QADEERUDDIN AHMED, J.-----These three appeals have been filed against the judgments of an Additional District Judge, Karachi dated the 6th of February 1967, dismissing three suits filed by the appellants. As they involve common questions of law, we shall dispose of them by this judgment.
2. The facts material to these appeals are that after the establishment in 1948 of the Federal Capital in Karachi, the Government of Pakistan resumed 2,053 acres of waste land in Karachi, from the Karachi Municipal Corporation (hereafter called the K. M. C.), under section 57 of the K. M. C. Act, 1933 and then allotted it to the housing societies of Karachi. The Karachi Co-operative Housing Society Union (hereafter called the Housing Union) consists of 24 Co-operative Housing Societies.
On the 1st of August 1951, the Government of Pakistan executed an agreement with the Pakistan Employees Co-operative Housing Society Limited (hereafter called the P. B. C, H. S.), by which it allotted .1292 acres of land to the P. E. C. H. S. As a licensee. The P. E. C. H. S. Was to divide that land into plots and then issue sub-licenses to its individual members in respect of them. After constructing buildings on those plots and payment of all charges in respect of them, the sub- licensees were entitled to get directly from the Government of Pakistan registered leases. On the 14th of January 1954, the Government of Pakistan executed another agreement with the Housing Union and allotted to it land as a licensee. The Housing Union was to develop it and to allot portions of it, as sub--licences to other housing societies which were its members. Thereafter, the sub- licensees were to further divide the land and by further sub-licences to allot those plots to their members for building houses on them. After completing construction on these plots and payment of all charges due from them, these sub-licensees were entitled to obtain registered lease directly from the Central Government in their favour. The individual plots-holders of the Housing Union are sub-licensees of sub-licences, but the individual plot-holders of the P. E. C. H. S. Are sub-licensees only yet for the sake of convenience we shall refer to both of them as sub-licensees. Most of these sub-licensees have not yet obtained registered lease deeds from the Government in their favour, although they have erected buildings on their plots and are living in them or have rented them out.
3. Meanwhile, the Municipal Administration Ordinance X of 1960 (hereafter called the Municipal Ordinance) came into force in Karachi on the 15th of April 1960 and the Government of Pakistan declared the urban area of Karachi to be a Municipality under section 7 of the Municipal Ordinance.
The areas of the Housing Union and of the P. E. C. H. S. Fell within the territorial boundaries of the Karachi Municipal Corporation. In January 1961, the K. M. C. Began demanding taxes from those who had constructed buildings in the areas of the societies. In January 1963, the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 (hereafter called the Urban Act) came into force in Karachi and the Province of West Pakistan became entitled to recover property-tax in Karachi and the respondents in Appeals Nos. 16 and 18 of 1967 demanded this tax from the sub-licensees. The sub- licensees resisted the demand and filed representative suits in the District Court, Karachi to challenge its legality. Suit No. 518 of 1963 was filed by the sub-licensees of the P. E. C. H. S. And Suit No. 523 of 1963 was filed by the sub-licensees of the Housing Union. Both the suits have been dismissed by the trial Court; therefore, the sub-licensees have filed these appeals.
4. First Appeal No. 18 of 1967 arises out of the dismissal of Suit No. 518 of 1963 and First Appeal No. 16 of 1967 out of the dismissal of Suit No. 523 of 1963. The third appeal bearing No. 17 of 1967 arises out of the dismissal of Suit No. 73 of 1962. The third one is different from the other two because the suit was not filed by sub-licensees but by the lessees of the plots situated in the Housing Union against the K. M. C. To challenge the recovery of Municipal taxes. However, as in the other two appeals, the plaintiff appellants in this appeal also challenge the legality of the constitution of the K. M. C., therefore we shall consider this appeal after disposing of First Appeals Nos. 16 and 18 of 1967.
