' NAZIR AHMED BHATTI, J.--Mufti Amanullah and others, appellants have, by this Intra-Court Appeal, challenged the judgment dated 29-6-1983 of our learned brother Mr. Justice (now retired) Faiz Muhammad Khan whereby he had dismissed Writ Petition No,434/80 of the appellants.
Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 of the Intra-Court Appeal in hand also filed cross-objections to the appeal which were registered under No,! Of 1985. Judgment in the Intra-Court Appeal in hand will also dispose of the same.
2. The facts of the matter have been elaborately given in the impugned judgment. However, for the purposes of the Intra-Court Appeal in hand we may briefly reproduce them. Property known as Kawatra Building (hereinafter referred to as the said property) consisting of 38 houses and 36 shops, situate in Peshawar Cantonment and occupied by the appellants herein individually belonged to a non-Muslim and became evacuee property after evacuation from Pakistan of the said non-Muslim owner. For the purposes of settlement under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) this property was declared a big mansion under the provisions of the Act and was to be transferred by unrestricted public auction under the provisions of Settlement Scheme No,Ill prepared under the Act. The said property was accordingly disposed of by an unrestricted public auction held on 31-1-1963. Against the reserve price of Rs,5,72,850 the highest bid of Rs,15,05,000 was jointly given by three persons, Major Muhammad Rafique, Major (now Brig. Retd.), Faqir Muhammad Khan and Ghulam Sarwar, all locals. However Malor Faqir Muhammad Khan and Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Khan each surrendered half of his share in favour of one Mst. Qamar Sultana. Later Ghulam Sarwar Khan also surrendered his remaining half share in favour of Major Muhammad Rafique. As such Major Muhammad Rafique acquired three shares, Mst. Qamar Sultana acquired two shares and Major (now Brig. Retd.) Faqir Muhammad Khan acquired one share in the said property. Since all the auction-purchasers, respondents Nos.3 to 5 herein, were locals the entire bid money was to be paid by them within thirty days of the date of receipt of the intimation of acceptance by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the said intimation of acceptance was duly conveyed to them by letter dated 15-4- 1963. It appears that the respondents Nos.3 to 5 were not able to deposit the entire bid money within the prescribed period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the intimation of acceptance and they applied for extension of the period for making payment of the bid money. The Chief Settlement Commissioner extended the period of payment upto three months which period was further extended upto 11-4-1964 by the Government of Pakistan. Even then the aforesaid respondents Nos.3 to 5 could not deposit the whole of the auction price and they made another request to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for further extension of the period of deposit which was allowed and the period was extended upto 11-7-1964. Still they could not deposit the auction price and requested for another extension of time and the Chief Settlement Commissioner extended the period upto 31-8-1964. The respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were again directed by a notice dated 28-12-1964 issued by the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Industries) to pay the entire outstanding auction price within seven days of the receipt of that notice. They were also informed through the said notice that if they failed to pay the entire outstanding bid money the auction in their favour will be cancelled with attendant penalities. The record shows that even after the said notice the respondents Nos.3 to 5 continued upto 29-12-1966 tendering compensation books of various amounts for adjustment against the transfer price, and the value of the compensation books and the cash amount tendered by them stood at Rs,15,85,119.70. However the matter of verification of the compensation books lingered on. At last on 4-4-1973 another notice was issued to the respondents Nos.3 to 5 whereby they were informed that the amount tendered through compensation books and admitted to have been adjusted towards the auction price was shown to be Rs,4,93,755 and the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were directed to remit the balance of Rs,10,11,245 within seven days. Aggrieved by that notice, the Nos. 3 to 5 took up the matter with the Chief Settlement Commissioner N.-W.F.P. Who by order, dated 15-9-1973 directed the Additional Settlement Commissioner to carry out immediate verification of the compensation books already tendered by the respondents. Nos.3 to 5 and if need be to permit them to make extra payment towards the auction price. Action in compliance of the said direction was in progress when on 13- 12-1975 the Chief Settlement Commissioner informed the Additional Settlement Commissioner that the Chief Minister was pleased to order that since respondents Nos.3 to 5 had not fulfilled terms and conditions of the auction and had not deposited the entire bid money the property involved should be excluded from the list of big mansions and should be disposed of by allotting each unit to the sitting tenant in due course of law under Scheme No, VIII then in vogue. The Settlement Commissioner (Industries) accordingly issued a notice on 17-6-1976 to respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to show cause as to why auction in their favour should not be cancelled and the property resumed for fresh disposal. The respondents Nos. 3 to 5 submitted reply to this notice and simultaneously filed Writ Petition No,78 of 1976 in this Court and succeeded in obtaining on 27-8-1976 a status quo order. The said writ petition was finally disposed of by this Court on 7-5-1980 on the basis of order, dated 12-4-1980 of the Settlement Commissioner (Industries) whereby the auction in favour of respondents Nos.3 to 5 was not cancelled but the lower Settlement Authorities were directed to verify the remaining claim of compensation books presented by the respondents Nos.3 to 5 towards adjustment of the 'payment of the auction price. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, dated 12-4-1980 of the Settlement Commissioner (Industries) Peshawar Division, the appellants herein filed the writ petition wherein the impugned order was made.
