DECISION 'I intend to dispose of all these 18 appeals by this one order as the appellant in all the appeals is same and the questions of fact and law involved are also same.
2. Admittedly all the respondents are the employees of the appellant who had allotted them some quarters built by the appellant on land, leased out to appellant by the Karachi Port Trust. After the expiry of the lease, the K.P.T. Asked the appellant to hand over the land to the K.P.T. And also threatened to impose penalty in case of failure of the appellant to hand over the possession of the land. However, an agreement/understanding was reached between the appellants and the K.P.T.
That K.P.T. Would directly eject the respondents as encroachers under the relevant provision of law available to the K.P.T. In pursuance of this understanding, the K.P.T. Issued notices to the respondents to vacate the quarters. The respondents filed writ petition in the High Court where stay order was issued against the K.P.T. And subsequently the K.P.T. Withdrew the notices and the respondents consequently withdrew the writ petition. The appellants thereafter filed a civil suit in the High Court seeking certain reliefs against the K.P.T. As well as seeking eviction of the respondents on the ground that they were licensees of the appellants who had terminated their licences. This suit is still pending in the High Court. In 1984 the Collective Bargaining Agent Union of the appellants entered into an agreement with the appellants whereby the C.BA. Agreed that the workmen would vacate the quarters on payment of Rs,5,000 as ex gratia to each of them. Out of more than 40 such workers, only the present 18 respondents refused to accept the ex gratia payment or to vacate the quarters while the rest vacated the quarters. The appellants, therefore, filed 18 petitions under section 34 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, against the 18 respondents for enforcement of the aforesaid clause of the agreement entered into by the appellants and the C.BA. Union. The learned Labour Court dismissed all the 18 applications on the ground that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the learned Labour Court had no jurisdiction. These 18 appeals are directed against the said order.
3. I have heard Mr. Noor Muhammad, the learned Advocate for the appellants. He contended that the fact that the civil suit was pending before the High Court shall not bar the filing of an application under section 34 of I.R.O. 1969, before the learned Labour Court. It was submitted that the Civil Courts A have to determine the rights of the parties whereas under section 34, I.R.O. 1969, the Labour Court acts only as executing Court to enforce the settled rights of the parties. In support, he has relied upon PLD 1984 Kar.
503. There may be no dispute to this proposition of law. However, the question is whether the appellants had acquired any settled right which they could enforce through the Labour Court under section 34, I.R.O.
1969.
4. The appellants base their rights on the aforesaid agreement between the C.BA. Union and the appellants. Admittedly, the appellants had allotted the quarters to the respondents before promulgation of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. According to them respondents are licensees and not tenants. Mr. Noor Muhammad also admitted that but for the I.R.O. 1969, they could only evict the respondents after termination of licence through a Civil Court. Thus, the respondents had a right not to be evicted save in accordance with law through the Civil Court.
Section 9 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, provides that nothing in this Ordinance shall affect any law, custom, usage, award or agreement in force immediately before the promulgation of this Ordinance in so far as such law, custom, usage, award or agreement ensures conditions of employment more favourable to workmen than those provided in the Standing Orders. The provision of the accommodation to the respondent workmen was a sort of condition of their employment which is also protected under Standing Order 16 which provides for eviction of the workman from accommodation provided by the employer. It lays down that such workman shall be bound to vacate the premises within 2 months from the date of his retrenchment, discharge, dismissal or termination of services. This Standing Order implies that except in the conditions mentioned above the workman cannot be ejected from the accommodation provided by the employer. Section 4 of the said Ordinance provides that the Standing Orders may be modified by means of a collective agreement and not otherwise, provided that no such agreement shall have the effect of taking away or diminishing any right or benefit available to the workman under the provisions of the Schedule.
5. As pointed above, under the ordinary law, the respondents had a right not to be ejected save in accordance with the Law through Civil Court which right is protected under section 9 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. Under Standing Order 16 also, they could only be ejected in case of retrenchment, discharge, dismissal or termination of services. This right under the Standing Orders which forms the part of the Statute cannot be adversely modified even by the Collective Bargaining Agent as the effect of such agreement would be taking away or diminishing the right of benefit available to the workmen. The legal position that emerges is that the C.BA did not have the right to enter into an agreement with the appellants for vacation of the quarters by the respondents and any such agreement would not create any right that could be enforced through the Labour Court.
6. For the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in these 18 appeals which are dismissed in limine.