DECISION ' This is an appeal against an order, dated 21-3-1988, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No, III at Karachi whereby the grievance petition filed by the respondent was allowed.
2. The facts of the case in brief, are that the respondent was admittedly working as a chowkidar with the appellants when his services were terminated on 4-6-1987, without any order, in writing.
After serving the grievance notice, the respondent filed grievance petition before the learned Labour Court. The appellant resisted the grievance petition on the ground that they are employing only 8 workers, therefore, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, or Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, were not applicable to their establishment. Further, that they are registered under the Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969, hence, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction.
3. I have heard Mr. Laiq Ahmed Khan, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. All Ahmed, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent.
4. There is only oral evidence of the respondent/applicant to the effect that the appellants/respondent employ more than 100 workers as against the oral evidence of the appellants viz. Amir that they were employing only 8 workers. The learned Labor Court was of the view that the burden of proof was on the appellants who had failed to discharge the burden of proof by producing Wage Payment registers, Inspection Book and employment register etc., or by examining any officer from the office of the Shops and Establishment or from the Social Security to show that the number of workers employed, was less than 20. Photostat copies of 2 documents have been produced. Apart from the fact that these photostat copies are not admissible under Qanoon-e-Shahadat, they do not appear to have been proved and furthermore, the learned Labour Court found these 2 documents to be suspicious.
5. By admitting grievance petition the learned Labour Court had impliedly held the I.R.O. 1969, to be applicable and as such the burden had been shifted upon the appellants to prove that the number of workers employed was less than 20. Furthermore, this fact as well as the relevant record and registers with regard to the employment of fie workers would be specifically within the knowledge and possession of the appellants and as such the learned Labour Court had rightly held that the burden of proof had been shifted upon them. In absence of such proof an inference can be drawn against the appellants. Mr. Laiq Ahmed Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellants has conceded that they did not produce documentary evidence before the Labour Court and made an oral request that he may be allowed to produce documents in appeal. No application praying for production of additional evidence has been moved nor an affidavit showing the grounds for production of additional evidence in appeal has been submitted. It was the duty of the appellants to move an application and file an affidavit in support thereof showing that the request for additional evidence was not hit by Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. The parties were given enough opportunities to produce evidence before the Labour Court. The appellants who are employers were educated and represented by able Counsel in the gaps Labour Court and as such they cannot be permitted to fill in the by allowing them to lead evidence in appeal which they failed to produce before the Labour Court. The purpose of Labour Laws is to provide quick and effective protection to the laborers against unjust actions of the employers and this purpose would be defeated if the employer is allowed to fill up the weakness of his case at the appellate stage or to A remand the case for further evidence. I am in entire agreement with the learned Labour Court that the appellants had failed to prove that the number of workmen employed by him were less than 20 and the I.R.O. 1969 or Standing Orders Ordinance was not applicable to their establishment.
6. Admittedly no order, in writing, has been passed terminating the services of the respondent which is in violation of Standing Order 12(3). Such an order or action is apparently illegal.
7. The next objection of the appellants that because the establishment is registered under the Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction has also no force. The respondent was removed from service, therefore, unless he is ordered to be reinstated by some competent Court, he could not claim the salary for the period, in question, as arrears of wages. Section 13(d) of the above-said Ordinance only bars the Courts from entertaining any suit for the recovery of wages in so far as the sum so claimed could be recovered under section 12. Section 12 of the said Ordinance only relates to the claim arising out of delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexations claims. The respondent could not have moved the authority appointed under the said Ordinance for his reinstatement nor could he have claimed the wages through such authority for the period, he was removed from service unless he had been first reinstated either by the employer or by a competent Court.
8. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in this appeal, therefore, I would dismiss the same.