3. Mr. Fazli Ghani, Advocate counsel for the respondents Nos.3 to 5 raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the Intra-Court Appeal in hand. The learned counsel contended that the said property was declared a big mansion by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the provisions of paragraph 16 of the Schedule to the Act in November 1959 and at that time there was provision of appeal under section 19 and review under section 21 of the Act. The learned counsel was of the opinion that a right of review was available to the appellants against that order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the provisions of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, as amended by Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act VIII of 1972), as further amended by Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974 (Act VI of 1975) and the same had not been availed of by the appellants and as such the Intra-Court Appeal was incompetent. The learned counsel further contended that the order whereby the Chief Settlement Commissioner had declared the said property as a big mansion, was an original order in the proceedings as envisaged by subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as amended by the aforesaid two Acts and when that order was made there was provision of review in the Act and the appellants had not chosen that remedy and so the Intra-Court Appeal was not competent.
4. The point which requires determination in this respect is whether aforesaid order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner tantamounts to an original order in the proceedings. The very wording of paragraph 16 of the Schedule to they Act would indicate that the declaration of any property as a big, mansion by the Chief Settlement Commissioner is more of an administrative exercise rather than a proceeding in a matter. In making such a declaration the Chief Settlement Commissioner is not in need of the presence of any party before him whereas the proviso to subsection (2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, as amended as indicated earlier, lays down that appeal to a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court from an order made by a single Judge would only be competent when the order made by the single Judge arises out of any proceeding in which the law applicable provides for at least one appeal to any Court, Tribunal or Authority against the original order. On the contrary we are of the opinion that since the declaration by the Chief Settlement Commissioner of the said property as a big mansion was not a proceeding out of which an appeal or review could be preferred, the said declaration made by him would not tantamount to an original order made in any proceeding. In order to elucidate his point the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 has brought to our attention the cases reported as Noor Muhammad v.
Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1968 SC 336) and S.M. Fakhar Hussain v.
Abdus Sattar PLD 1971 SC 438. However, the facts of both these cases, are different. In the case reported as PLD 1968 SC 336 Mela Ram Building Lahore had already been declared as a big mansion and was put to auction. The auction proceedings were carried out but they were not confirmed and subsequently the petitioner in that case offered to purchase the building by negotiation and then a right of review was exercised in those proceedings. Similar was the situation in the second case. But in the case in hand the order which was made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in November, 1959 was only a declaration of the said property as a big mansion and the said property had not yet been put to auction. We would, therefore, respectfully state that both the aforesaid Supreme Court cases are not applicable to the facts of the case in hand. No doubt the said property was declared as a big mansion in the year 1959 when there was a provision of appeal and review in the Act but actual auction had taken place on 31-1-1963 which ended in favour of respondents Nos.3 to 5. This auction was confirmed on 15-4-1963 and they were ordered to make payment of the entire auction money witi.In one month. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the order which could be considered as an original order in -the proceedings was the order made on 15-4-1963 and not the declaration made in November, 1959. On 15-4-1963 there was neither any provision for appeal or review for the reason that sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Act had been omitted from the Act by Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Amendment Ordinances, 1962 (Ordinance II of 1962) promulgated on 13-1-1962. It shall thus be seen that original order in the proceedings before the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities was made on 15-4- 1963 and at that time there was no right of appeal or review available in the Act. The