5. We must observe at the outset that both in the plaints submitted in the trial Court and in the memorandum of appeals submitted in this Court, the respondents are described in First Appeal No. 16 of 1967 as "Director of Excise and Taxation, Karachi" and "Assessing Authority Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, Karachi", and in the First Appeal No. 18 of 1967 as "Director of Excise and Taxation, Karachi" and "District Excise and Taxation Officer, Karachi". The tax under the Urban Act is recovered by the West Pakistan Government; therefore, on account of the provisions of Order 1, rule 3, C. P. C.
Read with section 79, C. P. C. The suits should have been fixed against the Province of West Pakistan. Since the Provincial Government is not a party to these cases, the success and failure of the plaintiffs-appellants can have no effect on the claims of that Government. We pointed out this defect to counsel for the parties. In consequence the learned Additional Advocate---General filed applications in both the appeals praying for the dismissal of the suits and the appeals on the ground that the plaints and the memorandum of appeals were not in conformity with the provisions of section 79, C. P. C. To meet this objection, the respondents filed an application in both of these appeals on the next day for the amendment of the plaints and the memorandums of appeals by impleading the Province of West Pakistan as defendants and respondents. We find that objection to impleading the defendants was taken in the written statements, but the plaintiff's paid no attention to it. The applications which have been made before us by the parties were the result of our objection that the suits would be ineffective against the Provincial Government even if they were decreed. The suits have not been filed against the Government, nor even against any officer of the Government by name. The defendants and the respondents are mere designations, which are not even legal persons. The suits and the appeals are not even maintainable against them. The suits were instituted in 1963 but the request for amendment has been made in 1969 after their futility was brought home by us to them. In these circumstances we do not find ourselves inclined to allow the amendment of the plaints and the appeals. We would nevertheless examine the appeals on merits.
6. We shall firstly consider the questions of law raised in First Appeals Nos. 16 and 18 of 1967.
According to Mr. Fazeel, learned counsel for the appellants, the Notification of the Central Government dated the 11th of October 1960 creating the K. M. C. Was ultra vires of the powers of the Central Government under the Municipal Ordinance; therefore, in the events which took place, the respondents were not entitled to recover any tax under the Urban Act. The second argument of Mr. Fazeel was that the appellants in the two appeals were only sub-licensee of the plots which were allotted to them and had no interest either in the said plots or in the buildings constructed by the licensees or the said plots. According to counsel the plots of land and the buildings, being fixtures on them, were vested in the Central Government and were exempt from property-tax under section 4 of the Urban Act.
7. In order to appreciate the first argument we would briefly refer to the statutes which have from time to time affected the constitutional status of Karachi. In 1947, Karachi was the capital of the former Province of Sind. On 23rd of July 1948, the Governor-General promulgated the Pakistan (Establishment of the Federal Capital) Order No. 15 of 1948 in exercise of powers vested in him under section 29J-A of the Government of India Act, 1935. Karachi was thus made the Federal Capital. Its territory was separated from the Province of Sind and made "Federal Territory". Article 5 of the Order declared that the executive authority of Karachi "shall be exercised by the Governor- General ---------through an Administrator to be appointed by him and that that authority shall also extend to all matters included in List 11 of the 7th Schedule to the Act" (i.e. Government of India Act, 1935). The Administrator was invested with the powers of the Provincial Government, but this was in his capacity of being the agent of the Central Government. By the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, promulgated on 3rd of October 1955, Karachi became territorially a part of the Province of West Pakistan, but by virtue of the provisions of subsection (2) of the said Act, read with Government of India (Second Amendment) Act. 1955, Karachi was still to be administered by the Central Government. This status of Karachi continued under the Constitution of 1956 and by virtue of Article 211 of it the President alone was entitled to make pro--vision for the administration of the Federal Capital, that is to say, Karachi. The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 did not make any change in this status of Karachi. On the 1st of August 1960, the President promulgated the Seat of Govern--ment Order No. 20 of 1960. By this Order Rawalpindi became the principal seat of the Government of Pakistan and Karachi ceased to be the Federal Capital. It continued to be the Federal Territory. Governor-General's Order No. 15 of 1949, to which we have referred, was repealed, but despite the repeal, by virtue of Articles 5 and 6 of the Seat of Government Order, Karachi was to be "administered as nearly as may be in accordance with the provisions of that Order (Governor- General's Order No. 15 of 1948) as so amended or supplemented". No material change in the administration of Karachi was made under Order 20 of 1960. However, on the 1st of July 1961, in pursuance of the West Pakistan Administration (Merger of the Federal Territory) with the (sic) result that it ceased to be administered by the Central Government. It became Division of the Province of West Pakistan.
