1. ' USMAN ALI SHAH, J.--This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 7-3-1988, passed in Civil Revision No,66-D/1988, whereby civil revision of the appellants against the order of the Additional District Judge, dated 6- 1-1988 affirming the order, dated 17-5-1986, passed by the Civil Judge Rawalpindi, was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
2. ' The dispute between the parties in this appeal relates to Jamia Masjid, Lala Rukh Colony, P.O.F.
3. Wah Cantt. The respondent called the P.O.F. Cooperative House Building Society, Wah Cantt., brought suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the appellants from acting as Khatceb of Mosque against appellant No,1 and Muntazim Markazi Jamia Masjid against appellant No,2. After framing issues and recording evidence of the parties thereupon, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit in favour of the respondent society, vide order, dated 17-5-1986 which order was impugned in appeal by the appellants in the District Court. The learned District Judge upheld the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal vide order, dated 6-1-1988. Hence; the appellants filed in this Court petition for leave to appeal which was allowed to consider whether in the facts and circumstances of the case section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is attracted and if so, whether the suit could proceed in the absence of the consent of the Advocate-General of the Punjab.
4. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence on record. The fact is not disputed that the Mosque was constructed with the donation of the Public on State land.
5. It is also conceded that the appellants were acting as `Khateeb' and `Muntazim' of the Mosque, when the present proceedings were instituted. We pause here to observe that suits concerning `Waqf properties are covered by section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code which lays down that such suits must be brought in Court with the permission of the Advocate-General. This being the position, it is obvious that as the consent of the Advocate-General has not been secured in compliance with the provisions of section 92 of the C.P.C., the suit was ab initio not competent. Had the Court of first instance attended to this legal requirement, it would have taken judicial notice of the matter and either would have returned the plaint to the plaintiff or would have dismissed the suit as not competent. In he present proceedings the respondent society was a stranger and had no locus standi to seek declaration against the appellants. The learned Single Judge in the High Court was wrong to observe in a case of this nature that section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code could not be agitated in the revisional jurisdiction because it was neither taken in the written statement before the Civil Judge nor at the appellate stage. The legal position is settled that there is no estoppel against the statute. If it is found by the Court that a party which has no legal right under the law and is openly a stranger and comes to Court to secure relief in a matter, he cannot be allowed to lay any claim to the same without the requisite course. We have already observed that in the present proceedings the respondent society was stranger and would have no locus standi to file the present suit unless it moved the Advocate-General and sought his permission in line with the provisions of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. Thus the suit was entirely incompetent and should have been thrown out as such. In Civil Appeal No,K-57/1975, Fakir Sheikh and others v. Mehtab Shah Pir Bukhari Masjid Committee and others, decided by this Court on 9th January, 1989, a somewhat similar question was raised before this Court and inter alia it was held that unless according to section 92 of the C.P.C. The permission of the Advocate-General has been sought, the claim of a party in a suit will have no legal worth and value and there will be no occasion for the Court to take cognizance of the claim of the party.
6. The result is that, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned orders of the Courts below holding that the suit of the respondent society was incompetent under the provisions of section 92 of C.P.C. No order as to costs.