DECISION ' I propose to dispose of these twelve appeals by this single decision as they all have been preferred against the order dated 3-2-1988 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No, VI at HyderAbad, whereby the learned Judge dismissed the twelve grievance petitions filed by the twelve appellants by a single order.
2. The admitted facts of the case are that the appellants entered into contract of apprenticeship with respondents. Original contract was for three years duration on the terms and conditions mentioned in the written contract which was executed by each appellant separately with the respondents. The services of the appellants were, terminated on 14-5-1987 after six months of the expiry of the original contract of the apprenticeship. The appellants claimed that after termination of period of apprenticeship they worked for six months as workmen against permanent job and as such they would be deemed to be permanent workmen and their services could not be terminated on the ground that their period of apprenticeship had expired. After serving grievance notice they filed 'grievance petitions before the learned Labour Court. The Despondent resisted the applications on the ground that the appellants were not permanent workmen and that their period of apprenticeship had expired and that they were removed from service after expiry of the period of apprenticeship.
3. I have heard Mr. Ali Amjad, learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani, representative for the respondents.
4. As pointed out above the facts of the case are not disputed. Admittedly appellants were apprentices upto 14-11-1986 under the contract of apprenticeship. Admittedly the services of the appellants were terminated on 14-5-1987 on the ground that their period of apprenticeship had expired. The question that requires consideration is as to whether by working for six months after expiry of the period of original contract of apprenticeship they had become permanent workers as claimed by the appellants or they still continued to apprentice as alleged by the respondents.
5. The respondents have produced a letter Exh. R/6, dated 15-11-1986 whereby Manager of the Administration of the respondents moved the Deputy Director. Regional Directorate of Apprenticeship Training, Government of Sind to extend the duration of the 23 apprentices, including the present appellants Under letter dated 11-2-1986 which is Exh. R/7, the Director of Manpower and Training Sind extended the period of apprenticeship by three months uptil 15-2-1987. Under Exh.
R/8, dated 7-2-1987, the period of apprenticeship was further extended up to 15-5-1987 though under Exh.R/6 extension was approved by competent authority up to 15-2-1987 only. Exh. R/9 is a letter dated 15-2-1987, written by the Manager Administration of the respondents to the Assistant Director, Apprenticeship Directorate, Government of Sind in which reference is made to their letter dated 7-2-1987 and approval was sought for training of 23 apprentices. By his letter dated 16-9- 1987 Exh. R/11, the Director Manpower extended the period of apprenticeship by three months upto 15-5-1987.
6. While appreciating the pleas of both the parties it is necessary to refer to rules. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 13 of the Apprenticeship Ordinance (hereinafter called the Ordinance) the Provincial Government made the Apprenticeship Rules, 1966 (hereinafter called the Rules). Rule 19 provides that duration of the apprenticeship shall be determined by the competent authority after taking into consideration the factors mentioned in sub-rule (1). Sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 provides that the duration of apprenticeship shall invariably be specified in the apprenticeship contract. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 provides that extension in the apprenticeship period, in individual cases, if considered essential in the interest of apprentice's training shall be made with the approval of the competent authority. The extension granted shall in no case be more than 1/4th of the original duration of apprenticeship.
7. Rule 18 provides that the employer and the apprentice shall, on the eve of apprentice's recruitment, enter into a written contract to be known as the Apprenticeship Contract' on the prescribed form given in Appendix I. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 18 provides that no subsequent alteration or amendment in the contract shall be made except with the prior approval of the competent authority.
8. The contention of the respondents is that extension of the period of apprenticeship was alteration and amendment which was permissible under the rules and was made with the approval of the competent authority. Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 the contract has to be in writing and it would naturally follow that even alteration and amendments to the contract would also be in writing. Admittedly there is no amendment or alteration of contract in writing signed by the employer and the apprentices to the effect that the period of apprenticeship had been extended.
Under Rule 19(2) even this extended period of apprenticeship had to be specified in the contract.
9. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 requires that such alteration should be with the prior approval of the competent authority. Admittedly the period of apprenticeship under the contract expired on 14-11- 1986 whereas the approval of the competent authority for first extension of period of apprenticeship for three months was accorded on 11-2-1987. Such an approval cannot be considered prior approval. It may be pointed out that the word 'prior' is not used for the approval of the period of apprenticeship under sub-rule (3) of Rule 19, as the decision has to be taken by the competent authority himself. Whereas the contract under rule 18 is not between the competent authority and the apprentice but between the employer and the apprentice. Therefore, word 'prior' is used before word `approval' in sub-rule (4) of rule 18. There is no ambiguity as to the meaning of the word 'prior'. In Black's Law Dictionary the word 'prior' is defined to mean `earlier, preceding'. The extension of the period of apprenticeship from 15-11-1986 to 14-2-1987; if any, was made by the employer without the prior approval of the competent authority. Similarly the approval for the alleged extension of period of apprenticeship from 15-2-1987 to 14-5-1987 was also made without any prior approval of the competent authority. In fact this approval has been received much after termination of the services of the appellants and after service of grievance notices upon the respondents.
10 It is argued that the fact that the appellants continued to work without requesting for permanent appointment would amount to their implied consent of apprenticeship and alteration of original contract. Even this implied consent would not be effective as the employer without prior approval of the competent authority had no power to extend the period of apprenticeship.
11. It is submitted by Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani that the preamble to the Ordinance spells out the purpose of Ordinance which reads as under:- "An 'Ordinance' to make provision for promoting, developing and regulating systematic apprenticeship programmes in the industries and for securing certain minimum standard of skill."
