The appellants are the joint owners of the property in dispute which w rented out to the.
Respondent bank in 1980 at a monthly rent of Rs.2,650. One al of the co-owners, Amir A.I, died on 16- 5-1985 and appellants Nos.3 to 6 are his le gal heirs. It is contended by the appellants/landlords that appellant No.5, Mustansar A.I, is the eldest son of co-owner deceased Amir A.I and after the death of the latter he has become the head of his family arld is responsible for their up-keep and maintenance and therefore he desires to start his own business for which purpose he requires the premises in dispute. The respondent bank in its written statement stated that they are a very old tenant and are in possession of the premises since a very long time, that previously the rent was Rs.372.25 P.M. But subsequently the rent agreement of April, 1980 was executed by the parties whereby the rent was enhanced to Rs. 2,650 P.M. With effect from 1-4-1980. The respondent bank relics on clause 3 of the rent agreement, which provides for the renewal of the lease decd for a further period of live years on terms to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. It was further averred by the bank that before the expiry of the lease period, they sent letter dated 14-3-1985 to the appellants expressing their desire to renew the lease for a further period of five years with effect from 1-4-1985 and the appellants in their reply dated 16-3-1985 agreed to meet and discuss the terms and conditions for the renewal of the lease and eventually the appellants vide their letter dated 21-3-1985 agreed to renew the lease but only for a period of three years (and not five years as stipulated in the previous lease deed which also provided for subsequent renewals at the option of the respondent) and that too on an enhanced rent of Rs.4,00n P.M. The respondent bank however did not agree to this enhancement and no agreement could be reached or fresh lease agreement executed. According to the respondents, death of co-owner, Amir A.I, is being exploited by the appellants to co-erce the respondents into enhancement of rent, as earlier demanded by the appellants, and appellant No.5 does not really require the premises in good faith for his own use and occupation for establishing his own business. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties before him, learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the appellant No.5 did not bona fidely require the premises for establishing himself in business and rejected the ejectment application vide impugned order dated 22-10-1986.
2. The appellants have now come in appeal. The contention of the appellants is that the learned trial Court has mis-read the evidence.
3. EX.A/1 is the expired lease agreement. It states that the rent is being increased with mutual consent from Rs.372.25 per month to Rs. 2650 per month with effect from 1-4-1980 and the lease was for a period of five years commencing from 1-4-1980. Renewal clause provides that on the expiry of the lease period the owners shall renew the lease on the same terms and conditions and the renewal shall be for such period or periods as may be decided by the bank in the exercise of its option of renewal. It would thus appear that the appellants/landlords had bound themselves to renew the lease at the option of the respondent bank. Obviously, the respondents had been given this option in return of the enhancement of rent from Rs.372.25 per month to Rs. 2,650 per month. The respondents bank having thus the option to renew the lease, exercised this option vide letter dated 14-3-1985 (ExA/2) and intimated the appellants that the bank was renewing the lease for a further period of five years with effect from Ist April, 1985. The appellants replied this letter vide their letter dated 16-3-198.5 (Ex.A/3) wherein they agreed for the renewal and asked for time and date for a meeting to discuss the terms and conditions for further renewal. It is clear that this letter makes certain mis-statements of fact inasmuch as it is stated therein that under clause 3 of the rent agreement further renewal of the lease was subject to mutual consent and the terms of the renewal of the lease were to be determined afresh. Copy of the lease deed Ex.A/1 shows that under clause 3(i) thereof the lease was renewable "on the same terms for such periods or period as may be required her the bank in the exercise of its option of renewal as provided-herein above. " No terms and conditions for the renewal were thus open to discussion. The lease was to be renewed on the same terms and conditions as contained in Ex.A/2 and the option to renew the lease deed lay with the respondent bank. In this context the Court was referred to PLD 1980 SC 298 and PLD 1988 SC 190, where it has been held that any clause in rent agreement which is contrary to rent law is in valid. I do not think that enhancement of rent from Rs. 372.25 to 2,650 is contrary to rent law.
Nor do I think that renewal clause is contrary to rent law. Obviously, the appellants/landlords conceded to the inclusion of the renewal clause in consideration to the enhancement of rent and, in my view, both these stipulations do not infringe the rent law. Moreover, the appellants cannot at one hand rely oil the legality of the lease agreement in so far as enhancement of rent is concerned I and, on the other hand, repudiate the legality of the same (case deed in so far as the renewal of lease is concerned as per clause 3(i) of the lease deed. The clause, providing enhancement of rent and the clause providing for the renewal of the lease go together and must be read together. As would appear from clause 1(i) of the lease deed it was not even necessary for the parties to execute a fresh lease agreement. It was enough if the respondent bank exercised its option for the renewal of the lease and intimated the appellants accordingly. This the respondent bank did vide their letter dated 14-3-1985 (Ex.A/2). The lease thus stood renewed for another live years with effect from 1st April, 1985.
4. In view of the renewal clause in the lease deed the appellants cannot seek ejectment on the ground of personal requirements of appellant No.5. If at all they should be suffered to raise this plea of personnel requirements, they must forfeit the enhanced rent which was the consideration for which the appellants had included the renewal clause in the lease deed.
5. Even otherwise, the requirement of appellants No.5 do not appear to be bona fide. Till as late as 16-3-1985 they were willing to abide by the terms of the lease deed as contained in clause 3 thereof with the only exception that in contradiction of the same clause 3, they demanded that the renewal should be based on afresh lease agreement whose terms should be agreed afresh. Till 214 March, 1985 when they sent letter ExA/5 the appellants were still willing to renew the lease. (The appellants however did not intimate the respondent bank that they were" unwilling to renew the lease (the act from which they had Contracted themselves out vide clause 3(i) of the lease deed Ex.A/2) and instead filed this ejectment application on 28-7-1985. The only circumstance which has Changed between 21st March, 1985, and 28th July, 1985 is the death of Amir A.I, father of appellants No.4 to 6 and husband of appellant No.3 and it is claimed that in view of the death of Amir A.I, appellant No.5 Mustansar A.I now desires to set himself up in paper business in the demised premises. Appellant No.5 was studying in second year in S.M. College, Karachi and was 18 years old on 15-2--1986 when he was cross-examined. I am not convinced that within three months of the death of his father he would have decided to set himself up in business on such a scale which required as much as 1,450 sq. Ft. Of space (on the ground and the mazanine floor) where the respondent bank is located. Even otherwise, it is, conceded in the cross-examination of A.W.2 Mansur A.I that appellant No.5 has joined the family partnership business on 1-7-85, i.e., before the death of his father Amir A.I. He was thus sufficiently employed in family business and he was-- also undergoing education and it does not appear probable that he would have enough extra time to devote to the paper business which he claimed he intended to start in the denused premises.
There is also sufficient evidence on record to show that the appellants have vast property located in the business area and is appellant No.5 had indeed bona fidely desired to set up paper business, he coup; have found sufficient space out of the property already in possession of the family business. No doubt, a landlord cannot be forced to use any specific property of his own for his personal requirements and he has full discretion to select in any of hip, properties of his use and occupation but he must at the same time prove the bony: fides of his requirements. As has been observed above, the appellants have failed to. Show that the demised premises are required bona fidely by appellant No.5.
6. In view of my above observations, I find no force in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly rejected and the impugned order is maintained. The parties shall bear their own costs.
M.Y.H/M-782/K