' This is an Administration Suit in which an application has been moved for appointment of Receiver by the plaintiff (C.M.A. No,25/88). This application is resisted only by the defendant No,2 and as regards the other defendants namely Nos.1 and 3 to 8, they, inpoint of fact, support the pleas of the plaintiff for such appointment.
2. The facts of the case are that the father of the parties, late Haji Muhammad Zakir, breathed his last, at Karachi, on 1-10-1980. He had left certain properties which, through a Will dated 28-8-1980, he manifested his intention to dispose of in consonance with a scheme, which was incorporated in his Will. All the legal heirs, inclusive of the plaintiff and defendants, signed this Will in token of their acceptance while the propositus was alive. The Will however, was, as is natural, to take effect after the death of Haji Muhammad Zakir. It is an acknowledged position that, under the Muslim Law, relatable to the Hanafi Fiqh, a Will, even though it be not in conformity with the rules for divestation on demise of a Sunni Muslim, may yet be accepted and acted upon after the passing away of the testator, if all the legal heirs, on the opening of succession, agree to abide by it. This, admittedly, though with certain reservations, had been done here in this case following upon the demise of the abovesaid Haji Muhammad Zakir. Soon after Haji Muhammad Zakir expired on 1-10-1980, a Deed of Partnership was drawn, dated 5-10-1980 (Annexure 'D' to the plaint), which appears to be in conformity with the wishes of the deceased, and in which the defendantsNos.1 to 3 figured as partners to run the workshop in dispute in this case. Prior, however, to such Deed the same workshop business in the same name and style of "Noor Muhammad and Bros.." had been successively run in terms of Deed of Partnership dated 1-4-1978 wherein Haji Muhammad Zakir, and his sons and daughter, Muhammad Zahid, Noor Muhammad, Muhammad Khurshid and Mst.
Shakeela Zakir were partners and then under a reconstituted Deed dated 1-4-1979 wherein only Haji Muhammad Zakir and his two sons Muhammad Zahid and Noor Muhammad figured as partners. It was this last partnership which was supplanted on 5-10-1980, in accordance with the dying wish of Haji Muhammad Zakir, as reflected in his Will and through the Deed of that date Muhammad Khurshid, Muhammad Zahid and Noor Muhammad, defendants Nos.1 to 3 came to be partners with 20%, 40% and 40% shares respectively each, capital contributions being the responsibility of Muhammad Zahid and Noor Muhammad and Muhammad Khurshid being only a working partner. All parties, except the defendant No,2, plead that the firm of "Noor Muhammad and 'Bros." was in reality the proprietorship concern of their father though, for his own convenience, he inducted or relieved members of his family as ostensible partners therein. There appears, prima facie, to be weight in such plea as in the Will of the deceased, acknowledged by all, this firm and its workshop etc. Were shown and disposed of as one of the three assets, left behind by the propositus. Receivership in relation to such firm and its assets is asked for in this application.
3. It is the case of the parties, but not in so many words of the defendant No,2, that disputes, subsequent to partnership dated 5-10-1980 having arisen between them, an arrangement dated 13-11-1982 (Annexure 'C' to the counter-affidvit of Noor Muhammad, defendant No,3), was worked out pursuant to which Muhammad Zahid, defendant No,2, was paid a sum of Rs,48,000 from the account of the firm (Receipt Annexure 'D' to the same counter-affidavit) whereafter the defendant No,2 was to take over the disputed workshop of "Noor' Muhammad and Bros." entirely and, in return, to pay off Rs,16,00,000 (Rupees Sixteen Lacs only) to the other legal heirs. This arrangement, in the Additional Affidavit of the defendant No,2, sought to be filed through C.M.A. 2800/88, which I will later deal with, is not denied, as such and all that the defendant says is that the concern of "General Engineers" was also included in the assets against which the figure of Rs,16,00,000 was worked out but then Noor Muhammad and Muhammad Khurshid, defendants, backed out and declined to part with all the assets and thus flouted the arrangement dated 13-11-1982. As to payment of Rs,48,000 aforesaid, defendant Muhammad Zahid says that "amount of miscellaneous expenses/income of the workshop were lying from the time of Haji Sahab and it was distributed among the legal heirs and I also got my share of Rs,48,235". Now even if all that Muhammad Zahid, defendant says is true the implication of the distribution of income/Misc. Expenses of the workshop of "Noor Muhammad and Bros." "lying from the time of Haji Sahab", from which the defendant No,2 avowedly received his share of Rs,48,235, is that the workshop and firm of "Noor Muhammad and Bros.", prima facie and apparently belonged to the father of the parties. Similar are the implications which arise from the tenor of the admitted arrangement, termed as "Agreement" by the defendant No,2, dated 13-11-1982. Besides, the values, as disclosed in such arrangement, are several fold higher than is reflected generally in these proceedings and therefore protective measures in this case have seriously to be considered.
