' This is an appeal directed against the decision dated 6-2-1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 3, Lahore at Ferozewala, whereby holding that the respondent was covered by the definition of workman, he was ordered to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. The only point argued before me is that the respondent is not covered by the definition of workman. He was Security Inspector. His duties at Moghalpura were different. On 13-2-1984 he was transferred to the factory and posted as Security Inspector at the gate. The duty performed by him after he was transferred to the factory, therefore, is relevant but tht learned lower Court relied upon the documents Exhs. P-1 to P-17, which pertain to the duties performed by the respondent in Moghalpura before he was transferred to the factory. Besides these documents the respondent did not produce any documentary evidence on the point. He, however, has appeared as his own witness. In his oral statement the respondent has made reference to letters Exhs. P 2 and P 3. Exh. P 2 is dated 16-2-1982 and, as mentioned above is not relevant, inasmuch as the respondent was at Moghalpura at that time and not in the Mills. It is addressed to all time office clerks and security inspectors. With pen and ink the name of the respondent is written in brackets. Since 1982 the respondent was not working in the Mills, this letter was not addressed to him. The entry of his name in ink in the letters, therefore, appears to have been made afterwards by way of interpolation. Ex. P 3 is about the changing of shifts. This letter is dated 23-2-1980. This letter shows that Mr. Muhammad Ayub Khan was posted in the oil decantation cell at Moghalpura, where the respondent was already working. Both of them were ordered to work in shifts A and B and to change their shifts alternatively. The letter, therefore, is not relevant to the point. No doubt, the respondent stated in his statement that while posted in the factory his duties consisted of checking incoming and outgoing vehicles to see whether the articles in them corresponded to the papers but since no documentary evidence has been produced, his bare statement has no value. He must have been making entries in the register and reports about the checking done by him but no report was produced on the record. The appellant produced leave applications Exs. R 2 to R 6 which bear the signatures of the respondent. He recommended the leave application. It is thus clear that without his recommendation leave could not be granted. He thus was supervising the work of those workers whose leave applications were recommended by him. R.W.1 stated that four security guards and watchmen used to work under the respondent, and he used to give duties to them. He produced copy of the duty register Exh. P 1 also. The respondent, no doubt, denied the suggestion in cross-examination that he used to supervise the work of the workers, but applications Exhs. R 2 to R-6 which were produced by way of specimen amply prove that his duties were supervisory. R.W.1, therefore, rightly stated that the respondent used to supervise the working of the security guards and watchmen. No evidence of the clerical work, if any done by the respondent, has been produced in evidence. The learned lower Court considered those duties which the respondent was performing at Moghalpura and thus fell in error in holding that he has been proved to be workman.
He learned lower Court relied upon 1984 PLC 598 and 1984 PLC 569. It has been remarked by the learned lower Court in the judgment that the duties of the employees who were parties to the above-mentioned rulings were similar to the duties of the respondent. The observation is wrong.
The duties were not similar. As mentioned above, the learned lower Court considered those duties which the respondent was performing at Moghalpura in 1980 to 1983 before he was transferred to the Mills. According to salary statement Exh. R 8, his Basic Salary was Rs, 638, House Rent Allowance Rs, 383 and dearness allowance Rs,
64. Thus, his wages exceeded Rs, 800. So, both the conditions laid down in exception (b) to section 2(xocviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 stood fulfilled. So far as the definition of workman given in section 2 (i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is concerned, as discussed above, there is no evidence that the respondent was performing any clerical duties as his main duties. He thus has been wrongly adjudged as workman by the learned lower Court.
3. As a result, the appeal is accepted and holding that the respondent is not covered by the definition of workman either given in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1963, the impugned decision of the learned lower Court is set aside. The grievance petition of the respondent, therefore, stands dismissed.