1. ' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.--This petition is detected against the orders dated 13-10-1981 and 23-2-1982 passed by the respondent No, 2 and respondent No, 1 respectively. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that the petitioner was appointed as an Attendant-cum-Security Guard on or about 26-2-1977 by the respondent No, 3 on the terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment dated 16th February, 1977. Para. 10 of the above appointment letter reads as follows:-- "In all other respects his services will be governed by the terms and conditions of service contained in West' Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1972 and rules made from time to time by the Pakistan Institute of Management, I.B.M."
2. ' It seems that the petitioner was charge-sheeted for the alleged misconduct on 14-4-1981 under the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
3. Ordinance 1968, hereinafter referred to as the Standing Orders. After that he was dismissed by an order dated 26-4-1981 under the Standing Orders. The petitioner after serving a grievance notice filed an application under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Which was resisted by the respondent No, 3, inter alia, on the ground that it was not covered by the provisions of the Standing Orders. The above objection prevailed and the respondent No, 2 vide its order dated 13-10-1981 dismissed the above application. The petitioner being aggrieved by the above order filed an appeal which was dismissed by the respondent No, 1 vide its order dated 23-2-1982. The petitioner being aggrieved by the above two orders has filed the present petition.
4. ' In support of the above petition Mr. Ali Amjad learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that since the petitioner was appointed on third terms and conditions which contained a condition that the petitioner would be subject to the provisions of Standing Orders and that the respondent No, 3 after having dismissed the petitioner under the Standing Orders was estopped from raising the plea that the provisions of the Standing Orders were not applicable to him. In the alternative, the submission was that in any case the burden was on the respondent No, 3 to have proved through some evidence on record that the provisions of the Standing Orders were not applicable and since no evidence was produced, the learned two Courts below were not justified in holding that the provisions of Standing Orders were not applicable to the respondent No, 3.
5. ' On the other hand Mr. A. Hafiz, learned counsel for the respondent No, 3 has submitted that the mere fact that in terms of the appointment letter, it was provided that the petitioner would be governed by the provisions of the Standing Orders or the factum that the charge-sheet was issued and the petitioner was dismissed under the provisions of the Standing Orders would not constitute an estoppel against the above respondent as there cannot be any estoppel against law. He has further submitted that the petitioner was given ample opportunity by the Labour Court to bring any material to indicate that any activity resulting in profit was carried on in respondent No, 3's establishment which he failed to bring and, therefore, the learned Labour Court on the basis of an earlier case decided by it against the respondent No, 3 in relation to another employee was justified in holding that the provisions of the Standing Orders were not applicable.
6. It may be pertinent to observe that it is a well-settled principle of law that there cannot be any estoppel against law. In the instant case if the provisions of the Standing Orders were made applicable as a part of the terms of the contract and if any one of them has been breached by respondent No, 3, it may constitute a breach of contract entitling the petitioner to claim damages.
7. However, question which needs consideration is, whether they can be applied with statutory hacking though the definitions of the commercial establishment and the industrial establishment given in the Standing Orders do not cover the establishment of respondent No,
3. Mr. Ali Amjad has submitted that the fact that under the terms of the appointment letter the provisions of Standing Orders were made applicable, they could be enforced by the petitioner. In support of the submission he has relied upon the case of the Evacuee Trust Property Board and another v.
8. Muhammad Nawaz reported in 1983 SCMR 1275, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, wherein it was held that the adoption of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 by the Evacuee Trust Property Board entitled an employee to enforce the same. It may be observed that in the above case a suit was filed and in the suit it was held that the breach of the above rules entitled the employee to file a suit. The appeal filed in the High Court was dismissed. After that petition for leave was also dismissed. While dismissing the above petition for leave the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that the pleasure of master to dismiss his servant stood surrendered to the extent the matter was covered by the relevant rules. In our view, the above case can be distinguished inasmuch as in the above case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was hearing a petition for leave against two judgments given by the Courts below holding that the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 could be enforced by an employee of the Evacuee Trust Property Board, whereas in the present case two competent forums have taken the view that the provisions of the Standing Orders are not applicable to the respondent No, 3, and that the petitioner had come in writ petition to challenge the above concurrent finding of the above two forums. Unless we find that the above view is in violation of some provision of law, the mere fact that it may be erroneous would not warrant interference in the Constitutional jurisdiction. On the contrary, there is a direct judgment of the full Court of the Supreme Court in the case of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, West Pakistan, Lahore v. Managing Committee, The Pakistan Co-operative Bank Ltd., Pakistan reported in PLD 1962 SC 315, in which the Co-operative Bank adopted the civil service rules for dealing with misconduct of its employee. It was contended that because of the above adoption of the rules by the Co-operative Bank they had statutory force entitling the person to invoke the same through a writ petition. The above contention was repRclled. The above Supreme Court case of the Full Bench has not been referred to in the above order of the two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the above case of Evacuee Trust Property Board in which the leave was declined.
9. ' Mr. Ali Amjad also relied upon a case of Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association v.
10. State of Bombay and others reported in 1961 PLC 567. In the above case the Indian Supreme Court while construing the term "industry" employed in section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) held that the research institute established for advancement of the industry was an industry within the ambit of the above provisions of the said Act. The above case is also distinguishable as it has been clearly pointed out in the body of the judgment in the said case that the research institute in fact contributes towards better production because of its research work. In the present case it is an admitted position that the respondent No, 3 imparts training to employees of its members without any profit basis.
11. ' Then it was contended by Mr. Ali Amjad that factually the respondent No, 3 is covered by the definition of commercial establishment given in clause (b) of section 2 of the Standing Orders Ordinance as third respondent No, 3 can be treated as a Club. It will suffice to observe that since the definition of the word "club" has not been given in the Standing Orders, we will have to construe the above word in its ordinary literal meaning, which does not admit the inclusion of a training or educational institute like one in issue. The term club connotes the place, where its members enjoy recreation facilities.
12. The last submission of Mr. Ali Amjad was that in order to decide, whether an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, (hereinafter referred to as the I.R.O.) is maintainable definitions of workman and establishment given in the I.R.O. Are to be pressed into service and not the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance. In this regard, it may be observed that an application under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Is competent only when a workman files an application for enforcement of any right guaranteed/secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being enforced. In the instant case, if we are to hold that the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance are not applicable the petitioner cannot urge that he was enforcing any right guaranteed in terms of above section 25-A of the I.R.O.
13. ' The petition has, therefore, no merits and it is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.