4. Now, the next admitted stage in these disputes arose when on 24-9-1983 the business of the firm of "Noor Muhammad and Bros" was suspended and intimation to the Income Tax Department was addressed on 27-10-1983. Subsequently, Noor Muhammad filed a suit against Muhammad Zahid in the Court of the XXVIII Civil Judge, Karachi which suit was numbered as 448/84. In this suit wherein a Permanent Injunction was sought against the defendant from breaking open the respective locks of the parties on the above workshop orders of status quo were passed and the workshop premises have, accordingly, remained inactivated ever since 24-9-1983. In the same proceedings defendant Noor Muhammad was permitted to pay the rents, taxes, telephone dues etc. Of the workshop premises, which Muhammad Zahid terms to be insignificant.
5. Matters did not rest here, the plaintiff alleges and no one denies, that then, it was the turn of Muhammad Zahid to file a suit which he did in the shape of Suit No,1774 of 1984 in the same Court of XXVIII Civil Judge, Karachi against Muhammad Khurshid and Miss Shakeela claiming that the latter's firm of "M/s. General Engineers" Ratan Talao, Karachi was established from the assets of the deceased and therefore, he, Muhammad Zahid was entitled to a share therein. It is said that plaint in this case has since been returned but what happened thereafter is not known for none of the parties has dilated upon the aftermath.
6. Thereafter, Mst. Naz Yaseen is reported to have filed her suit bearing No,1075/85 against all the other legal representatives of her father claiming that she had only been paid Rs,5,000 from her share from the workshop. This suit was later transferred to the Court of XV C.J. And renumbered as 4139/85 and is said to be pending. It is interesting that while the defendant No,2 pleads that all the heirs have been paid their shares, in reply to the institution and claim in this suit as pleaded in the plaint he does not say a word that Mst.Naz Yasin was duly paid her share and contents himself by maintaining that such suit acknowledges the factum of the aforesaid Will having been accepted by the legal heirs of the testator.
7. Now, the application for appointment of Receiver is resisted by Muhammad Zahid, defendant No,2, herein on several grounds which include delay in moving the Court, alleged want of cause of action, disputed title of the workshop, the subject-matter of the application and, lastly, that the person(s) in possession cannot be removed by the Court unless the claimant for Receivership has a present right to dispossess such person(s).
