' The appeal captioned above emerges from the decision dated 28-7-1988 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.4, Faisalabad, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement has been dismissed on the grounds that he is not covered by the definition of workman and that the order of removal from service was passed by the competent authority.
2. The services of the appellant were terminated as no longer required. He was Grade-II officer.
Firstly the charge-sheet was issued and inquiry was held but without passing any order in that respect, the services of the appellant were terminated. The appellant appeared as his own witness and on behalf of the respondents Mr.Abdul Jabbar, who had been appointed after the termination of the appellant in his place, was produced as RW-1. The emoluments of the appellant, according to the statement of RW-1, were Rs,2,198 including the dearness allowance, house rent, conveyance allowance and evening allowance. The basic pay, according to the witness, was Rs,1,270. On the issue of workman the appellant deposed that his duties were to maintain ledgers, accounts books and other books, to prepare statements and to fill up account opening forms. RW-1 deposed on the point of workman that the appellant was employed as officer Grade-II and was incharge of advances whose main duty was supervisory and he did not do any clerical job. He also deposed that the appellant used to supervise the work of lower staff and was not responsible to maintain cash books and ledgers as it was the duty of the clerical staff. In cross-examination he said that he could recommend leave applications but could not grant them. It is difficult to believe that an officer Grade-II getting handsome emoluments of Rs,2,198 per month was entrusted merely clerical work which is done by a clerk or a typist. The appellant did not bring on the record any record of clerical work done by him. Question arises if the appellant was doing clerical work, then what was the duty of the clerical staff. He did not disclose what work the clerical staff was doing and if he did not supervise them, then by whom they were being supervised. The respondents too were at fault in not bringing on the record documentary evidence such as the leave applications recommended or accepted by the appellant or any other document to show that he used to supervise the clerical staff, but in view of the handsome emoluments of the appellant, the presumption is that he was not entrusted merely clerical work. So far as emoluments are concerned, the statement of the appellant is silent, therefore, the statement of RW-1 and the contents of the copy of the salary register D-1 cannot be disbelieved. He being incharge of advances was performing very important duties and this is not believable that such an officer was doing only clerical job. The learned lower Court thus has rightly found that the appellant failed to prove that he was covered by the definition of workman given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
3. However, the services of the appellant were wrongly terminated under paragraph 234 of the Wage Commission Award. Since there were allegations against him and he was actually charge- sheeted and an inquiry was held against him, action could be taken against him as a result of inquiry and the respondents were not justified in passing an order of termination simplicity.
Paragraph 234 of the Wage Commission Award does not cover cases of misconduct. Since no ground is given in the order of termination as to why the services of the appellant were not required, it is apparent that on account of the charges laid against him he was shunted out. Of course, if he had been working within the probationary period, his services could be terminated on the ground that his work was not satisfactory but this is not the case of the respondents. He had served for about twenty years. He could be terminated from service for good grounds but since no ground is given, as mentioned above, the order of termination does not appear to be correct.
4. The learned lower Court has wrongly found that the competent authority had terminated the services of the appellant. Ex.P-9 is the order of termination, which was issued by the Vice-President but the Senior Executive Vice-President Administration, Head Office was competent according to the Schedule appended to Muslim Commercial Bank Rules. Item 4 appearing at page 57 is clear on the point.
5. Since the appellant is not covered by the definition of workman given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and since Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable to the bank cases, the learned lower Court had no jurisdiction and thus the petition of the appellant was rightly dismissed.
6. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.