DECISION ' This is an appeal filed by the appellant against an impugned order, dated 30-3-1985, passed by the Sind Labour Court No, 1 at Karachi, who had dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case were that the appellant claimed to be a permanent workman and was designated as Jamadar in view of his seniority amongst other chowkidars of the respondent mills. He claimed to have been performing unskilled manual work along with other chowkidars such as searching the persons entering and going out the mill area. The claim of the appellant was that on 7-6-1983 and 26-6-1983 he was charge-sheeted for purported allegations which could not be within the definition of a misconduct making him liable to be dismissed from service. Further, the claim of the appellant was that an unfair and partial domestic enquiry conducted against him resulting in his dismissal from service on 9-7-1983. He being aggrieved, had served his grievance notice followed by his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969.
3. The respondent mills had resisted the petition on the ground that the appellant was never employed to do manual or clerical work and as such he was not a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2(i) of Standing Orders Ordinance to maintain his present petition and on merits, it was claimed by the respondent mills that in fact he had never worked manually, but he was In charge of watch and ward staff (chowkidars) on duty in his shift. Besides he was responsible for all security arrangements in the mills, therefore, on merits also, he was not entitled to maintain his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969, which was liable to be dismissed. As the allegations were fully established against him in a fairly held domestic enquiry, therefore, he was rightly dismissed from service.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and they were duly cross-examined.
Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence the present appeal.
5. I have heard Mr. Mirza Muhammad Kazim, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents mills and have also perused the record and proceedings of the case as well as the written arguments, submitted by both the parties. At the very outset, I would observe here that on a perusal of the documents brought on record by the parties, it would be clearly evident that the appellant had himself confessed to have been promoted as Jamadar and as such, being the Head of the Watch and Ward Department, used to recommend leave applications of other chowkidars and used to make the posting of the chowkidars on different places inside the mills area daily and used to sign as Security In charge, therefore, the nature of his duties was of supervisor, so, he did not come within the definition of a 'workman' to maintain his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969. In this respect, I am fortified with the cases, reported in 1971 PLC at page 1 and 1981 PLC at page 871. In view of the matter, I would hold that the appellant was not a workman entitled to maintain his present grievance notice as well as the grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969, which was rightly dismissed by the learned Labour Court. In his evidence, the appellant has himself contradicted his contention that he was also performing the duties of a 'Fireman'. In view of the admissions by the appellant himself, all the Case Laws relied upon by Mr. Mirza Muhammad Kazim, the learned Advocate for the appellant are quite distinguishable hence not applicable to the facts, circumstances of the present case. While, on the other hand, Mr. Masood Ahmad Khan, the learned Advocate for the respondents mills had very convincingly argued his case and referred to me to a number of authorities, which, in my opinion support the contentions of Mr. Masood Ahmad Khan. However, as regards the merits of the case, the learned Labour Court has passed an elaborated well-reasoned impugned order and I see no reason to interfere. There is clear admission rather confession on the part of the appellant regarding his guilt and so he had also apologized for the same. In this respect, this Tribunal has held in a number of cases, placing reliance on a case, reported in 1987 SCMR at page 1823, that after admission of the guilt, a person could not claim that he was wrongly removed from the employment. I would, therefore, hold that on merits also, the appellant has no case, so, it was rightly dismissed by the learned Labour Court.
' For the reasons discussed by me above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.