil Court at Vehari and competently entertained there. Where a Court lawfully acquires seizin of a litigation it would not be taken to be deprived of the jurisdiction thereabout merely upon the relevant property going out of the territorial limits of its authority during the pendency of the case. There are volumes of case-law available on the point, dealing with a variety of situations of alteration of limits of jurisdiction of Courts but reference only to the following cases will suffice for the purposes hereof because they deal with the situations bearing close similarity to the one in hand.
' In Chokkalinga Pillay v. Velayudha Mudaliar and others AIR 1925 Madras 117, it was held:-- "The jurisdiction of a Court consists in its power to entertain suits, and when once a suit has been properly entertained, the jurisdiction is not removed unless it is specifically so done by the order of a competent authority. Once the suit has been entertained, the remaining proceedings taken therein are not taken by reason of any particular territorial jurisdiction, but in the exercise of the powers vested in the Court to try suits generally and consequently the only time at which the territorial jurisdiction comes into operation is at the time of filing the suit. Once the Court has seizin of the case it has jurisdiction to try it to its conclusion, unless there is any reason for holding that that jurisdiction has been removed, though the subject-matter of the suit may be transferred to another Court in the meanwhile."
' Again, in Subramanya Ayyar v.Swaminatha Chettiar and another AIR 1928 Madras 746 it was laid down that:- "A Court, where a suit was originally rightly instituted, continues to have jurisdiction over the suit even if the place where the cause of action arises ceases to be situate within its jurisdiction." ' and, on the basis of a number of other decided cases, it was further held:-- "The Court which tried the suit and passed the decree does not lose its jurisdiction to execute the decree even though it has lost territorial jurisdiction over the property."
' Last mentioned view taken in the above case with regard to execution of decree was even reiterated by another Division Bench of the same Court in Venkamamidi Balakrishnayya v.
Nannapaneni Linga Rao AIR 1943 Madras 449 and was approved also in Merla Ramanna v.Nallaparaju and others PLD 1956 Supreme Court (Ind.) 220 by affirming the earlier Full Bench judgments which had been relied upon therein.
' To the same effect is also the view taken by the Chief Court of Nagpur in Makhanlal Lolaram and others v. Pancham Lal Sheoprasad AIR 1933 Nagpur 318 to lay down as under:- 11 unless pending cases are expressly transferred by the notification effecting a change in the territorial jurisdiction of a Court or unless there is a specified provision in any enactment to the same effect, the Court in which the suit or appeal was instituted does not cease to have jurisdiction to decide the matter despite the change in its territorial jurisdiction."
9. Foregoing should suffice for dispelling any doubt which may have been lurking in the mind of the District Judge at Vehari who, I am sure, could have easily laid his hand upon these cases, if he may ever have intended to do so. Thereupon the frail conceptual urge for plea of transfer should vanish.
10. Result of the foregoing is that request of the District Judge has no justification in law and is turned down as also being incompetent.