' It is further submitted that section 4 of the Ordinance which spells out the obligations of employer does not provide that after completion of the period of apprenticeship the employer is bound to employ the apprentices. It is further submitted that under rule 23 it is clearly provided, that it shall not be obligatory on the part of the employer to offer an employment to an apprentice on the completion of his apprenticeship. It is also submitted, that admittedly no appointment order of permanent employment had been issued to the appellants after 14-11-1986 or at any time. There is no dispute about the legal proposition put up by the learned counsel. However, neither the law nor rules forbid the respondents from employing the apprentices. No doubt, under the law they are bound to issue written order/tickets to the permanent workers but they cannot take advantage of this lapse on their part if the appellants are able to show that they are permanent workers.
12. It is not disputed that after the expiry of the period of apprenticeship under the contract on 14-11- 1986, the appellants continued to work with the respondents up to 14-5-1987. Under rule 18, the person who engages apprentices under the contract is termed as "employee. Under Standing Order I the apprentices are shown in the category of workmen. They are (1) Permanent, (2)
Probationers (3) badlis, (4) temporary and (5) apprentices. Thus the Standing Orders Ordipance is applicable. The appellants, after 14-11-1987, after expiry of the apprenticeship period, still continued to work as workmen of the respondents. It may be pointed out that all the twelve grievance petitions were consolidated and only one of the appellants was examined in support of their case.
In the grievance application as well as in the affidavit-in-evidence of the appellants it is averred that they were working against permanent jobs which fact does not appear to be disproved. Under Standing Order No, 1, as pointed above, there are only five categories of workmen viz, (1) permanent, (2) Probationers, (3) badlis, (4) temporary and (5) apprentices. The appellants ceased to be apprentices after 14-11-1986. It is not the case of the respondent that the appellants were working against any temporary job. Therefore, they cannot be considered temporary. Similarly they cannot be termed as badlis as it is not alleged that they have been appointed in the posts temporarily due to absence of permanent workers. They are, therefore, either permanent or probationers. Only difference between the two categories is that a probationer does not complete three months of service. When he completes three months of service then he becomes permanent.
In the instant case the appellants had completed six months of their service.
13. Mr. Ali Amjad, counsel for the appellants, had relied upon PLD 1979 Note 85 at p. 60 wherein the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court held: "the petitioner completed his period of apprenticeship on 9-4-1974, but, was allowed to continue in service upto 21-1-1975 or 3-3-1975 after which date he was not allowed to work therefore the termination of service without written order as required under Standing Order 12(3) was without lawful authority therefore, the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated with back benefits."
' In appeal, against this decision, which is reported in 1988 PLC 295 the Division Bench of Lahore High Court had observed: "The contention that once an apprentice always an apprentice was not maintainable in law and the employment after the period of apprenticeship was to be treated as workman."
' In this case also a plea was taken that there was no written order passed by the employer employing the petitioner. It was observed by their Lordships:- 'The employer cannot treat its own failure to deny to the respondent the right due to him under the law. Written Order is not a sine qua non for establishing the relationship of the employer and the employee."
' Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Tribunal in appeal of M/s. Zeal-Pak Cement Factory Limited v. Syed Mushtaq All and others being Appeals Nos. 399 to 405 of 1987 and Appeal No, 43 of 1988. In that case also the apprentices were removed from service without complying with the provision of Standing Order 12(3), therefore, appeals were allowed by the learned Tribunal holding that the apprentice was a workman within the meaning of Standing Order and therefore, compliance of Standing Order 12(3) was necessary.
14. Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani has relied upon the decision of this Tribunal' reported in 1988 PLC
472. This appeal was also between Zeal-Pak Cement Factory Limited (respondents in this appeal) and certain apprentices. In that case the period of apprenticeship under contract expired on' 31-12- 1985 but apprentices were allowed to work till 30-9-1986. Therein it was held that the competent authority could extend the period of apprenticeship by nine months and such approval could be communicated by any person on behalf of the competent authority.
15. I have already referred to the relevant rules. Applying the rules to the admitted facts of this case there can be no doubt that there has been no valid extension of the period of the apprenticeship under rule 18(4) 9(3) and as such the period of six months worked by the appellants after the expiry of the period of apprenticeship would confer upon them the rights of permanent workmen, in view of the classification of the workmen under Standing Order -No, I, in spite of the fact, that no such written order was passed by the employer viz. The respondents.
16. It is submitted by Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani that in the instant cases compliance of Standing Order 12(3) has been made as order in writing has been passed terminating the services of the appellants and showing the reasons of the same. The word 'reason' signifies that reason should be valid, justifiable and reasonable. Mere showing of some reason would not fulfil the requirement of Standing Order 12(3). The word "reason" has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary as under:- "Reason" A faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes ,truth from falsehood, good from evil, and which enables the possessor to deduce inferences from facts or from propositions. Also an inducement, motive or ground for action, as in the phrase 'reasons for an appeal'."
' The reason shown in the order is that the apprenticeship period of appellants has expired. As already pointed out on the date when order was passed the appellants were no longer working as apprentices and, therefore, this cannot be considered as a ground for termination of their services.
By showing a reason, which is not valid for terminating the services of the appellants the provision of Standing Order 12(3) cannot be said to have been complied with.
17. For the aforesaid reasons I allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order and direct the reinstatement of the appellants with back benefits. Order is to be implemented within one month. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.