1. This appeal at the instance of landlord arises from the order of learned VII th Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller (South), Karachi, whereby he has dismissed the ejectment application made by the appellant before him on 29-5--1988 for eviction of the respondent on the ground of bona fide personal requirement.
2. The appellant is Messrs Habib Bank Limited. It owns a building known as Bank House No.2 situated in Habib Square, Boulton Market, M.A. Jinnah Road, Karachi. Room No.1 of the above building on second floor is in the tenancy of the respondent against the payment of rent of Rs.281.88 p.m.
3. (inclusive of betterment tax of Rs.6.88). The appellant set out the case of personal bona fide requirement in the application as under:- "That the applicant requires the aforementioned rented premises in good faith for its own occupation and use."
4. The respondent contested the said application by filing a written statement in denial of the appellant's claim. It also pleaded that the application --was made mala fide inasmuch as the respondent had declined to accede to 01--demand of the appellant for payment of enhanced rent of Rs.1,782 p.m. Again the existing rent of Rs.275 p.m. The demand of enhanced rent was made by the appellant vide their letter, dated 6-8-1979 (Exh.5/B). It was further pleaded the respondent that the appellant was not legally competent to terminate the tenancy of the respondent w.e.f. 13-4- 1980 as pleaded in paragraph 12 of the application.
5. On behalf of the respondent also only one witness named Haider A.I Fateh was examined, who reiterated the contents of written statement in his affidavit-in-evidence. He also deposed that "as a matter of fact the alleged ground of bona fide self-use was an afterthought and mala fidely resorted to against the appellant as well as against all other companies of Habib Group in order to continue undue pressure and coerce against all of them to comply with the Bank's demand for increase in rent." During his cross-examination not a single question was directed to assail his statement about the application having been made mala fidily.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for parties, who have carried me through the pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence led by the parties on their behalf. It was vehemently urged by Mr. Muhammad Akmalt Waseem, learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Rent Controller has grossly erred in dismissing the application by holding that the appellant had attempted to prove their case beyond pleadings and that the application was filed to; pressurise the respondent.
7. Relying upon the decisions reported in 1982 CLC 935 and 1980 SCMR 772, the learned counsel submitted that the demand of enhancement of rent does not necessarily lead to justify the inference of mala fides on the part of the landlord. The High Court in the above-referred case has specifically held "that a demand for higher rent by itself does not cast any doubt about the personal bona fide requirement if the factum of the bona fide requirement is independently proved:" The same principle has been reiterated in the second above-referred reported case. The learned counsel for the appellants invited my attention to the deposition of Muhammad Inamullah Sheikh to show that the appellants had proved their bona fide requirement inasmuch as their Banking business was showing an upward trend and that the shifting of all the non-public dealing departments of the Foreign Exchange and other branches to the premises in dispute would make more accommodation available to the different branches of the appellant-Bank functioning in the close vicinity at a distance of 100 to 500 yards from the building in question. The counsel further emphasised that although every effort was made to do so, yet the evidence of the appellants on the question of bona fide requirement of the demised premises by them could not be shattered. He also urged that the failure on the part of the witness of the respondent to challenge the correctness of statement made by the appellants' witness to the existence of various branches of the appellants-Bank in the close vicinity of the building in question and of the expansion of their business is tantamount to admitting the case of the appellants as was proved by the appellants' witness.
8. Mr. Salcem Qureshi, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the impugned order. He also submitted that in their letter, dated 6-8-1979 the appellants-Bank had threatened the respondent that if the enhancement of rent to Rs.1,782.50 was not accepted by the respondent they (appellants) will have no alternative but to institute appropriate legal proceedings against the respondent. It is pursuant to that threat that the ejectment application, out of which this appeal has arisen, was Filed by them. It clearly shows that consequent to the failure of the respondent to accede to the unreasonable demand of enhancement of rent, the eviction proceedings had been adopted against it with the sole object of pressurising it. He also supported the impugned order for the other reasons as are assigned by the learned Rent Controller. Lastly, he submitted that Officer of the appellants-Bank who signed the application did not appear as a witness on behalf of the appellants to show that he had the lawful authority to sign and verify the application. No power of attorney was produced although he had signed the application as an authorised officer/Attorney of the applicant. The learned counsel for the respondent also cited an authority of the Supreme Court in the case of Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Mian Muhammad Sharif (1987 SCMR 7768) to contend that if "the assertion that the premises was required for personal use was in such a close proximity in point of time with the demand for increase of rent, that it militates against the plea of the landlord as a strong circumstance reflecting upon his bona fides."
9. I have given my earnest consideration learned counsel for parties. While narrating the facts above I have specifically reported the paragraph from the application which contains the statement for bona fide requirement of the premises in question by the appellants. No specific case has been as such set out in the application as to how and in what manner the premises in question was proposed to be utilised by the appellants-Bank. I also find that in their letter, dated 18-3-1980 (Exh.5/D) addressed to the respondent, the appellants had mentioned that the Bank management has decided to get the premises in question vacated as soon as possible, in order to provide the Foreign Exchange Branch, Karachi and Wood Street Branch, Karachi, functioning in Habib Square a space to accommodatee their staff. The witness of the appellants has no doubt given a clear version as to how and in what manner the premises in question was proposed to be utilised by the appellants-Bank, he being an Officer of the bank has not disclosed the source of his information as to whether it was based on certain resolutions adopted by the Bank management as stated in the above said notice or that there were certain other documents prevalent on record to justify his statement. When I confronted the learned counsel for the appellant with his lapse on the part of the appellant, he promptly replied that the officer deposing in Court was a duly authorised agent and Incharge of Properties Celi at Habib Bank Plaza, Karachi. The learned Rent Controller has disbelieved the A version of the appellant regarding personal bona fide use mainly for the reason that there was a mere wish on the part of the appellants that they will either open Regional Office or some other office of the appellants Bank Branch but they were not certain as to for what specific purpose they required the premises in question. I further rind that the appellants having failed to specifically plead in the application the purpose for which the premises was required, could not be said to have proved their personal bona fides requirement 4ifhply for .The reason that an officer of the Bank who, as already stated, also did not disclose the source of his knowledge, deposed that certain offices of non-public dealing departments, were proposed to be housed or shifted to demissed premises. At this juncture it may also be observed that the demand for payment of higher rent not long before the 5iing of the ejectment application obviously militates against the plea of the appellants as a strong circumstance reflecting upon their bona fides, as observed by the Hon'ble Court in the case of Muslim Commercial Bank (Supra).
10. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I do not find any substance in this appeal.
11. Consequently, it is dismissed with no order as to costs.