1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought by the plaintiff/pre-emptors' side against the dismissal by the High Court, of their regular first appeal which had arisen out of a pre- emption matter.
2. ' As stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners, their suit for preemtpion was decreed in 1980.
3. They were directed to make payment of the remaining pre-emption money up to 21st of June, 1980.
4. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs, 1,00,000 (one lac). The petitioners challenged the sale consideration as fixed by the learned trial Judge. According to them the same was Rs,48,000.
5. Accordingly they preferred an appeal but presented the memo. Thereof before the District Court. It is admitted that the appeal was returned in June, 1981. It was refiled in July 1981 in the High Court, but was dismissed as time-barred in May 1982. Accordingly as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners they have suffered two grievances. One, that they have lost the appeal, vis-a-vis the pre-emption money to the extent of Rs,52,000. Secondly, the time for deposit of the pre-emption money fixed as 21st June, 1980, though remained suspended on account of a stay order passed during the pendency of the appeal before the District Court, it lapsed during the pendency of the matter in the High Court. Accordingly, on account of dismissal of their appeal by the High Court the petitioners have also lost the pre-emption decree due to the failure to make the said payment within the time prescribed or within a reasonable time after the return of the appeal by the District Court.
6. ' When questioned as to whether the petitioners made the required deposit of the remaining pre- emption money within reasonable time after the dismissal of their appeal by the High Court as time-barred on 11-5-1982, the learned counsel stated that they have not made any deposit even till now.
7. On the question of limitation the High Court has taken the view that the conduct of the petitioners was not bona fide and to say the least about the facts and circumstances of this case the learned counsel who advised them to file appeal in the District Court, also did not act in such a manner so as to either exclude the delay under section 14 of the Limitation Act or to condone the same under section 5 thereof. The reasoning of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, in this behalf is unexceptionable. The appeal, therefore, has rightly been dismissed as time-barred. In so far as the failure to deposit the pre-emption money is concerned, we might have examined the point of hardship urged by the learned counsel but it seems that the conduct of the petitioners vis- a-vis the deposit of the remaining pre-emption money is not bona fide, obviously because, instead of making deposit after the failure in the High Court in May 1982 within reasonable time, they have not made the deposit even till now, more than six years thereafter. Looked at from whatever angle this petition fails and leave to appeal, accordingly, is refused.