JUDGMENTAKHTAR HASSANJ.-This civil revision initially arose from a rent case. The revision petitioner Mst. Hajan Begum Bibi had brought an application for ejectment against her tenant but in execution thereof, the respondents Muhammad Shafiq etc. Were ejected. They preferred an objection petition, which was accepted on 9.7.1978. An appeal brought against the same was dismissed on 18.12.1978. Later, when the respondents obtained a warrant for restoration of possession, the petitioner made yet another miscellaneous application in the course of execution and got the proceeding stalled. Ultimately, that application was dismissed and even another appeal preferred from that order was as well dismissed. She preferred the present revision petition against the same. Meanwhile, the warrant was executed and the possession of the premises was restored to the respondents.
2. 1 had taken an impression, as is clem from my order dated14.3.1988, that order XXI, C.P.C.Did not apply to execution of order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller. 1 had in my mind the case reported as Abdul Hamid Vs. Abdul Waheed etc. (NLR 1983 CIVIL 403 ) but it was pointed out by Syed Faqir Hussain Shah, Advocate, for respondents that acceptance of his objection petition on 9.7.1978 and dismissal of the petitioner's appeal against that order on 18.12.1978 having preceded the amendment of Section 17 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, taking effect from 12.9.1979 were no more subject to the incidence of the amended law. According to him, dismissal of the petitioner's appeal on 18.12.1978 presented fait accompli of the matter, and it being a case already finally decided, could not have been reopened by a'ny subsequent application or so. He submitted that restoration of possession in execution of the said final order dated 18.12.1978 was simply consequential, and not something substantive in character so as to be governed by the amended procedural law.
3. The contention should prevail because it is not denied that the petitioner's own appeal had been finally disposed of on 18.12.1978, that is much before Section 17 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance was amended on 12.9.1979. Under Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897, rights and obligations determined before the amendment cannot be reopened. It equally appeared correct that restoration of possession in execution of such an order was merely consequential and, therefore, could not be made a ground whatsoever for re-agitating the same matter subsequently.
4. The chronology of orders shows that the respondents were third party and were successful in establishing their objection to the execution. The relevant order was appealable vide Order XXI rule 101, read with Section 2(2), C.P.C, and the petitioner as decree holder availed an appeal. It was , however, dismissed on 18.12.1978 and the only remedy left behind was to have taken the matter in revision before this Court. Instead she tried to put the clock back by making I counter-objection before the executing Court which obviously was not competent. There is no provision in OOrder XXI, C.P.C, or elsewhere to permit a decree holder to make such counter-objection and then take their remedies like appeal, revision etc. Etc. In a fresh cycle. This is what the petitioner seems to have done. Her miscellaneous application before the executing Court was incompetent, likewise, her appeal before the District Judge was incompetent and obviously the present revision petition is of no better character. Section 47, C.P.C, also did not help her inasmuch as the controversy did not arise between parties to the suit: the respondents in fact were third party-objectors claiming in their own right and not representing the judgment debtor. Thus there was no question of their being bound by Section 47 ibid. Counsel requested to treat the present revision petition against the order dated 18.12.1978 whereby the petitioner's appeal in execution proceedings was dismissed. It is too late in the day to entertain any revision to challenge the said order passed about ten years ago. Each day beyond the unprescribed period of ninety days had to be explained.This was the rule laid down in Manager. Jammu & Kashimir. State Property in Pakistan Vs. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 S.C. 678) and Aziz Din and another Vs. Qadir Bakhsh and 2 others (PLD 1987 LAHORE 119).
Counsel stressed that the petitioner had been after all pursuing some remedy here and there in good faith all this while, and that the time taken so far be condoned. 1 regret, I am not persuaded, ln Abdul Ghani Vs. Ghulam Sarwar (PLD 1977 S.C. 102) it was held long ago that time consumed in wrong forums,or for that matter in sustaining untenable remedies,could not be deemed to have been spent in good faith so as to condone it. Even otherwise condonation of delay is a matter of discretion as held in Syed A.I Hasan Rizvi Vs. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others (1986 S.C.M.R.
1086) and the circumstances of the present case rather impell one to reject the prayer out of hand.
Years have been taken by the petitioner in involving a third party in uninvited litigation. Such an unsavoury course on her part was rather reprehensible. The law is not to be used as a handle to perpetuate a mischief or misery for the opposite side. The prayer cannot be acceded to.
5. The whole line of remedies adopted by the petitioner in this cycle was against Ictw. Since both the parties have been heard at length, the revision petition is dismissed as a pacca case with costs throughout. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.