8. On the question of delay all that need be said here is that while an equitable relief, such as appointment of Receiver, should be sought without undue delay, as delay defeats equity, the question of delay is always one of fact and has to be considered in the totality of circumstances in a case. The element of delay or laches does not have the same connotations as a provision as to limitation, which bars the remedy altogether, but simply operates as an impelling force leading the Court to decline in exercising its discretion for grant of relief. But such discretion is always 'judicial and never arbitrary. Applying these principles to the case in hand it needs to be stated that this is a suit for administration of the estate of a deceased person, which, according to the tenants of Muslim Law, came to vest in pre-determined proportions in the legal heirs, as soon as the C succession opened, who immediately became tenants-in-common in such estate. All of them, therefore, have rights and none of them has precedence over the other. In this case they seem to have acted on the Will of the propositus but in a way which soon led to acrimony. Three successive suits were filed which hardly served any useful purpose. Parties in relation to such suits must undoubtedly have remained in expectance of relief for all their protestations of lack of knowledge or participation, which I have no hesitation in disbelieving. All their suits touched upon administration of the estate. Even the period of limitation gets extension under section l4 of the Limitation Act if the remedy is sought or resisted in a wrong forum but in good faith. The property which is the subject matter here has remained in limbo perpetuated by these disputes. The application for Receivership seeks re-activation of the assets in the estate. The matter of delay, therefore, recedes into background and equity, on the contrary, demands adjudication on merits.
Such objection, thererfore, is not sustained.
9. Another objection of the defendant No,2 is that the Will of the deceased has been acted upon in its entirety, that nothing remains out of the estate of the deceased, which requires to be administered, that there is no cause of action and, this being so, the suit itself is meaningless and not maintainable and, further, that the plaintiff has come to Court with unclean hands inasmuch as she seeks receivership only in respect of the workshop and not for the other two properties left by the deceased namely, the house and a plot, both of which are reflected in the aforesaid Will. As regards the cause of action the stand taken is that the defendants Nos.1, 2 and 3, according to the Will, were to operate the workshop and were to pay the shares of the other legal heirs which were also determined in the Will and that being so and partnership dated 5-10-1980, having been formed, the Will, allegedly, stands duly implemented and thus no cause of action for the Administration suit arose. Nothing, however, has been brought on record to show that any of the legal heirs has been paid any such shares except the sum of Rs,5,000 reflected in Suit No,1075/85.
The plea of the defendant No,2 is that there was a ledger indicating these payments, which has been removed by defendant No,3 but, surely, in acknowledgments of payments, if such k payments had been made, and to so many persons, at that, there must have been some documents other than the ledger. These payments, according to the Will, had to be made within six months of the death of the propositus and if payments were to be made by defendants Nos.1 to 3 to the remaining six heirs there is no reasonable or plausible explanation on the part of the defendant No,2 as to why there is not a shred of evidence showing any such payment. Significantly, in his written statement, Muhammad Zahid, defendant No,2, has left the column "Documents Relied Upon" completely blank not even mentioning the allegedly removed ledger what to say of any other document evidencing discharge of liability to the other heirs. Besides, the above-admitted arrangement dated 13-11-1982 also clearly implies that the shares of the remaining heirs continue to be unrequited. It is thus prima facie and tentatively, more or less, clear that no payments, as alleged, were made while such payments as per terms of the Will had to be made within six months from the date of death of the propositus Haji Muhammad Zakir. In fact paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Will are most relevant in this context as the same show, both expressly and by implication, that the property in the workshop was not to pass to the defendants 1, 2 and 3 till shares of the other legal heirs had been paid. As no payments have been shown as made, muchless proved, either within the said period of six months or, if I may say so, at any time, the property in the workshop, prima facie, cannot be deemed to have passed to the defendants 1, 2 and 3. It cannot thus be convincingly argued that the suit is bad for want of cause of action or is non-maintainable or the shares of the legal heirs have been paid and discharged. This, however, is said tentatively and the defendant No,2 would be free to show otherwise on regular hearing.
10. Taking up the plea of the plaintiff not, allegedly, coming to Court with clean hands it is virtually an admitted position, on the part of all concerned, that the Will has been accepted and acted upon and that it has been so adapted after the demise of Haji Muhammad Zakir, the testator. The plea regarding the plaintiff, allegedly, not seeking Receivership in the context of the two other properties in the Will has, therefore, to be seen in that background. As to the plot, belonging to the deceased, the same, according to the Will itself, has finally and unconditionally gone to the plaintiff whereas the house in question is being occupied by the defendants, as envisaged in the Will, for as far as the plaintiff is concerned she, per title of the plaint, is shown to be living at a different premises, apparently, belonging to her husband as in the verification clause of the plaint .She is shown to be a married lady. This being so, the only item of dispute in the estate of the deceased Haji Muhammad Zakir remains the workshop in question and if the plaintiff has sought Receivership for the same, in the context of the facts above recited, she cannot be said to have approached this Court with unclean hands.
