1. ' NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.--This is a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment, dated 9- 2-1985 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No,179/D of 1984.
2. ' The facts, which form the background, are that land measuring 173 kanals 5 marlas comprised of old Khasra No,199 (present Khasra No,216) situated in village Barki Badhal, Tehsil Gujar Khan, District Rawalpindi, was evacuee property. The said land together with some other evacuee lands was acquired by the Central Government and became a part of the Compensation Pool. The said land was allotted and confirmed in the name of one Muhammad Din, a Displaced Person, on 1-3-1966.
3. The said Muhammad Din sold the same in favour of Muhammad Ayub, petitioner No,1 and two other persons namely Abdul and Fazal vide Mutation No,543 (sanctioned on 17-8-1966). The last mentioned two persons namely Abdul and Fazal in their turn sold half share of their land in favour of petitioners Nos.2 to 6 vide Mutation No,592 (sanctioned on 13-6-1968).
4. ' According to the petitioners although the said land was recorded in the Revenue records to be in possession of Forest Department it was not susceptible of physical possession and hence no one was, in fact, in possession thereof. However, the learned counsel has proceeded to submit, somewhat inconsistently, that the Forest Department started interfering in the possession of the petitioners (how they started to do so when the petitioners themselves say that this land was not susceptible of physical possession is somewhat difficult to comprehend). Anyhow, the petitioners filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that they are owners in possession of the said land and for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with their possessory title.
5. ' The suit was dismissed by the learned trial Court observing "that the plaintiffs never got possession and that many trees have been grown up there in the supervision of the Forest Department" and, therefore the claim of the petitioners that they were in possession which was allegedly interfered with by the Forest Department, was not well founded. It was also held on account of Memorandum No,65/775-RL, dated 27-2-1965 from the Chief Settlement Commissioner Lahore to the Deputy Commissioners, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Gujrat, Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Attock on the subject of "disposal of evacuee land in possession of Forest Department" which was to the effect that evacuee lands in possession of the Forest Department whether notified or unnoticed were not to be allotted against any claim under the provisions of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, the allotment of this land in favour of Muhammad Din on 1-3- 1966 against his verified claim was itself not valid and the subsequent sale of this land in favour of the petitioners did not confer any title on them. The aforesaid judgment and decree was upheld by the learned District Judge on appeal and again by the High Court on revision. Hence this petition for leave.
6. ' The main contention of Mirza Anwar Baig, learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of this petition for leave, is that all the evacuee lands had become part of the Compensation Pool and no land, which had gone into the Compensation Pool, could be excluded therefrom by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In support of this plea learned counsel relied on Inayat Bibi etc. v.
7. Assistant Settlement Commissioner and Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1978 Lah. 252).
8. However, this is not a case of excluding any land from the Compensation Pool but is merely a case where the allotment of those bits of evacuee land which were in possession of a Government Department viz. The Forest Department in this case were excluded from allotment to refugee claim holders for being given to them on payment, which amounts thereafter also went to the Compensation Pool. Accordingly, the judgment of the Lahore High Court, relied upon by the learned counsel, is not in point.
9. ' The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed hereby.