controversy about the term "original order" and the true scope of the expression arising out of any proceedings in proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as amended by the aforesaid two Acts, has been very elaborately discussed in the case of Yusuf Ali v. Muhammad Javed Iqbal Cheema (PLD 1975 Lah. 1339) and the learned Judges arrived at the conclusion that "the obvious intention underlying the provision was to abolish Intra-Court Appeal in cases in which the impugned order in the Constitutional order arises out of the proceedings in which the original order was appealable and necessarily therefore the question whether an original order was appealable or not will be determined with reference to the law that was applicable only to the, date of such original order and not the date when the matter came before the High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction." This point was also a subject-matter of discussion by a learned Division Bench of this - High Court in the case of Sardar Muhammad v. The Settlement Commissioner, Peshawar Division PLD 1989 Pesh. 155 and learned Judges of the Bench also arrived at the following conclusion:- "The test to determine which order is the original order passed in the proceedings and subject to an appeal, disregarding the fact whether the remedy of appeal so provided was availed of or not, obviously is the one with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced. In this context, the word "proceedings" itself is a term which enjoys a wide meaning and includes every step, right from the first to the last, taken towards achieving the final object from the commencement of an action to the execution of the final judgment."
However, some confusion appears to have arisen as a result of judgment in the case of Muhammad Ismail v. Secretary to Government of N.-W.F.P. Peshawar PLD 1988 Pesh. 19 made by this Bench. We would like to clarify the position in this respect. The said Muhammad Ismail had filed Writ Petition No,338/74 under Article 199 of the Constitution in this Court against Secretary to Government of N.-W.F.P. Settlement and Rehabilitation Department and other respondents which came up for hearing before our learned brother Abdul Karim Khan Kundi, Judge on 10-19-1987 and our learned brother by an order of the said date directed the said Muhammad Ismail to implead one Abdul Majid as a party therein. Feeling aggrieved by the said order Muhammad Ismail came up with Intra-Court Appeal No,2 of 1987 which came up for hearing before this Bench. One Syed Zawar Hussain had also filed Writ Petition No,602 of 1980 with regard to the same evacuee property which was in dispute in Writ Petition No,338 of 1974. That writ petition also came up for hearing before our learned brother Mr. Abdul Karim Khan Kundi, Judge on 10-10-1987 and therein also our learned brother directed Syed Zawar Hussain to implead the said Abdul Majid and Muhammad Ismail as parties in his writ petition. Syed Zawar Hussain had also filed Intra-Court Appeal No,3 of 1987 impugning the said order of our learned brother. In both the aforesaid writ petitions an interlocutory order of our learned brother was challenged in Intra-Court Appeals Nos.2 and 3 of 1987 and the learned counsel of both the appellants had contended that the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to proceedings in those writ petitions and the same were civil proceedings and the Intra-Court Appeals were competent under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, read with section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (Ordinance X of 1980). The main argument of the learned counsel in both the aforesaid writ petitions was that the writ petitions being original civil proceedings and the interlocutory order made by our learned brother Abdul Karim Khan Kundi, J. On 10-10-1987 was appealable before a Bench of two or more Judges of this High Court and we had held that Constitutional jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution was not commensurate with the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Actually the point involved in the aforesaid two Intra-Court Appeals was not whether the Intra-Court Appeal was competent or not in respect of a writ petition with regard to evacuee property but the question for determination was whether exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction was exercise of original civil jurisdiction or whether these were two separate jurisdictions and we had come to the conclusion that these were two separate jurisdictions. The question of pendency of Intra-Court Appeal vis-a-vis a Constitutional petition with regard to evacuee property was actually not involved in the aforesaid case.
5. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. .Fazli Ghani, Advocate. The Intra-Court Appeal is competent under the amended Law 'Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and it is not exceptionable on this preliminary objection.