11. Messrs S.M. Afzal and S.H. Mujtaba, the learned counsel for the defendant No,2, both of whom were permitted to argue on different aspects of the case, have drawn my attention to and relied upon paragraphs 10 to 12 of the plaint and maintain that the plaintiff, at best, can claim accounts and that being the case, no appointment of Receiver in respect of the disputed workshop can be made. Reliance in this context is made on Sardar Ali Raza Khan v. Sardar Nawazish All Khan (AIR 1939 Oudh 229), Mst. Muhamamd Bibi v. Addl. Settlement Commissioner Khairpur and 2 others (PLD 1976 Kar.181) and Mst Ghulam Zainab and others v. Mst Tahira Sultan and 3 others (PLD 1977 Lah.830). This contention will be dealt with together with the one which follows hereafter.
12. Another contention of the learned counsel for the defendant No,2 is that where title to property is disputed Receiver should not be appointed. Reliance in this behalf is placed on M. Ataur Rehman Alvi v. Inamur Rehman (1974 SCMR 54), Mst. Kubra Begum v. Sardar Muhammad Yahya Khan (1976 SCMR 111), Mst. Selma Zaheer v. Anwar H. Pirbhai (1982 CLC 1044) and Rehmat Sons Ltd. v. Saeed Tourist Enterprises (1982 CLC 2667)
13. The citations made by the learned counsel may now be discussed seriatim. The decision of the Oudh Chief Court reported as Sardar Ali Raza Khan v. Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan (AIR 1939 Oudh.
229) is based on an application for interim Receiver, made in appeal, against the order of a learned Single Judge of that Court whereby he had rejected the Receivership application in the Suit for possession, on the ground that the plaintiff had claimed the whole of the property while he was found to be entitled to 2/15th share only whereas the other party was entitled to 1/3rd of the property and the resultant finding was that the applicant/plaintiff had to apply for partition in order to get his 2/15th share. Such application, in appeal, was dismissed, inter alia, on an observation that unless the decision of the Single Judge of the Court was entirely upset, no interference was called for and, besides, waste was not proved.
14. In the case of Ataur Rehman Alvi v. Inamur Rehman (1974 SCMR 54) where none of the properties stood in plaintiff's name and his title was disputed, Hamoodur Rehman, C.J. Observed that, unless the dispute as to title was resolved plaintiff, could not ask for a Receiver and the person bona fide in possession could not be deprived of possession.
15. In the case of Mst. Kubra Begum v. Sardar Muhammad Yahya Khan (1976 SCMR 111) Muhammad Yaqub Ali, J. As he then was, who authorised the order of the Court, making the key obsevation that the order of the High Court, was "in aid of justice" declined interference on facts which revealed that the disputed property was allegedly gifted to respondent and the gift, prima facie, being in favour of the respondent, which was challenged by the other legal heirs, the High Court order, putting the parties on terms, was fair to all concerned.
16. In the case of Mst. Muhammad Bibi v. Addl. Settlement Commissioner, Khairpur (PLD 1976 Kar.
181), Zafar Hussain Mirza, J., then in the High Court, explained the objects for appointment of Receiver, as being preservation of the subject-matter of litigation, pending judicial determination of the rights of parties and forestalling danger of its waste in the hands of the other party, and declared that mere existence of a prima facie or arguable case was not sufficient for appointment of Receiver. There being no allegations of malversation or waste and the plaintiff having delayed seeking the relief for 18 years, this Court contended itself by issuing an Injunction instead.
