The facts relevant to this Revision Application are as follows: The applicant joined the Department of Animal Husbandry, Government of West Pakistan on 1st October 1954--and claims to have held the permanent post of Veterinary Assistant Surgeon from 1963. In 1963 he was serving in the area known as the Guddu Barrage Project Area, and by a notification dated the 26th November 1963, the services of all persons working in this Area in the West Pakistan Animal Husbandry Department were automatically transferred to respondent No. 2 with effect from 1st July 1963. According to the applicant, the result of this notification was that he remained in Government service but was working under the second res--pondent from the date of this notification. He further claims that on 5-12-1967, in view of his excellent service record, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Director in the Animal Husbandry Department, and the promotion "was unqualified, permanent and substantive in nature in the transferred cadre of the Department of Animal Husbandry". Finally on 26-2-1971, he was permitted by the Director of the Guddu Barrage Project to cross the efficiency bar so that he entered into a higher pay scale.
Meanwhile however according to the applicant by its order dated 11-2-1970 the second respondent sought to relieve him of his duties as Assistant Director, and directed him to report for duty as a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon. According to the applicant, this order amounted to a reversion and was illegal on several grounds, as he was a Government servant the second respondent was not competent to pass this order, nor could he (the applicant) be reverted without a show-cause notice as he was entitled to the constitutional guarantees available to Govern--ment servants.
However, as the second respondent Insisted on implementing this Illegal order, he filed a suit against the respondents in the Court of the Civil Judge, First Class, Sukkur to challenge the legality of this order, Together with the suit he also filed an application under order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 praying for the grant of interim injunction to restrain the first respondent from reverting him and recalling him. The learned Civil Judge granted an ad interim injunction by his order dated 21-9- 19711, but the respondents filed an appeal against it in the District Court, Sukkur. By his judgment dated the 26-3-1971 the learned District Judge allowed the appeal of the respondents and vacated the interim injunction granted by the trial Court. Aggrieved by this order, the applicant filed a revision against it in this Court, and the learned Single Judge, who admitted the revision, also passed ad interim orders in favour of the applicant. The revision application has now come up for hearing before me, and I will examine the arguments of the learned counsel.
2. Mr. Khalid Ishaque advanced arguments at length to show that the impugned order of 11-2-1970 reverting the applicant was illegal. But these arguments relate to the merits of the applicant's case.
However, in order to obtain interim relief, the applicant has not only to establish that he has a strong prima facie case, but he has also to show that the balance of convenience is on his side and that he would suffer irreparable injury unless he was projected during the pendency of his suit.
That is the settled law, and the learned Advocate-General who opposed the revision application, referred me to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. K-41 of 1970 (Province of West Pakistan and another v. Malik Asghar Khan). There the facts were that the respondent claimed to be a confirmed Forest Ranger and as he was reverted to the post of a Forester, he filed a suit ,:challenging the order of his reversion as mala fade and illegal. Together with the suit he had applied for interim relief to restrain the appellants from reverting him, pending the hearing of his suit, and in the events that happened, a learned Single Judge of this Court had granted an interim injunction in his favour. The ,appellants therefore filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against the order of the learned Single Judge, and in allowing the appeal Sajjad Ahmed Jan, J. Observed as follows: "Issuance of temporary injunctions to the Government Departments in respect of service matters is bound to disturb their working, and they should not ordinarily be issued unless there are compelling reasons to do so because balance of convenience ordinarily would not lie in disturbing the adminis--trative arrangements of a Department. Again, there can be no question of any irreparable injury being caused to the respondent in this case by refusing the temporary injunction to him as he can claim a monetary, compensation in case he succeeds in his suit and the orders of the appellant reverting the respondent to his original post of Forester are finally held as illegal and without jurisdiction by the competent Courts. In this situation, we feel that the learned Single Judge in the High Court has not proceeded on correct legal principles in granting a temporary injunction to the respondent which was refused by the trial Judge as well as by the learned District Judge."
I am in respectful agreement with these observations, and as the facts in the case cited are on all fours with the present case the above observations are fatal to the revision application. .
3. Mr. Khalid Ishaque sought to distinguish the judgment cited on the ground that unless an interim injunction was granted, it would cause very great hardship to the applicant because the Impugned order not only prejudiced his earning but also effected his status. I have pointed out that the facts in the case cited are on all fours with those in the present case, and in view of the observations quoted Mr. Khalid Ishaque's arguments have no force.
4. The revision application is therefore dismissed and the ad interim orders obtained by the applicant in this Court are vacated. However, at the request of Mr. Khalid Ishaque, I direct that the applicant's suit should be disposed of by the trial Court without delay. Both Mr. Khalid Ishaque and the learned Advocate-General informed me that the hearing of the suit should not take time because the pleadings had been closed and the case would largely turn on notifications and documentary evidence, It is therefore obvious that the case can be decided expeditiously provided the trial Court is vigilant. Accordingly, I direct the trial Court to dispose of this suit within three months of the date of this order under intimation to this Court. The offices should inform the trial Court of this direction immediately.