8. Against the above background, we shall now examine the relevant provisions of the Urban Act and of the Municipal Ordinance. Under section 3 of the Urban Act, the Urban Immovable Property Tax can be recovered only from an urban area, the definition of which is contained in clause (1) of section 2. Section 2 (1) runs as under:- " `Urban Area' means an area within the boundaries of a Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee, Cantonment Board, Small Town Committee or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by Government with the control or management of a Municipal or Local Fund."
But a Municipal Corporation means a Corporation legally constituted under the Ordinance; therefore, the provisions of the Ordinance become relevant. As mentioned above, Mr. Fazeel has argued that the K. M. C. Was not validly constituted accord--ing to this law. We would therefore, examine the soundness or otherwise of this argument.
9. The Municipal Ordinance was promulgated on 15th of April 1960, and the provisions of section 1 and section 3 of the Municipal Ordinance came into force, at once but the other provi--sions came into force on the 15th of April 1960. Section 1 mentions the time on which the Ordinance came into force and section 3 contains definitions. Clause 26 of section 3 defines a Municipality as an urban area declared to be a Municipality under the Municipal Ordinance. Section 7 of the Municipal Ordinance lays down that:- "The Government may, in the prescribed manner, declare any urban area other than a Cantonment to be a Municipality, and extend, curtail or otherwise alter the limits thereof, or declare that any urban area shall, from a date to be specified, cease to be a Municipality."
10. Section 7 itself does not specify the Government which is competent to make the above declaration, but the definition of Government is contained in clause (19) of section 3. On the 11th of October 1960, when the impugned Notification was issued this definition was as follows:- "Government, means in the case of the Federal Capital, the Central Government and in other cases the Provincial Government."
The words italicized by us should be noted. Learned counsel submitted that on the promulgation of the Seat of Government Order, 1960, Karachi bad ceased to be the Federal Capital and was Federal Territory only; therefore, no notification could be issued with respect to Karachi under section 3(19) which speaks of the Federal Capital and not of Federal Territory. According to him, the notification should have been issued by the Provincial Government because Karachi fell in "other cases" in terms of section 3(19).
11. The argument is ingenious but it ignores the legal, position that the words "Federal Capital".
Which occur in) section 3(19) of the Municipal Ordinance should be read as "Federal Territory" in view of section 8 of the General Clauses Act because the Pakistan Establishment of the Federal Capital order, 1948 was repealed and re-enacted by the Seat of Government Order 20 of 1960. We now proceed to explain section 8 of the General Clauses Act, section 8 in so far as it is relevant, runs as follows:- "8. Where this Act or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals and re-enacts with or without modification any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provisions so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as reference to the provision so re-enacted."
The Pakistan (Establishment of the Federal Capital) Order, 1948 was repealed and re-enacted by Articles 5 and 6 of the Seat of Government Order 20 of 1960 as follows: "5. (1) The territory, demarcated by the Pakistan (Estab--lishment of the Federal Capital) Order, 1948 and heretofore known as the Federal Capital shall henceforth be and be known as the Federal Territory of Karachi and shall continue to be administered by the President, from such day forward as he may appoint, acting to such extent as he may think fit through an agent to be appointed by him.
(2) On the appointed day the discharge in the Federal Territory of Karachi of any function hitherto discharged in the exercise of the executive authority other than the President shall forthwith vest in the agent.
6. The Pakistan (Establishment of the Federal Capital) Order, 1948, together with all other Orders amending and supplementing the same, is hereby repealed but until other provision is made by competent authority Karachi shall, notwithstanding such repeal and subject to the provisions of Article 5 of this order, continue to be administered as nearly as may be in accordance with the provisions of that Order as so amended or supplemented."
