' A suit for recovery of money filed against the petitioner Mirza Abdul. Ghafoor code to suffer default on 24-7-1986 in terms of Order XVII, rule 3 of the C.P.C. And his right to adduce evidence was snapped into passing a preliminary decree ex parte against him on the very same day. Nothing seems to have been done by him for a period of almost one year when on 4-6-1987 he poured in an application under Order IX, rule 13 of the C.P.C. For the ex parte decree being set aside. This application itself came to be dismissed on 24=9-198'7 for want of prosecution and soon thereafter a petition for restoration of the earlier application was filed on 11-10-1987 on the solitary plea that he had gone out of station at the assurance of his counsel who had undertaken to look after his interest during his absence. This petition was summarily dismissed by the trial Court on 13-10-1987 and an appeal filed there against also met the same fate on 6-2-1989. He has now invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
2. Solitary contention raised in support hereof is that the plea for setting aside of dismissal in default of the earlier petition was not liable to be determined without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence. Reliance is placed on two cases respectively reported as 1988 CLC 1873 and 1988 CLC 654.
' There is no cavil with the propositions laid down in the cited cases which emphasize the need for the pleaded cause of sufficiency being allowed to be proved as a fact and they do not get attracted to the circumstances of this case wherein the plea urged for the purpose of restoration, even if assumed to be proved to the hilt, would not suffice for setting aside the dismissal in default.
A counsel acts as an agent of the client and their relationship is contractual so that the result has rather to be that the default of the counsel may get saddled upon the principal (client). It is inconceivable that the failure of the counsel to keep his commitment, if any, with his client may be used by him either to his own advantage or to the prejudice of a third party, the respondent herein.
Failure to carry out contractual obligations may appropriately give rise to a liability for payment of damages by the party in breach of the contract to the party suffering in its consequence but such a breach of contract between them cannot be accepted as a sufficient ground for condoning the defaults of the client towards the litigation. There really was nothing capable of being proved by the petitioner in the Courts below who have not disbelieved his assertion but have regarded it insufficient for the purposes of restoration and rightly so. Contention fails, thus.
' In addition to the foregoing, it deserves to be observed also that this litigation appears to be only unproductive inasmuch as even if the petitioner may, by any stretch, be able to get rid of the order of default passed on 24-9-1987, then the best result to follow for him will be that his original application brought under Order IX, rule 13 of the C.P.C. Will fall to be considered on merits but since that application is barred by time by more than eight months, therefore, it will only have to be thrown out on that score.
3. Result of the foregoing is that the orders passed by the two Courts below are unexceptionable and have not been shown to be suffering from any error of law or jurisdiction to become liable to be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction which, even otherwise, is not liable to be exercised in favour of the petitioner, in the circumstances set' out above. The Civil Revision has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed in limine.