' ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.--This is a petition seeking review of this Court's judgment dated 24th June, 1980, in Civil Appeal No, 45 of 1974 (Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others), which was allowed and it was held that Mst. Zainab Bibi was the lawfully wedded wife of deceased Sycd Riaz Hussain Shah and that her children from the said wedlock were the legitimate children of the deceased, therefore, they were all entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased according to their shares under the Muslim Law as profounded by the Shia sect. The aforesaid judgment was the culmination of a dispute over the inheritance and distribution of the estate of the deceased, who died on 15th December, 1948, leaving behind considerable landed property. The dispute arose as Mst.Zainab Bibi, respondent herein, (who was appellant in the main case) claimed that she was married to the deceased and the other co-appellants with her are her children from the deceased through the said wedlock. Mst. Bilqis Bibi, the petitioner herein, who was respondent in the main appeal, was admittedly the daughter of the deceased alongwith two other daughters, from a previous marriage. The petitioner repudiated the claim of Mst. Zainab Bibi that she was the lawfully wedded wife of the deceased and that the other co-appellants, were the children of the deceased from the said marriage.
2. As the claim of Mst. Zainab Bibi succeeded before the Revenue authorities, the petitioner filed a suit against the appellants at Multan, in which the main plea raised by her was that Mst. Zainab Bibi was the wife of one Allah Dawaya and because she was a woman of easy virtue, she had lived in sin with the deceased, and the other appellants in the main appeal were illegitimate children of the deceased. On this plea she sought declaratory decree that she and her sister Mst. Shado were entitled to a third share of the estate of the deceased (as there were other heirs) to the exclusion of the appellants.
3. Mst. Zainab Bibi and her co-appellants contested the suit and filed a written statement, in which it was admitted that she was married to Allah Dawaya, but as she had embraced the Christian faith on 25th October, 1924, her marriage with Allah Dawaya was ipso facto dissolved. However, sometime thereafter she had re-entered the fold of Islam and married the deceased, from which marriage the co-appellants were her children from the deceased. Thus the real issue on which the parties went to trial in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Multan, related to the validity of Mst. Zainab Bibi's marriage with the deceased. Both parties produced oral as well as documentary evidence to prove their contentions on the main issue. The crucial point in the case was whether Mst. Zainab Bibi was free from the marital bonds with her former husband Allah Dawaya because of her conversion to Christianity, so that upon her re-embracing Islam she was a free Muslim woman and could enter into a lawful wedlock with the deceased, It is only necessary to mention that the petitioner examined Mr. Shad a Christian priest who was blind, in order to prove the certificate Exh.
D/15, purporting to be baptism certificate on which Mst. Zainab Bibi had relied in an earlier litigation.
Mr. Shad in his evidence denied that he had ever baptised Mst. Zainab Bibi or issued the baptism certificate but in his cross-examination he had stated that he could not remember whether he had baptised her or not. Mst. Zainab Bibi on the other hand besides herself produced her (sic) wrongly placed on the petitioner (plaintiff). In this view of the matter they examined the evidence and took a contrary view thereof, holding that Mr. Shad's evidence was improperly rejected by the trial Court and that of Allah Dawaya was given unnecessary and undeserved credence. Accordingly the learned Judges found that Mst. Zainab Bibi, upon whom lay the onus of proof, had failed to prove that her marriage with Allah Dawaya had been dissolved by her apostacy and consequently no valid marriage was possible between her and the deceased.
5. The matter then came before this Court in an appeal filed by Mst. Zainab Bibi and other co- appellants by leave of the Court. This appeal succeeded and was allowed by the impugned judgment dated 24th June, 1980.
6. In support of this review petition Mr. A.K. Brohi learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised the following points:-
(ii) That Mst. Zainab Bibi's renunciation of Islam and acceptance of Christianity has not been legally proved on record, for the reason that only a copy of the baptism register was produced whereas it was incumbent upon her to summon the original register.
(ii) That this Court was not justified to interfere with findings of fact recorded by the High Court without holding the same as vitiated.
(iii) That at any rate the plea of conversion could not he gone into without framing an issue on the same which was not done.
(iv) That as the marriage with a Christian, under the Muslim Law was permissible as a marriage with a Kitabia, it follows that the marriage of Allah Dawaya was not ipso facto dissolved.
(v) That this Court did not consider the effect of section 4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
(vi) That the factum of acknowledgement of Syed Riaz Hussain Shah was not properly proved and even if it be so, it did not con titute either acknowledgement of legitimacy or the fact that the co- appellants were actually his children.