A plain reading of the above articles shows that the Establish--ment of the Federal Capital Order, 1948 was repealed and re--enacted; therefore, the provisions of section 8 of the General Clauses Act are applicable to the Municipal Ordinance "unless a different intention appears" in the Ordinance itself. Not only that there is "no different intention" in the Municipal Ordinance, but, as discussed above in paragraph 7, the Provincial Govern--ment had no power in 1960 either to administer Karachi or to legislate in respect of Karachi.
12. However, Mr. Fazeel contended that his argument was supported by the observations of the Supreme Court in Pakistan Textile Mill Owners v. The Administration of Karachi (PLD 1963 SC 137).
He relied on the following observations which appear at page 144 of the judgment "In April 1960 when Ordinance X of 1960 was promulgated the Seat of Karachi was no longer the Federal Capital, hence the appropriate Government was the Provincial Government of West Pakistan which had no power to levy any terminal tax on goods imported by sea or air."
The question before the Supreme Court in that appeal was whether the Chief Commissioner of Karachi had the power to impose terminal tax under a Notification dated the 4th of January 1957; the Supreme Court was not considering the effect of the Seat of Government Order 20 of 1960. 7 hey have directly considered the effect of the Seat of Government Order, 1960 on the Constitutional status of Karachi in Amiruddin and others v. The State (PLD 1966 SC 971), and have held that before the enactment of the West Pakistan Administration (Merger of the Federal Territory of Karachi) Order, 1961, the Chief Commissioner was the Provincial Government within the meaning of section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a restricted sense only. They have observed as follows: "The Federal Capital Area was administered by the Agent of the Central Government which possessed in respect of this area all the powers of a Provincial Government as well as the powers of the Central Government . . . . . It is important to note that the agent did not possess any powers delegated to him by the Central Government which was also the Provincial Government in respect of the capital area."
13. As the Central Government's Notification creating the Karachi Municipality was issued before the 1st of July 1961, it is clear, in view of the Supreme Court's observations, that the Central Government alone was competent to create the Karachi Municipality. We may also mention that a Division Bench of this Court has expressed the same view as we are taking in Saddar Cloth Market Welfare Society, Karachi and another v. The K. M. C. Petition No. 168 of 1967. Accordingly, we hold that the Central Government's Notification dated the 11th of October 1960, is valid, and learned counsel's argument that the K. M. C. Is not legally constituted is incorrect.
14. We shall now consider Mr. Fazeel's second argument that the appellants are exempted from tax under section 4 of the Urban Act as sub-licensees. Section 4, insofar as it is relevant is as follows: "4. Exemptions.-The tax shall not be leviable in respect of the following properties, namely:-
(a) Buildings and lands, other than these leased in perpetuity, vesting in the federal Government.
Mr. Fazeel submitted that under the agreements of licence and sub-licence, to which we have referred, the Central Government is the owner both of the plots of the land allotted to the sub- licensees and the buildings erected by the sub-licensees because the sub-licensees have till today not executed deeds and became lessees. In support of this argument he relied on clause 1 of the Central Government's agreement with the Housing Union and clause 2 of the Central Government's agreement with the P. E. C. H. S. And the term of the sub-licensee. Clause 1 of the agreement with the Housing Union, in so far as it is relevant, states as follows:- "It is hereby further agreed that on the due completion of the buildings in accordance with the terms and conditions contained herein, the sub-licensees shall be entitled to a lease of the plot allotted to him for a period of 99 years in Form `B' appended hereto AND IT IS HEREBY FURTHER AGREED AND DECLARED that till such lease shall have been granted by the landlord and licensees and the sub-licensees shall have no right or interest in the said plots except that of bare licensees.
The sub-licensees shall not except for the purpose of raising loans for construction of building thereon from the Housing Building Finance Corporation or a Co-operative Society or Co--operative Bank, transfer any right or interest in the said area, or, as the case may be, without the previous permission in writing of the landlord."
The corresponding provision in the agreement made with P. E. C. H. S. Is identical, except for the words shown by us in italics in the above quotation, and they make no difference for the present discussion.