17. Next for consideration is the judgment of Munawwar Elahi Rana, J., of the Lahore High Court, in the case of Mst. Zainab and 7 others v. Mst. Tahira Sultana and 3 others PLD 1977 Lah.
830. In this case, the learned Judge, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, recalled the order of appointment of Receiver concurrently made by the two Courts below, apparently, on the ground that there was want of jurisdiction in such appointment, as the property was not directly in dispute in the suit. Other factors which weighed with the learned Judge were that the plaintiffs had acquiesced in the property being enjoyed against their rights for a long time, that there was no allegation of waste and, further, an appointment of Receiver was one of the harshest remedies, which the law provided and was available only in extreme cases. On the facts of the case, the suit from which the revision arose was based on the property left behind by one S.S. Abdul Hameed in 1945, which devolved on his widow and 8 sons including one Major S.S. Rashidul Hameed, who died in 1964, leaving behind a widow, a son and two daughters in 1964, who, in turn, in 1970, filed the Suit for Administration on the allegation that the estate with its assets was still undivided, lying in control and management of the defendants, as agents. The application for Receivership itself was moved in 1974. Obviously, therefore, very serious delay was involved for the administration of the estate which was available or apportionable in 1945 and the element of prolonged acquiescence could not be ruled out.
18. Even so, but with respect, I would be extremely slow in subscribing to the view that in an Administration Suit, a property, admittedly, forming part of the estate, can be over-stepped, even though recitals in the plaint may have been found to be wanting in clarity. Appointments of Interim Receivers have been made in cases where the relevant property was not involved in the Suit at all.
Further, the harshness in the remedy of Receivership, if any, is directed only against wrongdoers but for the aggrieved party such remedy is only just and convenient. Besides, while care and caution is to be exercised in granting such relief, that mere circumstance does not render the remedy to be beyond the reach of a claimant, who is able to bring his case within the perimeter of Rule 1 of Order 40, C.P.C., and establishes that the appointment sought is just and convenient and warrants an exercise of discretion to make such an appointment.
19. Adverting now to two other decisions of this Court, ascribed to my learned brother Saleem Akhtar, J., reported as Mst. Selma Zaheer v. Anwar H. Pirbhai 1982 CLC 1044 and Rehmat Sons Ltd. v.
Saeed Tourist Enterprises and 4 others 1982 CLC 2667, the first lays down that the effect of appointment of Receiver is to dispossess the person in possession for the benefit of all those, who may ultimately be found to be entitled to the property but such appointment was declined as the plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie case as regards their right to the property in dispute, as also that defendant No,1 was mismanaging, wasting or misappropriating the property, whereas in the second case, where the plaintiff was owner of property, having passed on the same to defendant to manage and run the business of a residential hotel, the suit being for possession and accounts, appointment of Receiver was declined, the parties having been found to be equally poised, on-the basis of allegations and counter-allegations, but monthly accounts were ordered.
20. It may be true that, ordinarily, in a mere suit for accounts Receiver can be appointed but only sparingly and, likewise, where the title to property is genuinely disputed appointment of Receiver is to be made with all caution. However, the provisions of Order XL Rule 1, C.P.C. Are to be justly and beneficially construed and wherever requirements of law, as incorporated in such provision, are satisfied a Receiver is to be appointed. The cardinal consideration in such matters always is as to where the equities in the case lie or how the ends of justice are to be served for all that Rule 1 of Order XL requires is that the appointment is to be made if it is "just and convenient" so to do. To quote the passing but key remarks of Yaqub Ali, J., in Mst. Kubra Begum v. Sardar Muhammad Yahya Khan 1976 SCMR 111 appointment of Receiver is to be "in aid of justice".