7. Learned counsel elucidating his points submitted that the issues settled by the Court clearly show that the trial Court did not put the conversion of Mst. Zainab Bibi in issue. Our attention was invited to para. 8 of the plaint and its reply in para. 8 of the written statement in which Mst. Zainab Bibi merely pleaded that Syed Riaz Hussain Shah deceased had entered into a valid nikah with her.
It was further argued that the document Exh.D/15 (baptism certificate) was not proved according to law and that the marriage of Mst. Zainab Bibi war not established by the evidence led by her at the trial as was held concurrently by the trial Court as well as by the High Court. In support of the contention that the conversion of a Muslim woman to Katabia order does not ipso facto effect a dissolution of her marriage with a Muslim male, learned counsel made reference to Mahommedan Law by Syed Ameer Ali (pages 351 to 353), English translation of "Durul Mukhtar" page 81 and Muslim Law of Marriage by Dr. Mahmuddlah Jang at page 83. Learned counsel submitted that these authoritative commentaries on Muslim Law clearly support the proposition that conversion of one of the spouses to a Katabia religion did not ipso facto affect the status of marriage which remained intact, but the judgment under review rejected this proposition on the principle of stare decisis. In order to fortify his submission learned counsel referred to the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, and referring to preamble of this enactment submitted that the same only consolidated and clarified the provisions of the Muslim Law relating to dissolution of marriage and to remove doubts as to the effect of renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman on her marriage tie. The submission was that it therefore, follows that the law was along as it was declared in this enactment. Section 4 of the said Act lays down that the renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage. It was contended that the rule of stare decisis relied upon by the Court was not applicable because the proposition relied upon is opposed to law, namely, section 4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act,1939, which was clarification of the law as it has always existed.
Finally it was submitted that although the baptism certificate itself may have been proved, but it does not constitute substantive evidence of conversion. In support of these submissions learned counsel relied upon Surjan and others v. The State of Rajasthan PLD 1957 SC (India) 37), Fazal Khitab v. Mst. Naheed Akhtar and another PLD 1979 SC 864 and Muhammad Bakhsh v. Crown and others PLD 1950 Lah. 203).
8. Learned counsel for respondent No, 1 opposed the review petition and submitted that the grounds urged on hehalf of the petitioner do not constitute valid grounds for review of judgment.
He argued that the question of conversion and legality of the marriage of Mst. Zainab Bibi was sufficiently covered by issue No, 8 framed by the trial Court which reads as follows:- "Are not defendant No, 1 Mst. Zainab Bibi a widow and defendants Nos. 2 to 7 descendants and heirs of Syed Riaz Hussain Shah deceased?"
9. The argument that no finding could be given in absence of an issue on the question of the effect of apostacy on the marriage of Mst. Zainab Bibi with Allah Dawaya is of no substance. In the first place it has been rightly pointed out that issue No, 8 framed by the trial Court sufficiently covers this question. At any rate this question was the pivotal point in the decision of the suit and evidence was led by both parties on it. The trial Court, on the evidence led by the parties adjudicated on this point and gave its decision thereon. It is not the case of the petitioner that she has been taken by surprise or in any way prejudiced in her defence for absence of an express issue being framed by the Court. Indeed the central issue raised by the petitioner in appeal before the High Court was the question of Zainab Bibi's alleged renunciation of Islam and thereby the High Court was invited to decide this question, and judgment obtained by her in her favour. In the circumstances it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to raise this technical question at this stage and argue that this Court should not have gone into the same.
10. As regards the argument that the baptism certificate has not been proved according to law, it may be pointed out that this matter has received consideration in the judgment in reivew in considerable detail and cannot therefore be reurged. On the question of the effect of renunciation by a Muslim female, of Islam on her marriage tie, also there is a detailed discussion in the judgment with an exhaustive review of case law in the sub-continent extending over the last one century and even the argument that the provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, are declaratory and hence retrospective was considered. Adding further authorities to the proposition canvassed or submitting further arguments to support the same, as we will presently discuss will not bring the case within the limited jurisdiction of review. The questions whether factum of the conversion of Mst. Zainab Bibi to Christianity or her renunciation of Islam has been proved by evidence on record or whether acknowledgement of the paternity of her children by Syed Riaz Hussain Shah was properly established by evidence at the trial, have been considered in the judgment and are only being reagitated once again.
