This revision petition arises out of a suit filed by the petitioner on 27th of July, 1987 for the recovery of Rs.50,00,000 as compensation for libel. In the suit the petitioner/plaintiff had impleaded, (i) Daily Mashriq through Editor and Publisher, (ii) Mr. Ziaul Islam Ansari, Editor and Publisher of Daily Mashriq, (iii) Government of Punjab, and (iv) Mr. Ahmad Nasim, Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore as defendants. In the plaint, it was alleged that the petitioner had been defamed by publication of defamatory ,matter appearing m `Daily Mashriq' of 5th of July, 1986 and Sunday Edition of. Mashriq, dated 27th of July, 1986. These publications were allegedly based on 'a statement made in a Press Conference by respondent No.2, who, at that time was the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore. It was asserted that though the petitioner was not named in the publications but the innuendo was too obvious and it was understood by all as relating to the plaintiff/petitioner.
2. The respondents Nos.3 and 4 contested the suit by filing their written statement, but respondents Nos.1 and 2 instead of submitting the written statement, riled an application under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. For rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit on the face of it was barred by time. This application was resisted by the petitioner by filing a reply. On 20th of April, 1988, the trial Court while accepting this application, proceeded to reject the plaint as regards respondents Nos.1 and 2, as being barred by time. It was observed that according to the plaint itself, the libel was published in the `Daily Mashriq' of 5th of July, 1986, while the suit was riled on 27th of July, 1987, beyond the period of one year prescribed by Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1908. This order has bean assailed in this revision petition.
3. It is well-settled and needs no gainsaying that under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C. a plaint can only be rejected, if on the basis of the statements made in the plaint itself, the suit appears, on the face of it, to be barred by any law. For A this limited purpose, every allegation in the plaint is to be taken as correct. In the present case, from the perusal of the plaint, it is apparent that the petitioner had claimed to have been defamed twice, firstly, by publication of libel in `Daily Mashriq' of 5th of July, 1986 and for the second time by its publication in Sunday Edition of `Daily Mashriq' of 27th of July, 1986. The trial Court proceeded on the assumption that the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of first publication i.e. 5th of July, 1986 but did not take into account the subsequent publication of 27th of July, 1986.
4. I have heard Syed A.I Zafar, Advocate in support of this petition, and Rana Muhammad Arif, learned A.A.-G. Who appeared for respondents Nos.1 and 2. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court erred in holding that the suit was barred by time and while coming to this conclusion, the subsequent publication of 27th July, 1986 was completely ignored by it. The learned Assistant Advocate-General on the other hand, contended that as the suit was not brought within one year of the first publication of libel, it was not within time and the plaint was rightly rejected by the trial Court.
5. Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes the limitation for filing a suit for recovery of compensation provides that the suit has to be Filed within one year of the publication of libel. The limitation, under this Article, runs from the date when the libel is published but it need not be the first publication. The words "libel is published" cannot be read "when the libel is first published". In law each and every publication or repetition thereof gives a fresh cause of action to the plaintiff and it is not necessary that all or the first publication should be within one year. It is sufficient if any one of the publications is proved to have been made within the prescribed period.
"Each communication of a libel is a separate publication in respect of which a civil action may be brought or - criminal proceedings may be instituted."
Carter-Ruck in his book "Libel and Slander" (3rd Edition) at page 62 has opined that technically each and every publication of a libel gives rise to a fresh cause of action. Colin Duncan and Brian Neill in their treatise on "Defamation" at page 38, have explained that each communication of a defarrmatory matter to a publisher, is, in law a separate publication and if the libel is contained in a book or newspaper, each publication to each publish of each copy of the book or newspaper is a separate publication.
6. This question was considered by Calcutta High Court in Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury v.
Tarapada Sanyal (40 C.W.N. 500) and it will be useful to reproduce the observations appearing at page 501 of the report:-- " ....One of the grounds for dismissal is that the suit is barred under Art.24 of the first schedule to the Limitation Act which imposes a limitation of one year for a suit for compensation, for libel. The reply is that publication to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was on the 30th of April, 1926, and the suit was instituted within a year from that date and each, publication gives a fresh cause of action and the suit is therefore not barred under Art.24 of the Limitation Act. The Appellants' argument on this point is sound ...."
7. From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the time under Article 24 runs from the date of a publication of the defamatory matter which need not ~be the first publication. It may also be pointed out that "publication" as appearing in Article 24 of the Limitation Act and as understood in the context of law of defamation means, the communication of the defamatory matter to a third person or making known of defamatory matter to any person other than the one about whom it is published.
8. 1n the present case it is pertinent that the trial Court was acting under a misconception of law while rejecting the plaint under Order 7 rule 11(d) of the C.P.C. And did not take into account the subsequent publication of 27th of July, 1986 from which the suit was within time. The impugned order is, therefore, not sustainable. It may, however, be clarified that the observations made in this judgment are only for the purpose of decision of the application under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. And it will be open to the respondents to raise all such pleas as may be available to them under the law, in their written statement before the trial Court.