6. In so far as the facts are concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants challenged the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge on the ground that the said property was available property under Settlement Scheme No, VIII as reconstituted on 16-9-1973 on the ground that the various extensions in the period for deposit of auction price granted to the respondents Nos.3 to 5 by the Settlement Authorities were in violation of the terms and conditions as laid down in the Schedule to the Act as also under the provisions of Settlement Scheme No,III, and since the respondents Nos.3 to 5 had failed to deposit the entire sale price within the period specified under the law, the auction proceedings had become inoperative and Loki and the said property did not stand transferred in their favour and was available for transfer to the appellants. It was contended by Mr. Khalid Farooq Qureshi, learned counsel for the respondents that all the respondents Nos.3 to 5 were locals and the auction in their favour was confirmed by the Settlement Authorities by leiter, dated 15-4-1963 and according to paragraph 12 of Settlement Scheme No,III the whole amount of the bid money had to be paid within thirty days from the date of receipt-of the intimation of acceptance by the auction. Bidders. It was further contended by him that at the most a further period, of three months could be allowed to them for the deposit of the entire bid money under paragrpah 25 of the Schedule to the Act read with paragraph 21 of Settlement Scheme' No,III.
However, the respondents Nos.3 to 5 had failed to pay the entire bid money even within the, aforesaid extended period and as such under paragraph 21 of Settlement Scheme No,III the Settlement Authorities were left with no alternative except to cancel the auction and resume the property for fresh proceedings for transfer of the same. His contention was that the various extensions allowed to the respondents Nos.3 to 5 for payment of bid money after the expiry of the period of four months from the date of intimation of acceptance of the auction proceedings were illegal, void and of no legal effect. It has already been stated in the facts that the respondents Nos.
3 to 5 had paid some amount in cash and had also submitted compensation books for adjustment towards the bid money and the matter of payment of the aution money remained pending as late as 17-6-1976 when a final show-cause notice was issued to them by the Settlement Commissioner (Industries) informing them as to why--
(a) the incomplete association Deeds involving Rs,10,11,245 (Rs, ten lac eleven thousand two hundred and forty-five only) be not treated invalid and rejected straightaway,
(b) the auction of the property be not cancelled from your name,
(c) the property be resumed for fresh disposal."
' This show-cause notice has been reproduced in full at pages 8 and 9 of the impugned judgment.
7. On the contrary the plea of the respondents Nos.3 to 5 was that they had already paid in cash and in the shape of compensation books more than the price which was offered by them in auction proceedings. The respondents Nos.3 to 5 filed Writ Petition No,78 of 1976 in this Court wherein on 27-8-1976 an interim status quo order was made. In the said writ petition on 19-12-1979 a further interim order was made which has also been reproduced in full at pages 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment but for the sake of convenience it would be profitable to reproduce the same as under:- "The Department has accepted that a sum of Rs,5,46,987/70 has been received by them and adjusted on the basis of Compensation Books. They have also admitted the receipt of Rs,1,00,000 as cash. Apart from that they admit that CBs of Rs,6,32,916 have been verified but the adjustment has not been made in view of the writ petition. In respect of Compensation Books of Rs,5,74,724 it is stated that Compensation Books relating to this amount though verified, the amount thereof has not been adjusted as such a course would have not been contrary to the instructions contained in letter of 27-3-1964.
(2) To resolve the controversy and to reduce the limit of time for final disposal of the matter, the learned counsel has shown his readiness to pay in cash a sum of Rs,2,70,113 about which the Department is not sure. This amount should be paid within a period of thirty days by the petitioners.
After the receipt of this amount the Settlement Commissioner notwithstanding any interim status quo order of this Court may make a tentative decision whether the transfer of the property in favour of the petitioners is to be finalized by issuance of transfer order. If he comes to the decision that the petitioners are entitled to the transfer order then the present writ petition would become infructuous. If the tentative decision is to the contrary then the writ petition shall proceed. The Settlement Commissioner should communicate the tentative decision to this Court within three months of the date of the deposit of the amount of Rs,2,70,113 by the petitioners if done within thirty days.
(3) As regards the uncertainty about Rs,5,74,724, the Settlement Commissioner should give I an opportunity to the petitioners to explain the same and if he is satisfied about the genuineness of the Compensation Books then the cash deposited by the petitioners shall be refunded to them and the amount of the Compensation Books adjusted against the transfer price.
(4) A copy of this order should be handed over to the petitioners, to the counsel for the Department and to the counsel for newly-added respondents. One copy of the order should be sent directly to the Settlement Commissioner.
