DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No, V at Karachi, dated 25-5-1988, dismissing the grievance petition filed by the appellant.
2. The admitted facts of the case are that the appellant was appointed as `Trainee Waiter' by the respondent vide appointment letter dated 10-11-1986. His services were terminated on 9-8-1987 on the ground that his trainee contract had terminated. The contention of the applicant is that he was workman as defined under Standing Order No, 1 and had worked for 8 months and, therefore, he had become permanent workman and his services could not be terminated on the aforesaid ground. The respondents resisted the application on the ground that the appellant was not a workman but only a trainee waiter.
3. I have heard Mr. Abdul Majeed, representative for the appellant and Mr. Muhammad Humayun, Advocate for the respondents.
4. The facts of the case are not disputed. The only question, which has to be decided, is whether a trainee waiter could be considered as workman. Admittedly provisions of the Apprenticeship Ordinance, 1962 was not applicable to the present case. Therefore, the appellant cannot be considered as an apprentice.
5. It is submitted by Mr. Abdul Majeed, representative for the appellant, that under Standing Order No, 1 there are only five categories of workmen and if the appellant was not apprentice he could also not be considered Badli or temporary but would be probationer, but as he had completed three month's services satisfactorily he would be deemed to be a permanent workman. He has referred to the appointment order which is A-I which showed that he had been appointed as trainee waiter for three months. It is submitted that this period of three months is, in fact, the period of probation as provided for a probationary workman under Standing Order No, I. He has relied upon the decision of Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of Managing Director Sargroh Vegetable Ghee Mills v. Muhammad Mukhtar. Khan 1988 PLC 295, wherein it was observed that there was no principle known to law that once an apprentice, always an apprentice which was against common sense and against statutory provision made in the Apprenticeship Ordinance. In the reported case apprenticeship Ordinance was applicable and workman having first been appointed as apprentice was allowed to continue to work after the period of apprenticeship expired and he claimed that he subsequently acquired the character of workman. The establishment had resisted claim on the ground that there was no order appointing him as regular workman. Their Lordship observed `the written order was not a sine qua non for establishing the relationship of employer and employee which was a question of fact and could be proved independently of an order in writing'. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court and others PLD 1980 SC 323. Their Lordships observed in that case that the employer purporting to appoint workman on purely temporary basis cannot contract out of his obligations under West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance.
6. Mr. Muhammad Humayun, the learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the instant case was distinguishable from the two above cited cases as they did not pertain to trainee workers. He submitted under the first order of appointment the appellant had been appointed as a trainee Waiter and the appointment order clearly showed that he could not acquire any right title or lien on any job/post which may be assigned as a part of his training nor would it confer upon him the right and status of the employee of the company. It is further submitted that the appellant has admittedly signed this appointment order accepting all the terms and conditions as mentioned in the contract of training. He also relied upon two other Exhs.
Exh. R/1 and Exh. R/2 which are also signed by the appellant. Under Exh. R/1 his period of training was extended for a period of three months from 10-2-1987 on the terms and conditions as per letter dated 10-11-1986. Exh. R/2 also shows that the period of training was further extended from 10-5- 1987 for a period of three months on the same terms and conditions. The appellant was admittedly removed on 9-8-1987 vide order Exh. A/6 which shows his training contract terminated with effect from 10-8-1987 and that he may collect his stipend from the Account Department. It is submitted that these documents show that the appellant was under training and his period of training was extended from time to time with his consent as he had signed Exh. R/1 and Exh. R/2. He has relied upon a decision of this Tribunal reported in 1980 PLC 718. It was observed therein that an apprentice in an establishment which was not subject to Apprenticeship Ordinance, 1962 cannot be treated as apprentice for the purpose of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 nor he is a workman but merely trainee person relieved after the completion of training period." Reliance was also placed on 1983 PLC 956 which is a case decided by this Tribunal wherein also similar view was taken. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Nasim Ahmed Siddiqui v. Pakistan Machine Tools Factory 1982 PLC 264. In this case the decision by their Lordship of Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court was also considered and it was held that Nasim Ahmed's case was distinguished from the reported case as the appellant had already accepted training programmer containing the explicit provisions that it was merely a training programmer and not an offer of employment and therefore, he could not be allowed to resale or take a different stand from the undertaking. It was further held that trainee's claim, after completion of successful completion of training, seeking appointment or employment was privilege of management to be considered depending upon available vacancies.
