1. ' USMAN ALI SHAH, J.-- Leave was granted to the appellant to examine the correctness of the decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 21-9-1982, passed in case No,229/1000/81, whereby, appeal of the appellant against the order dated 8-11-1980, passed by the respondent No,4, regarding dismissal from I service of appellant, was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
2. ' The appellant was appointed as an A.S.I. On 3-9-1966 in the District Police of Lahore. He was placed on probation for two years with effect from 5-11-1973 to 4-11-1975. When his period of probation was about to expire, the S.P. City Police, recommended his period of probation for a further period of six months, vide letter No,5878/Steno dated 1-11-1975, addressed to D.I.-G.
3. Respondent No,3 but it was found that the appellant was addicted to drinking habits, average in work and enjoying poor reputation, he instead of extending the period of his probation, passed the orders of reversion against the appellant vide his order dated 3-11-1975.
4. ' The appellant filed a Writ Petition No,9396/S-1979 challenging the said order of the D.I.-G.
5. Respondent No,3 before the Lahore High Court. The learned High Court vide its judgment dated 26- 4-1980 held that the S.P. Concerned who would be competent authority in case of the appellant, shall pass the order within three weeks. This order was passed on the undertaking of the A.A.-G.
6. Who conceded that in matter relating to reversion of the appellant from probation period, respondent No,4 was the competent authority and not the respondent No,3. So, the file of the appellant was sent back to the S.P. (Administration) to pass the order after the decision of the High Court. Consequently, respondent No,4, vide his order dated 8-11-1980 after taking into consideration the previous record of service of the appellant, removed him from probation from the date on which he was placed. While the case was not yet finalised by the S.P. (Admin), the appellant filed a contempt petition against respondent No,3, stated therein that he was flouting the orders of the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court vide his order dated 15-11-1980 held as under:-- "As the order has now been passed by the S.P. I would not like to proceed with the matter further. It shall stand disposed of."
7. ' The appellant challenged this order of the High Court dated 15-11-1980 before a Division Bench of the said High Court. The learned Bench vide its order dated 18-1-1981 rejected the same on the ground that the clarification of the said order had to be sought from the same Judge who passed the order and not the present Bench. The appellant again filed a Writ Petition No,11715-S of 1980 in the Lahore High Court with the prayer that the Order No,40555-59/B dated 8-11-1980 regarding the removal of the appellant from probation by S.P. (Admin) be set aside and the appellant be declared as confirmed A.S.I. Since the date of expiry of his probation period. The said writ petition of the appellant was dismissed, vide order dated 16-12-1980 with the observation that the appellant has already approached the higher executive authorities, therefore, his remedy with the said authority would be more competent as provided by law.
8. ' Being aggrieved, the appellant filed Service Appeal No,229/1000/81 before the Punjab Service Tribunal against the order of his dismissal dated 8-11-1980 by the respondent No,4. The learned Chairman and Members of the Tribunal after going into the relevant record and decisions taken by the competent authorities as well as that of the learned High Court, Lahore in writ petitions filed by the appellant, dismissed the appeal of the appellant on the following observations:-- "While attending to this argument, we find that actually competent authority had taken a decision before the expiry of the probationary period of the appellant that he was an unfit person for confirmation and requested the D.I.-G. At that time to extend his period of probation to another six months. The D.I.-G. Being the overall authority instead of extending such period, reverted the appellant to his substantive rank of temporary A.S.I. Now the second order which is under dispute is confirmation of the earlier view of the S.P. And D.I.-G., formally expressed, after the verdict of the High Court and cannot be said to be retrospective order. If the appellant would not have challenged the earlier situation before the High Court, the said reversion would have remained in field, therefore, it cannot be said to be a fresh order, but an order to fulfil the formality and to remove the legal lacuna, as pointed by the High Court. The appellant's record of service has throughout be changed one and it was only due to his average work, with reputation of drinking habits and doubtful integrity, that his case is not recommended by the then S.P. For confirmation.
9. ' With regards to the allegations of malice against the present D.I.-G. Police Mr. Jchanzeb Burki, we find that the same is without any foundation. This appellant when it was found that he had acted in a gallant manner in dacoity/robbery case, the D.I.-G., Police against whom malice has been alleged confined him straightaway. We note with concern such like tendencies, which are getting into this disciplined service, to malice its suspension without any rhyme and reason.
10. ' In view of the detailed analysis of all the pros and cons of this case we do not find any reason to hold that impugned order dated 8-111980 was passed by an authority, incompetent to do so, or that appellant stood confirmed from 5-11-1975 as an A.S.I."
11. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the judgment of the learned Tribunal as well as the relevant documents in the light of the contentions raised by the learned counsel. The appellant's counsel urged that the appellant was placed on probation for two years with effect from 5-11-1973 which was not extendable under the rules and this period should not have been extended beyond two years but the order of probation of the appellant remained in force till 8-11-1980 when his removal order from probation was passed by the respondent No,4 which is contrary to the police rules. He further contended that the entire service record of the appellant has been taken into consideration i.e, from 3-9-1966 to 5-11-1973 during which period he was a temporary A.S.I. And not a probationer, therefore, his entire service record should not have been taken into consideration by the authority for assessment of his performance. A perusal of the record shows that the appellant was on probation till 5-11-1975 with his two years probation period.
12. According to the P.R.
13. 13.18 this period of service of the appellant was not confirmed by the competent authority but instead the appellant was placed on adverse report which has ultimately resulted in his reversion on the charges of average performance, bad reputation and being addicted to alchohol and also taking little interest in finalisation of the investigation of cases entrusted to him by his superiors. His case for confirmation was duly considered by the competent authority but he was always not found fit for confirmation due to abovementioned adverse remarks endorsed in his service record.
14. Due to this reason no option was left with the competent authority i.e, S. P. (Administration) but to pass his reversion and removal from probation order, which he was competent to do so under P.R.
15. 18.13. The appellant was never recommended by any authority for confirmation and as a matter of fact the orders of probation and confirmation were within the exclusive powers of departmental authority.
16. ' Under the circumstances, we are, therefore, of the opinion that the findings recorded in the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal are based on due and proper appreciation of the entire record and the learned Chairman and Members have arrived at a correct conclusion to dismiss the appeal of the appellant and the learned counsel failed to show any legal infirmity therein. We, therefore, find that this appeal has no merits for consideration of any interference in the impugned judgment. We, therefore, dismiss the same with no order as to costs.