1. ABDUL QADIR SHAIKH, J.--The petitioner Abdul Aziz Baloch has challenged the order dated 13th March 1972 passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 114, removing him from service. This petition was filed on 1st April 1974, and when questioned as to the reasons that had prevented the Petitioner to seek the relief earlier, the learned counsel appearing for him replied that the petitioner had no sufficient funds to engage a counsel. We regret we cannot accept this explanation. In the first place such an averment has not been made in the petition itself; indeed no explanation whatever has been given. The petitioner was holding the post of Deputy Director of Agriculture in the Government of Sind and it requires no stretch of imagination to hold that he can afford to pay the normal amount of fees charged by an average counsel in cases such as this. It was open to the petitioner to approach this Court personally, and in that case the expenditure on court-fee stamps is just Rs.
100. The petitioner did not file a review application against the impugned order, which was the statutory remedy shade available to him under Martial Law Regulation No. 116. In this connection we may, however, point out that the petitioner has not made averment in the Memorandum of the Petition to the effect that he had filed a review application and when questioned in this behalf the learned counsel stated that resort to this remedy has not been made. From the unexplained caches on the part of the petitioner which cover the period of more than two years, it would, therefore, be only reasonable to presume that the petitioner had accepted his fate; for, otherwise he would have, like the many others placed in similar circumstances, either sought the remedy by way of filing a review application and/or approached this Court for relief without loss of time.
2. Generally speaking, the superior Courts are averse to granting relief in the exercise of the extraordinary power of judicial review under the Constitutional Jurisdiction to persons who are guilty of unexplained laches, the reason being that the omission to seek relief within the period prescribed by law or within the time considered legitimate in cases of this A type, tantamount to waiver or acquiesence on their part, unless proved to the contrary. Bars of limitation placed by law on the parties who wish to seek legal remedies are to be strictly enforced, for the finality, after all, is to be given to the actions taken under the law. It is not open to a party, therefore, to evade the normal remedies provided by law which are to be availed of within the period prescribed in that behalf and to approach High Court under its Constitutional Jurisdiction for relief at any time at his own sweet will. In such cases, the party is deemed to be under the burden of giving an explanation for the delay in seeking the relief through the Constitu--tional means. Several persons placed in the same situation as the petitioner approached this Court long time ago, yet the petitioner chose not to follow such a course of action. It does not even lie in his mouth to say that he was waiting for the decision in those cases, for this explanation has been field to constitute no sufficient justification for the delay. Such a plea was raised on behalf of the petitioners in the case reported as Kisan Transport Co. Ltd. v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan Lahore and others (PLD 1968 Lah.
3. 478), and their Lordships of the Division Bench, rejected it saying that "the fact that they waited to see the result of litigation commenced by other parties, does not constitute sufficient justification for the delay that has occurred on their part." In the case of Eastern Pakistan Railway Workshop League v. Chairman, East Pakistan Railway Board and another (PLD 1968 Dacca 681), the delay of two years was sought to be explained in that the petitioner was awaiting the decision of another writ petition, which to his mind, was a test case on the point, but the Court held the explanation to be unsatisfactory and dismissed the petition for 1 aches. In another case reported as Jalal-ud-din v. Settlement Commissioner (1968 SCMR 995), the appellant pleaded that he was not able to file writ petition to challenge the order of the Settlement Commissioner as he was away in England. It was, however, noticed that his wife was in Lahore alt along, and indeed it was she who had filed the settlement form for the transfer of the property. In the circumstances the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches, although the connected petition brought by another party in which the appellant figured as a respondent, and which was heard together was stills pending. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the contention that the High Court had not exercised its discretion on sound judicial principles, for having directed the hearing of both the petitions together, they should not have taken them up for hearing separately. On the final analysis the Supreme Court, however, upheld the view that prevailed in the High Court, finding themselves "in agreement with the learned Judges in the High Court that the appellant had been guilty of laches in invoking the Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court". "A delay of nearly two years in moving the High Court," their Lordships observed "was on the facts of the case tantamount to waiver or acquiescence on the part of the appellant in the impugned order of the Settlement Commissioner for it could not be said that there existed any insuperable impediment in his way to bring that order under challenge with expedition which is one of the conditions for invoking the writ jurisdiction."
4. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the petitioner having slept over his rights for a period covering more than two ears is deemed to have accepted his fate of the removal from the service' and cannot now be permitted to seek relief at his choice of time. We are conscious that quite a number of persons placed in like circumstances as the petitioner who have already approached this Court for relief against the same type of order would have the benefit of decision of their cases from this Court, and they even may perhaps succeed, for the result cannot be forecast, but this aspect would not justify placing the petitioner at par with those who have been vigilant, and moreover we would be also condoning waiver or acquiescence on the part of the petitioner.
5. For these reasons, we dismiss this petition in limine.
6. KHUDA BAKHSH MARRI, J.----I agree.