7. It is submitted that the instant case is similar to the reported cases decided by this Tribunal as the agreement signed by the parties clearly shows that it was a training programmer appellant was appointed as trainee and he did not acquire any right of the workman after completion of the training. It was submitted by the learned counsel that the mere fact that the training programmed involved working of the appellant as waiter which was on the spot as part of training programme would not make him a workman as defined under Standing Order No, I.
8. A "workman" has been defined under Standing Order 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance:- "Workman" means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward."
The word 'hire' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: `Compensation for the use of a thing, or for labour or service.' ' The word 'reward' has been defined in the same dictionary means: `which is offered or given for some service or attainment; some of money IC paid or taken for doing some act."
' It is contended that the appellant was not paid 'salary' but 'stipend'. The word `stipend' defined in the same dictionary to mean: `A salary; settled pay; fixed or regular payment.'
Thus it cannot be doubted that the appellant was being paid some salary. It is not I disputed that he was working also but it is submitted that he was trainee worker D and was not regular employee. Whatever the case may he the fact remains that the appellant was working for remuneration.
9. Word "any" used before word person in the definition of 'workman' is very significant. Word 'any' as defined in Black's Law Dictionary means "an indefinite number" One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity. Word "any" has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate 'all' or 'every' as well as 'some' or 'one' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute."
' Word "any" defined in Words and Phrases "permanent edition" published by West Publishing Company--means in its ordinary sense broadly inclusive and in its plural sense means 'all'. It is also defined as 'all' or 'every'.
' In construing statutes and other instruments 'any' is equivalent to 'every' or 'all'. Branham v. Minear Tex. Civ. App. 199 S.W. 2d 841, 846.
' Word "any" is a word of comprehensive meaning and is frequently used in the sense of 'all' or 'every'. Purely v. Inamn 54 S.E. 2d, 800, 802, 215 SC 243.
' The word "any" is all comprehensive and, unless modified by context, includes all persons and things referred to indiscriminately. Orme v. Atlas and Gas Oil Co. 13 M.W. 2d 757, 763, 217 Minn.
27.
In view of the aforesaid construction and definition of word "any", the workman as defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance would include all and every person who work in the establishment for hire or reward. As pointed above, the appellant was working in the establishment as a Trainee Waiter and was getting salary, remuneration or reward for the said work. The mere fact that he was a Trainee waiter would not exclude him from the definition of 'workman'.
10. I have already held that the appellant was a 'workman' as defined under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Under the Standing Order 1. There are only five categories of workers which do not include any trainee worker. As the appellant is held to be 'workman' he has to be fitted in the five categories of workmen mentioned in the Standing Order 1. Admittedly he is not apprentice or badli.
It is not claimed that he was a temporary worker in the sense that he was employed on job of temporary nature which was likely to be finished within nine months, therefore, he would be either probationer or permanent. The period of probation cannot be extended beyond three months.
Admittedly the appellant had completed three months service and had served for 8 or 9 months.
Under the circumstances he could not be removed on the ground that his period of training had expired. He had acquired the status and right of permanent workman and as such order terminating his services was illegal and was not sustainable. His acquiescence to the terms of his appointment is not material. As held by the Supreme Court the employer cannot contract out of his obligation under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
11. With due respect to the view of my learned predecessor in the aforementioned decisions of this Tribunal, I am unable to agree that the Trainee workman cannot be considered as workman' under the Standing Orders Ordinance.
12. For the aforesaid reasons I allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Labour Court and order appellant reinstatement with back benefits. Orders to be implemented within one month.