15. As to the sub-licence, in both cases, clause 2 states as follows: "2. It is hereby agreed that on the completion of the building in accordance with the said terms and conditions and on the sub-licensee No. 2 complying with the said rules, he shall be entitled to a lease of the said plot for 99 years in Form B' appended to the Main Agreement and IT IS HEREBY FURTHER AGREED that until such lease has been granted by the landlord the sub-licensee No. 2 shall not have any right or interest in the said plot except that of a bare licensee and shall not without the previous permission in writing of the sub---licensee No. 1, the licensee and the landlord (i.e. The Central Government) transfer his interest in the area allotted to him either part or whole, except for the purpose of raising loans from the Housing Building Finance Corporation for con-- struction of building thereon."
Thereafter clause 3 states that in the event of the breach of the terms and conditions of the sub- licensees or in the event of a failure by the sub-licensee to comply with the direction of the Landlord (i.e. The Central Government), the Landlord shall be entitled to terminate the agreement and on such termination the payments made by the sub-licensee "shall be forfeited and he (the sub-licensee) shall have no further claim whatever against the landlord . . . Except the option of compensation to the extent of the amount of actual expenditure incurred by him on building on the plot."
16. Mr. Fazeel admitted that the Central Government has never claimed to be the owners of the buildings constructed by sub-licensees and that the sub-licensees have been enjoying all the benefits of the constructions, yet, according to learned counsel, they were not the owners of what they have built. In support of his argument he relied on the maxim of the common law; "quiequid inmedificature sole, solo cedit." According to this maxim, a building constructed on a plot of land belongs to the owner of the land. But even under the common law this maxim has been varied by a mass of exceptions so that it is of little value in the present context. In the instant case; the Central Govern--ment has allowed the sub-licensees to construct buildings on the g assurance that they would be entitled to a registered lease in their favour, therefore, the application of this maxim would be contrary to that agreement. In Thakoor Ghunder Paranick v. Ramdhone Bhattacharjee ((1866) 6 W R 228), a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that this maxim was not applicable to India and observed: "We think it clear that, according to the usages and customs of this country, buildings and other such improvements made on land do not, by the mere accident of their attachment to the soil, become the property of the owner of the soil . . . . ."
This judgment was approved by the Privy Council in Narayan Das Ketty v. Jatindranath (I L R 54 Cal.
669). Additionally, the Legislature has departed from the English Law of fixtures in sections 51 and 108~ of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, therefore, it is clear that the maxim of English Law as such is not applicable in Pakistan. Further, in terms of clause 3 of the sub-licence, the relevant part of which we have quoted above in paragraph 15, even when the Central Government forfeits the interest of a sub--licensee for breach of the terms and conditions of the sub--licence it is liable to pay him compensation "to the extent of the amount of the actual expenditure incurred by him on buildings on the plot". We do not believe that the sub-licensees really mean to make a gift of these buildings to the Government and think that the argument has been advanced to make use of it in these proceedings with knowledge of the convenience with which it can be repudiated if the Government was to claim the buildings as its property. The argument has no merit.
17. We shall now consider Mr. Fazee1's argument that the plots, as distinguished from the buildings which the sub-licensees have constructed, are exempted from property-tax under section 4 of the Urban Act, the relevant part of which has been reproduced by us above in paragraph 14. In support of this argument Mr. Fazeel relied on the provisions of the said section and of clause 2 of the sub- licence which we have quoted above in paragraph 15. Under section 4 the tax is not leviable on "buildings and lands, other than those leased in perpetuity, vested in the Federal Government". It is common ground between the parties that, as the sub-licensees have completed construction on the plots allotted to them, they are entitled to 99 years lease of these plots; therefore, Mr. Fazeel argued that as soon as lease deeds of these plots are executed, the present sub-licensees would become liable to tax as perpetual lessees. He conceded that there is no hitch in the execution of the lease deeds only if the present sub-licensees desire to do so. According to counsel it is up to them to apply for it and that there is neither any time limit for doing so nor any compulsion on them to do so. In other words they have refrained from executing the lease deeds with the object that their omission would technically save them from paying the tax. The stand taken by them is obviously not sound because it ignores the principle that neither a statute nor any document be interpreted so as to enable a party to take advantage of his own fraud.
