JUDGMENTMALIK MUHAMMAD QAYYUM, J.- This revision petition calls in question the judgment and decree dated 3rd of January, 1982 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Sheikhupura, upholding the decision of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sheikhupra, dated 24th of October, 1981.
2. Briefly stated the facts necessary for the disposal of this revision petition are that on 27.6.1975 the petitioner filed a suit for declaration claiming ownership of land measuring 1 kanal 15 marlas situate in Mohalla Noorpura, Mandi Choharkana, Tehsil and District Sheikhupura against the respondents in the Civi court at Sheikhupura. Before the trial Court the petitioner was represented by Mr. Muhammad Aalam Chaudhry, Advocate, Sheikhupura. During the course of hearing of the suit, it was stated on her behalf by her husband, Ghulam Rasool claiming to be the special attorney, on 29th of September, 1976 that statement made by Ghulam Muhammad Arbitrator regarding compromise between the parties would be binding on the petitioner. This statement was signed not only by Ghulam Rasool but also by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned trial Court, thereafter recorded the statement of ghulam muhammad referee/ arbitrator and passed a decree in terms of this statement on the same day i.e. 29th of September, 1976.
On 18.1.1977, the petitioner filed the present suit in the Civil Court, in which the decree dated 29th of September, 1976 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge in the earlier suit was challenged as being void, fraudulent and ineffective. It was averred in the plaint that the compromise in the earlier suit had been entered into by her husband withourt having been authorised by her and the same was collusive. The respondents contested the suit by filing their written statement which led to framing of eight issues. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit on 24th of October, 1981. This decisionwas challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal but she ramained unsuccessful before the learned Addl. District Judge, Sheikhupra, on 3.1.1982.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that no power of attorney executed in favour of Ghulam Rasool, the husband of the petitioner had been producced before the trial Court in the present proceedings and it was thus clear that Ghulam Rasool had never been appointed as an attorney by his wife Mst.Majeedan, petitioner and consequently Ghulam Rasool had no authority to make any statement on her behalf or to enter into any agreement to be bound by the statement made by the arbitrator or the referee. It is correct that no copy of the power of attorney executed in favour of Ghulam Rasool has been produced during the trial of this suit. However, in paragraph 4 of the plaint it has been admitted that the earlier suit had been filed by the petitioner through her husband. While appearing as P.W.3, Mst.Majeedan has stated that she had appointed her husband as her attorney but she had not authorised her husband to make the statement or to enter into any compromise. In face of these admissions, it cannot be urged with any success that the petitioner had not appointed her husband Ghulam Rasool as her attorney. Another fact to be noticed in this behalf is that Ch. Muhammad Aalam Advocate, who had been engaged by the petitioner for prosecution of the earlier suit, was examined as D.W.l in the present suit. He stated that he had been engaged by the plaintiff in that suit but throughout the trial of the suit he was being instructed by Ghulam Rasool, the husband of the plaintiff. He also deposed that he had seen the power of attorney in favour of Ghulam Rasool which was in his possession, lt is admitted by P.W.1 Sardar Muhammad, son of Muhammad Shafique that both Mst. Majeedan and Ghulam Rasool, her husband, are living together. It is not her case that the relationship between them were strained. In these circumstances, I do not find any legal infirmity in the findings of both the Courts below to the effect that Ghulam Rasool had the authority to enter into compromise on behalf of his wife.
4. Since the appointment of Ghulam Rasool as attorney stands admitted or at-least proved on the record, it was for the plaintiff/petitioner to prove by positive evidence that while entering into compromise, her husband Ghufam Rasool had exceeded his authority. In cases where a document or a compromise is alleged to be without authority or a result of fraud, it is for the person, who challenges the same, to prove the necessary facts. In support of this proposition the learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon Muhammad Zakeer Sukani Vs. Mostanser & others (PLD 1961 Dacca 71) in which it was observed that it was the plaintiff who asserted that the solenama had been obtained by fraud and onus of proving the same was clearly on him. This view also finds support from Ghulam Muhammad etc. Vs. Zia Anwar and others (PLD 1978 Lah. 1054) and Mst. Sardar Bibi Versus Muhammad Bakhsh etc. (PLD 1954 Dacca 480). -
5. The petitioner, however, in the present case, has not only failed to do so but neither she nor her husband has produced in evidence the power of attorney so as to enable the Court to arrive at a conclusion as to enable the Court to arrive at a conclusion as to whether Ghulam Rasool by making such statement had cxcceedcd his authority. Since this document has been with-held an adverse presumption is to be drawn against the petitioner under section 1.14 of the Evidence Act which was applicable at the relevant lime. The compromise was also signed by the counsel about whose authority there is no dispute. Be that as it may, both the Courts have concurrently found that the compromise arrived at in the earlier suit was not unauthorised and was not the result of any fraud. This conclusion of the Courts below is fully supported by the evidence on the recor'd and there is hardly any ground t o interfer in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
6. Even otherwise, revisional jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and cannot be exercised in aid of injustice. In the present case, the compromise was entered into in the earlier suit by the husband of the petitioner, who, admittedly was her attorney. There is no allegation much less evidence to the effect that the relationship between the husband and wife were ever strained. On the other hand, it was admitted by P.W.1 that they were still living together. The suit, therefore, clearly appears to have filed with a view to avoid the effect of compromise entered into between the parties in the earlier suit and to wriggle out of the same. This conduct of the petitioner, makes her ineligible for the exercise of any discretion in her favour. For this reason too, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed.For the foregoing reasons, this revision petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.