21. Now, it would be noticed that the present is not a mere suit for accounts. It is a suit for Accounts and Administration in respect of the properties left behind by the deceased father of the parties and, therefore, necessarily some properties are involved herein and it is the duty of Court to see that such properties are not subjected to waste or otherwise jeopardised and safeguards are to be worked out, accordingly. The manifest position is that the workshop in question was a running concern while the father of the parties was alive. Its present degenerated position is that it is no longer profitable to anybody. What to say of the other six heirs of the deceased not even the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, who, pursuant to the Will, have formed themselves into a partnership, derive any benefit from it. The defendants Nos. 1 and 3 are thus co-partners of the defendant No,2 in such workshop and their interests are to be safeguarded. Besides, the other legal heirs were, admittedly, to be paid and if they have not been so paid, within the time frame of six months, as settled in the Will, the workshop, for all that may be said at this interlocutory stage, could have even reverted to the estate but then such position can be finally determined only on evidence and on due interpretation of the legal position that may therewith emerge. This, however is a fit case where it has to be seriously considered whether Receiver should be appointed.
22. As regards the question pertaining to the disputed title there is, prima facie, no dispute as to title because the workshop is admitted to have formed part of the Will of the deceased, father of the parties. It is admitted to have been subjected to the partnership, run by defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3, in which partnership the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 have shares aggregating 60% whereas the defendant No,2 has 40% share. Since the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 have also joined in asking for Receivership the alleged dispute as to title is further conditioned.
23. Here, it may be appropriate to observe that in suits for Administration of the estate of a deceased person or for Accounts in a partnership or by shareholders in a private limited company, for it partakes elements of partnership, property(s) is normally involved or in question and in such suits the requirements of Rule 1 of Order XL are more often satisfied than not and, in principle, it is, generally, just and proper to appoint a Receiver, if it appears necessary to safeguard the interests of the contestants. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords case of Owen v. Homan 94 R.R. 516 who in that case said: "Where, indeed, the property is as it were in medio, in the enjoyment of no one, the Court can hardly do wrong in taking possession. It is the common interest of all parties that the Court should prevent a scramble. Such is the case where a receiver of a property of deceased persons is appointed pending litigation in the Ecclesiastical Court as to the right of probate or administration."
24. Next point taken is that, a party in possession should not be dispossessed by or on account of appointment of a Receiver. Reliance in this behalf is placed on Aisha Bai v. Muhammad Ismail AIR 1941 Sind 112, Rais Tayyab and 2 others v. Raza Muhammad and another 1985 CLC 2600, Niaz Muhammad v. The Province of Punjab and 11 others PLD 1987 Lah. 675 and Mir Muhammad v.
Muhammad Hashim and others 1988 CLC 2195.
25. Now, Labo, J., in the case of Aisha Bai v. Muhammad Ismail AIR 1941 Sind 112, holding that "ordinarily in a matter of this kind it would be proper to appoint a receiver" could not do so in the peculiar circumstances of that case, as the plaintiffs, one of them a lady and the other an infant, could not come up with a proper person to run the business of a bakery and this Court had no option but to order submission of running accounts.
26. In the case of Rais Tayyab 1985 CLC 2600 Muftakharuddin, J., of the Baluchistan High Court, declined to interfere in Revision against the orders of the two forums below and appoint a Receiver on the application of defendants against the plaintiffs as the latter were allegedly, enjoying all the benefits of ownership as hereditary tenants since the days of the ex-Rulers of Kalat. It was opined that there were no allegations of waste in the case, the discretion for such appointment was of the trial Court and finally that disturbance of possession being a factor in appointment of Receiver, it was recognised as one of the harshest remedies which law provides and must be exercised in extreme cases.
27. Amjad Khan, J., in the case of Niaz Muhammad PLD 1987 Lah. 675 declined interference, again in Revision, the order of refusal to appoint, being discretionary and on a finding that the petitioner failed to cross the hurdle of sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order XL, C.P.C., as he had failed to establish a right, in present, to dislodge the party in possession.
