DECISION ' This revision application is directed against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No, III at Karachi, dated 15-11-1988 whereby he dismissed the legal objections of the application with regard to the maintainability of the grievance petition filed by the respondent under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969. The objection of the applicants was that the grievance petition was barred by limitation.
2. I have heard Mr. Abdul Samad, Advocate for the applicants.
3. The facts of the case appear to be that the termination order against which the grievance petition was filed was passed on 22-1-1988. The respondent gave grievance notice on 27-1-1988. He also filed an appeal under the Rules against the impugned order on 7-3-1984, which appeal was decided in July 1988. After giving fresh grievance notice the respondent filed grievance petition before the learned Labour Court on 24-9-1988.
4. The question, at issue, appears to be as to whether the grievance arose to the respondent when the first impugned order was passed on 22-1-1988 or when his appeal was dismissed in July 1988. It is conceded by Mr. Abdus Samad, the learned Advocate for the applicants that if it is held that the grievance arose to the respondent after dismissal of the appeal, then, the grievance petition would be within time. It is also admitted that under the Rules of Service framed by the applicants, the respondent had right of appeal. It is also admitted that the appeal was filed within time. It is, however, contended that the applicant is not a statutory body and, therefore, these Rules of Service are not statutory rules and as such it was not necessary for the respondent to have waited for filing of the appeal or for the decision of the appeal, but, should have given grievance notice within 3 months and filed grievance petition within 2 months after receipt of the reply of the grievance notice as provided under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969.
5. The respondent on employment with the applicants would be deemed to have accepted for the employment terms and conditions of the service as framed by the applicants. As such, these terms and conditions of the service would be the terms and conditions of the contract of employment between the applicants and the respondent. Under this contract of service, the respondent admittedly had right of appeal which he exercised. Admittedly, his appeal was decided in July 1988, and admittedly the grievance petition has been filed within time from the date of decision of the appeal. The learned counsel has relied upon PLD 1971 Lah. 748, which is entirely on different point. It was held therein that the contract of service between the P.I.A. And its employees was not capable of specific performance and the safe guard was not provided to such employees under the Constitution. He also relied upon NLR 1984 (T.D.) 468, which is a decision of Punjab Labour Court holding that the "fact that the petitioner had filed departmental appeal and waited for its outcome cannot be treated as a valid ground for condensation of delay in service of grievance notice".
Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Division Bench of Karachi Bench of High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, reported in PLD 1973 Kar. Page 1. There it was held by their Lordships that "It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that when a statute creates new rights and obligations and prescribes the mode of its enjoyment or enforcement, such provisions are considered mandatory and that the Legislature intends compliance of such provisions to be essential to the validity of the act or proceedings." The principle laid down by their Lordships is not disputed. As pointed above, only point at issue is as to at what stage the grievance accrued to the respondent. The facts of the reported case are altogether different from the facts of the present case. The learned Labour Court had relied upon 1981 PLC 184, wherein this Tribunal has held that where the right of departmental appeal was available under Rules of the establishment, the grievance arises on the rejection of appeal and the grievance notice served within prescribed period of limitation from the date of rejection of appeal was not time-barred on the basis of the date of termination order. In A.D.B. Decision of Karachi High Court reported in 1984 PLC 1149, their Lordships have held that each bank employee was to prefer departmental appeal before invoking section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969."
6. No doubt, in the cases decided by this Tribunal as well as in the last mentioned D.B. Case of Karachi High Court, the employers happened to be statutory bodies, but, that does not make any difference. In my opinion, where the rules of service provide for appeal and if the appeal is preferred, the right to invoke section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969, accrues to employee on the rejection of such appeal. As such, I find no merit in this application. However, it may be pointed that question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the applicants are not debarred from leading evidence to show that even otherwise the grievance petition is time-barred. With the above observation, the application is disposed of as dismissed in limine.