(5) The replies of the Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner have been received and placed on record."
' Pursuant to the aforesaid directions given by this Court the respondents Nos.3 to 5 deposited in cagh on 9-11-1980 an amount of Rs,2,70,113 towards the payment of auction price. Thereafter the Settlement Commissioner (Industries) proceeded to make a tentative decision whether or not the transfer of the property in favour of the bidders could be finalized by issuance of transfer documents as was directed by this Court in the aforesaid interim order. He finally made an order on 12-4-1980 whereby he refused to .Set aside the auction proceedings concluded in the year 1963 with the approval of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. With regard to the payment of auction price by the respondents Nos.3 to 5 he found the position as under:- {{TABLE}} Amount paid in cash in 1963 and 1966. Rs, 28,250.00 adjusted. Amount of claim compensation books verified before the cancellation proceedings. Rs,5,29,737.70 adjusted.
Cash payment in the form of Bank Draft received after the #TBS Rs.1,00,000.00 unadjusted. #TBE cancellation proceedings. Amount of claim compensation #TBS Rs. 54,316.00 unadjusted. #TBE books verified before cancellation proceedings but unadjusted.
(5) Amount verified during the #TBS Rs.5,78,600.00 unadjusted. #TBE pendency of the writ petition with the original record.
Total:- Rs, 12,80,903.70 ' The respondents Nos.3 to 5 had also deposited, in obedience to the aforesaid order of this Court made in Writ Petition No,78 of 1976 an amount of Rs,2,70,113. He also came to the conclusion that the entire transfer price had paid by the petitioners (respondents Nos.3 to 5 herein) and thas the resumption of the property would be highly arbitrary.
8. It shall thus be seen that the respondents Nos.3 to 5 had paid in cash and in the shape of compensation books the entire bid money, but the Settlement Department failed to verify the amounts of the compensation books. Thus the delay in adjustment of the entire bid money occurred due to negligence on the part of the Settlement Authorities.
9. No doubt considerable delay had also occurred in payment of the entire bid money on account of fault on the part of the respondents Nos.3 to 5 and the learned counsel for the appellants urged that the auction proceedings which have been confirmed in favour of respondents Nos.3 to 5 should have been set aside by the Settlement Authorities and the said property should have been resumed and it was available for transfer under the provisions of Settlement Scheme No,VIII as reconstituted on 16-9-1973 and it should have been transferred to the sitting tenants by metes and bounds as laid down in the said Scheme. In, this connection Mr. Khalid Farooq Qureshi, Advocate, relied upon, the judgment Muhammad Rashid v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner' PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lahore 217 wherein it was held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had no authority to extend period of payment of bid money beyond three months.
On the contrary the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.3 to 5 contended that the Settlement and Rehabilitation Laws were of beneficial nature and that the Settlement Authorities had often been granting extensions to the respondents in the period for payment of bid money and that in spite of the non-payment of the same within the statutory period the Settlement Authorities had not cancelled the auction proceedings and that action of the Settlement Authorities had created a right in the respondents Nos.3 to 5 and they could not be penalized due to wrong act on the part of the Settlement Authorities. In this connection the learned counsel has firstly drawn our attention to the case of Punjab Province v. Sita Ram etc. PLD 1956 Federal Court 157 wherein it was held as under:- "Ordinance (XV of 1949) is really a piece of legislation which concerns itself with administration rather than with adjudication, "a droit administratif" concerning what is conductive to the welfare of the evacuees under the changed situation, rather than what is required by law under the strict principles of legal Jurisprudence.
' It is a legislation of extremely special nature providing a special machinery for dealing with an extraordinary situation.
' Decisions in cases relating to evacuee property have to depend on grounds of policy and not only on considerations that weigh with Courts of law."
' Again in the case of Rafiuddin v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1971 SC 252 it was held as under:- "Evacuee and Rehabilitation legislations are legislations of an extremely special character which are from the very nature of things to be construed not so much on considerations that would weigh with Courts of law but also on considerations of policy. They were designed for meeting an extraordinary situation of a complex and confusing nature created by the influx of a large number of refugees who had to be settled and were intended to be so adaptable as to meet the changes in the situation that developed from time to time. They could not, therefore, be construed upon strict legal principles and certainly not in such a manner as to defeat the very object for which such special legislation was designed."