18. In the instant case the sub-licensees were given the possession of the plots on the undertaking that they would construct buildings on them and then execute lease deeds. After completing the construction they are living in the houses or have rented them. They are enjoying all the advantages of perpetual leases but decline to honour the obligations that are attached to that status merely on the plea that they have not applied for the execution of lease deeds, and are under no compulsion to do so. Mr. Fazeel pointed out that clause 2 of the sub-licences states that until a sub-licensee obtains a lease he "shall not have any right or interest in the said plot except that of a bare licensee, therefore, he. Submitted that even though the sub-licensees are enjoying all he benefits to which they would be entitled as perpetual lessees, they do -not legally have any interest in the plots of land. But the sub-licensees have to read the document as a whole. There is no doubt that the intention of the agree--ments is that lease deeds be executed as soon as the buildings are constructed. The stratagem of omitting to execute the lease deeds is at best a thin curtain drawn over their mala fide breach of the intention of the contracts. We may note here that the co-operative societies have connived at this breach. The mala fides and the breach would have been long ago exposed to view if the Central Government, which is the other party to the contracts, was also the taxing authority instead of the Provincial Government. The sub-licensees have taken full advantages of this dualism, but certainly have not acted in a bona fide manner.
They cannot take advantage of their own wrong.
19. However, in support of his argument that these plots vest in the Central Government, Mr. Fazeel relied on a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Corporation of Calcutta v. Governors of St.
Thomas School (AIR 1949 Cal. 312) and a judgment of the Nagpur High Court in Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nagpur v. H. S. Munje and another (AIR 1949 Nag. 152). In the judgment of the Calcutta High Court the material facts were that the Central Government had requisitioned the property of the respondents under the Defence of India Act for an agreed annual compensation.
The property comprised of a building which stood on a large plot of land, and during the period of requisition, the Central Government constructed buildings on the open land. Thereupon, the Municipal Corporation sought to tax the respondents not only on the annual value of their property on the basis of the compen--sation received from the Government, but also on the annual value of the buildings constructed by the Central Government. The respondents challenged their liability for paying Municipal tax on the value of the buildings constructed by the Government on the ground that the buildings were exempted from taxation under section 154 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 154 of the Government of India Act, 1935 exempted from Municipal taxes "property vested in His Majesty for purposes of the Government of the Federation". The Municipal Corporation's contention was that since the buildings constructed by the Government were not situated on land owned by the Government, the buildings belonged to the respondents. In rejecting this contention the Calcutta High Court observed at page 314 that- "The structures apart from the land are in every sense the property of His Majesty and so comes within the main enact--ment contained in section 154 . . . ."
We respectfully agree with the view of the Calcutta High Court that the building constructed by the Government at its own expenses and for its own use and benefit vested in the Govern--ment, but in the instant case it is not the Government but the sub-licensees who are in possession of the plots and owners of the buildings and are enjoying the benefits of this property; therefore, the judgment cited is of no relevance to Mr. Fazeel's argument. Similarly, the judgment of the Nagpur High Court in Extra Assistant Commissioner v. Munje and another, also does not help him. The facts of that case were that the respondent built a house on a plot of land leased to him by the Federal Government. The local Municipality taxed him under section 66 of the C. P. Municipality Act both in the value of the house and the land. He disputed his liability for tax on the value of the land on the ground that he was not its owner within the meaning of section 66 of the said Act. A learned Single Judge of the Nagpur High Court accepted his contention and held that he was only a lessee of the land and not its owner within the meaning of section 66 of the C. P. Municipal Act. Thus it will be seen that the judgment is of no value in this case.
20. We shall now turn to First Appeal No. 17 of 1967. As already observed, this appeal has been filed by those sub-licensees who have executed lease deeds in respect of certain plots of land situated in the Housing Union, only challenge the recovery of Municipal taxes from them by the K. M. C. Mr. Fazeel's main argument in this appeal also was that the K. M. C. Was not legally constituted. As we have already discussed this aspect and held that it is without merits, we proceed to consider the other arguments advanced by counsel.