11. Coming now to the question of law as already stated learned counsel for the contesting respondents submits that the grounds urged in support of this review petition do not warrant interference by review of the impugned judgment. On the scope of review he has placed reliance on Brig. H.H. Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi Ameer Bahawalpur v. The Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1984 SC 67); Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty and others (PLD 1962 SC 335). On the other hand Mr. A.K. Brohi referred us to North-West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand (PLD 1949 P C 1); Zulfikar Ali Bhutto v. The State (PLD 1979 SC 741); Syed Muhammad Zaki v. Maqsood Ali Khan (PLD 1976 SC 308) and Ch. Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1975 SC 66) and argued that the points raised by him make out a case for review. In the case of Muhammad Ameer Khan this Court by consensus of the learned Members of the Bench which decided that case, attached great importance to the principle of finality of judgment rendered by the Court to be regarded as "a considered and solemn decision on all points arising put of the case" and the power ,f review was regarded as an extraordinary power which can be invoked in exceptional circumstances. Hamoodur Rahman, J.
(as then was) emphasised the limited scope of this jurisdiction and compared it with the scope of jurisdiction in appeal it the following words:- "This Court is competent, no doubt, to reconsider a question of law previously decided in a subsequent case but this Court has no jurisdiction to sit on appeal over its own judgments, and although Article 161 of the late Constitution gives it the power to review its decisions in very wide terms that power, as pointed out by this Court in the case of Ilam Din v. Muhammad Din (Civil Petition No, 3 of 1960), will only be exercised "consistently with the nature of review jurisdiction and with due regard to the principle that there must be an end to litigation." I for my part would be inclined to hold that a review is by its very nature not an appeal or a rehearing merely on the ground that one party or another conceives himself to be dissatisfied with the decision of this Court, but that it should only be granted for some sufficient cause akin to those mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions whereof incorporate the principle upon which a review was usually granted by Courts of law in England. The indulgence by way of review may no doubt be granted to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, as where by some inadvertence an important statutory provision has escaped notice which, if it had been noticed, might materially have affected the judgment of the Court, but in no case should a rehearing be allowed upon merits."
' B. Z. Kaikaus, J., emphasised the principle of finality of litigation and observed that "the mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached can never be a ground for review". Referring to the limitations underlying the principles of review contained in Order XLVII, rule 1, C.P.C. He observed:- "While I would prefer not to accept those limitations as they placed any technical obstruction in the exercise of the review jurisdiction of this Court I would accept that they embody the principles on which this Court would act in the exercise of such jurisdiction. It is not because a conclusion is wrong but because something obvious has been overlooked, some important aspect of the matter has not been considered, that review petition will lie. It is a remedy to be used only in exceptional circumstances."
These are the parameters within which the exceptional power of review conferred by the Constitution is to be exercised. Some of these principles were reiterated in the case of Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi.
12. As reliance was placed on some of the reported cases of this Court on behalf of the petitioner it will he appropriate to briefly refer to them. In the case of Muhammad Zaki the question raised in the review petition was to reconsider the order allowing the substitution of a deceased party's legal representatives on the ground that the Court by oversight had omitted to dispose of petitioner's application for the purpose. The application for review was dismissed on the basis that the question of abatement of appeal having been impliedly disposed of there was no sufficient ground for review of judgment. In the Privy Council cases an appeal filed by the Province of North-West Frontier was allowed. However, before the advice of their Lordships was tendered to His Majesty, it was brought to their notice that the assumption to the effect that the Police Rules, on which the decision turned came into effect before the dismissal of the respondent from service, was incorrect. It was shown that the said rules came into force by publication four days after the dismissal of the respondent. The Court in view of such apparent error with regard to the promulgation of the statutory rules, reviewed the final decision and dismissed the appeal. In the case of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, on which reliance has been placed in support of this petition, the review application was dismissed and it was pointed out that the error in order to be a ground for review must be apparent on the face of the record i.e, so manifest, so clear as could not be permitted by any Court to remain on record. It must be so self-evident and floating on the surface as not to require any elaborate discission. In case of Ch. Manzoor Elahi it was not pointed out which passage of the judgment supports case of the petitioner and there appears nothing in the judgment which has any bearing on the question before us. In any case the review petition was dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay.
13. After having carefully examined the contentions raised in support of this review petition we are of the opinion that the requisite conditions for exercise of this Court's power of review do not exist in the present case. The petition accordingly is dismissed with costs.