10. We have very anxiously considered contentions of both the learned counsel in this respect. The very preamble of the Act shows that it was promulgated to provide for the payment of compensation to certain displaced persons for the losses suffered by them on account of expropriation by the Government of India of their rights in property in India or in any area occupied by India and the rehabilitation of others. The object and purpose of the Act was, therefore, rehabilitation and settlement of the Muslims who had been displaced from India and had come over to Pakistan. The auction of the said property was also a step towards such settlement and rehabilitation of Muslims displaced from India. The price which the said property was to fetch in auction proceedings was to be appropriated towards the rehabilitation and settlement of the aforesaid persons. Thus the primary purpose and object of the Act was to rehabilitate persons and not to disturb them. As such even if extensions in period of payment of bid money were allowed beyond the limit fixed by law, the sane were not exceptionable on this ground as well. Not only that but there is also a wealth of case-law on the point that if the property was not resumed for failure to pay the price within the time fixed by the statute, it was presumed that there was automatic extension of time for .Payment of the same. In this respect a reference may with profit be made to the cases of Shah Wali v.
Ghulam Din PLD 1966 SC 983, Muhammad Musa v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner 1974 SCMR 352, Shamroz Khan v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1978 SC 89 and Rashad Ehsan v. Bashir Ahmad PLD 1989 SC 146.
11. Actually under paragraph 21 of Settlement Scheme No,III, read with paragrpah 25 of the Schedule to the Act, the Settlement Authorities could resume the property in default of payment of the bid money, however, such resumption was not automatic and the Settlement Authorities were required to make a specific order with regard to the extinction of the right of the auction-purchasers to remain in possession of the property and then they could resume the same by dispossession of the auction-purchasers. It is also provided in paragrpah 23 of the aforesaid Scheme that the purchaser could within 60 days of dispossession make payment of the arrears due from him along.With a penal interest and could apply to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for restoration of the property to him. This would also indicate that intention of the Act was rather to afford concession to the transferees of property in making payment of the transfer price rather than extinguishing their right to retain the same when they had failed to make payment within the statutory period.
12. The contents of the order, dated 12-4-1980 -f the Settlement Commissioner (Industries), a copy of which is availble in the record of the writ petition, would clearly indicate that the matter of adjustment of the bid money lingered on due to non-verification of the compensation books by the Settlement Authorities and little fault lay on the shoulders of respondents Nos.3 to 5 in this respect and for that very reason the learned Settlement Commissioner did not deem it proper to cancel the auction and we think he was right in doing so.
13. The position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that although the entire bid money should have been paid by the respondents Nos.3 to 5 within a period of four months of the conveyance of acceptance of auction proceedings in their favour by the Settlement Authorities but the non-deposit of the same within the aforesaid period cannot to made a ground to declare that the auction proceedings had become void and inoperative and the said property was available for transfer under Settlement Scheme No,VIII, as reconstituted on 16-9-1973. Since the Settlement Authorities had not cancelled the auction proceedings and had allowed further time to the respondents Nos.3 to 5 to make payment of the bid money as also the fact that the fault in this case again lay more on the shoulders of the Settlement Authorities we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the said property was available for transfer to the appellants.
14. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.3 to 5 that the appellants had no locus standi to file the writ petition for the reason that the said property was declared a big mahsion and it was auctioned as such and the respondents Nos.3 to 5 had already paid the entire bid money in cash and through compensation books and it was no longer available property. This point was also raised before the learned Single Judge and it prevailed with him. We also agree with the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge. The said property was not available property.
Moreover it had been auctioned as a big mansion and none of the appellants had taken part in the auction proceedings. We will, therefore, agree with the learned Single Judge that the appellants had no locus standi and in that sense they were also not aggrieved persons.
15. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.3 to 5 that the writ petition suffered from laches. However, this objection was not taken in the written statement submitted by the said respondents to the writ petition, we cannot allow it to be taken at the appeal stage.
16. For the aforesaid reasons we have come to the conclusion that there is neither any merit in the Intra-Court Appeal in hand nor in the case objections. Both are dismissed with no order as to costs.