28. My learned brother Saiduz Zaman, J., in the case of Mir Muhammad 1988 CLC 2195, again in the exercise of Revisional Jurisdiction, declined to appoint a Receiver but ordered periodic accounts of income to be filed, in the background of a controversy, involving the estate of a deceased person, where the defendants had resisted the suit on the ground that the propositus, in his lifetime, had settled the question of inheritance and, in satisfaction of plaintiff's expected claim, gave him a property worth Rs, 10,00,000 at Karachi.
29. There is no cavil with the proposition that a plaintiff cannot seek appointment of Receiver unless he or she has a present right to dispossess the other party. This salutary principle embodied in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XL, C.P.C., however, operates as an embargo only in cases where the applicant, for such appointment, does not have a subsisting or enforcible entitlement. It has no application where the applicant is a co-sharer, a partner or a substantial shareholder in a private limited Company in all of which cases he is entitled to share in possession. In the present case, in addition to claims as legal heirs, which character the parties fill, each of the two remaining partners, in the admitted firm, is equally entitled to possession and so no exclusive possession is to be disturbed on account of appointment of Receiver. But then, even otherwise, the defendant No,2 is not in such possession at all as the workshop is lying closed in the first instance under separate locks of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and then under an status quo order of Court. This being the situation there would not be, in a case of this kind, any deprivation of an exclusive possession for the rule as to divestation of possession does not apply to persons either jointly holding or claiming possession.
30. It has not been argued before me that the property in question is not subject to waste and dissipation. It obviously is, even otherwise, in suits of this kind waste and dissipation is inherent in the situation where one or more co-owners or co-shares continues in possession to the detriment or exclusion of others.
31. Lastly, citation may be made of the leading decision of Cornelius, J., as he then was, in the case of Roshanlal v. Muhammad Afzal PLD 1949 Lah. 60 where the learned Judge, in an appeal from a suit involving a Waqf, heavily relied on authorities pertaining to Administration matters, and held that a Receiver could be appointed ahead of the decree in Suit as the interest of the disputing parties lay in prolonging litigation and safeguards had to be worked out.
32. In the instant case all requirements for appointment of an Interim Receiver stand fulfilled and the present is an eminently fit case in which Receivership is to be allowed.
33. In the foregoing view of the matter and in the circumstances of the case, I would appoint the defendants 1 and 3 as Receivers to run the workshop in question but this they shall run under the supervision of the Nazir of this Court, who in doing so will act jointly with the defendant No,2 in order to see that the defendants 1 and 3 do not, in any way, operate to the detriment of other parties to the suit. However, on account of the strained relations between the parties, the defendant No,2 shall not visit the disputed workshop personally but will only instruct and make suggestions to the Nazir or his staff, who may physically and otherwise exercise supervisory functions in relation to the business of the workshop. In executing their appointments the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 may contribute capital personally or obtain the same from other parties but always with the concurrence of the Nazir and on such investments due returns will be payable in due course and on profits accruing.
34. However, before the operation of the workshop commences the Nazir of this Court will issue notices to all the parties to be present at the disputed workshop in order that possession of the same be handed over by him to the Receivers and a proper inventory is made before he inducts the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 to re-commence the business of the workshop and follow such modus operandi in relation to the same, as may be prescribed by the Nazir. All parties shall co-operate with the Nazir in the discharge of functions assigned to him per this order.
35. This will dispose of C.M.A. No, 25 of 1988 for appointment of Receiver. As regards C.M.A. 2800 of 1988, whereby the defendant No,2 seeks to file an Additional Affidavit in reply to the counter- affidavit submitted by the defendant No,3 such application, which accompanies the Additional Affidavit, is allowed as it is the right of the defendant No,2 to reply to allegations of a party arrayed on the same side as himself, if such party chooses to make allegations contrary to his interest. The Additional Affidavit, therefore, so filed shall form part of the record. C.M.A. 2800 of 1988 also thus stands disposed of. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.