21. His second argument was that the K. M. C. Was estopped from functioning as a local authority within the area of the Housing Union and from collecting any tax from the appellants because under the agreement between the Central Government and the Housing Union dated the 14th of January 1954, the Housing 'Union was to develop the area and a local authority to administer that area was to be set up only after the Housing developments were completed. This provision was subsequently modified according to which the Central Government agreed that the area of the Housing Union was to be administered by a Special Local Authority consisting of members of the Karachi Improvement Trust and of the Housing Union. The terms of this revised agreement are contained in the minutes of a meeting which was convened by the Ministry of Works, Government of Pakistan on 5th October 1955 and are confirmed in the Central Government's letter to the Housing Union dated the 5th March 1956. Counsel argued that Housing Union had developed the area on that assurance; therefore the K. M. C. Was estopped from functioning as a local authority and from collecting municipal tax in this area. The argument is clearly wrong because in the first place, the K. M. C. Has been constituted under the Municipal Ordinance and is entitled to collect tax under it. It is settled law that there can be no estoppel against a statute. Secondly, estoppel arises only when somebody makes a representation to another person which induces that other person to alter his position to his detriment. In the instant case the K. M. C. Is a stranger to the agreement which were between the Housing Union and the Central Government.
22. Finally, Mr. Fazeel argued that even if the K. M. C. Was entitled to function in the area of the Housing Union, as a Municipality, it was not performing its statutory functions; therefore, in view of the letter written by the Central Government to the Department of Local-Self Government, Lahore dated the 17th of December 1960, it was not entitled to collect taxes. The letter, in so far as it is relevant, states "I am directed to say that the Central Government have on further consideration of the matter decided that
(a) the Karachi Municipal Committee be allowed to recover its statutory taxes in all the Housing Societies with effect from the 1st of January 1961 and that,
(b) it should perform its statutory functions in those areas with effect from 1st January 1961."
As this letter directs the K. M. C. To perform its functions in the area of the Housing Union and to collect taxes, according to Mr. Fazeel, it is a direction under section 18 of the Municipal Ordinance, since the K. M. C. Has failed to perform its functions it is not entitled to collect taxes. Section 18 runs as follows: "18. Subject to rules, and such directions as the Govern--ment may from time to time give, and within the limits of the funds at its disposal, a Municipal Committee shall undertake such of the functions given in detail in Part IV as are required to be undertaken by Municipal Committees and may under--take-
(a) all or any of the functions so given which may be under--taken by a Municipal Committee, and
(b) such other functions as are declared by the Government to be appropriate matters for administration by Municipal Committees generally or by any particular Municipal Commit--tees."
There is nothing in the above section to support Mr. Fazeel's contention. Mr. Tahir Hussain argued in reply that the appellants' case did not fall under section 18 but fell under section 36 of the Municipal Ordinance. Section 36 reads as follows "36. (1) The Government may direct any Municipal Com--mittee-
(a) to levy any tax, rate, toll or fee which the Municipal Committee is competent to levy under section 35; or
(b) to increase or reduce any such tax, rate, toll or fee, or the assessment thereof, to such extent as may be specified ; or
(c) to suspend, abolish or exempt any person c r class of persons or property or class of property from the levy of any such tax, rate, toll or fee.
(2) If a direction issued under subsection (1) is not complied within the specified time, if any, the Government may make an order giving effect to the direction."
Mr. Tahir Hussain's argument is correct. Section 18 deals only with the performance by a Municipal Committee of its statutory functions, whilst section 36 empowers the Central Govern--ment to issue directions regarding the imposition of taxes and in the event of non-compliance to give effect to them. If the K. M. C. Has violated a direction given to it by the Government under section 36 the appellants may apply to the Government under section 36 of the Municipal Ordinance for relief on the ground. They have neither made any representation to the Government nor have impleaded the Government in these pro--ceedings.
23. In conclusion we dismiss these appeals with costs.