' NAIMUDDIN, J.--This appeal, by leave, calls in question the order of the High Court dated 22-9-1987 dismissing the revision application against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Charsadda, dated 8-9-1985, passed in favour of the respondents in Civil Appeal No,149/13 of 1984 in the following circumstances.
2. The respondents filed a suit against the appellants in the Court of Civil Judge, Charsadda, for possession of land measuring 32 Kanals 11 Marlas comprised in two Khasra Nos.1341 and 1535/1328/ 1333, situated in Mauza Zaim, Tehsil Charsadda of the demolition of abadi. The appellants defended the suit inter alia, on the ground that they had perfected their title to the land by adverse possession. Alternatively they claimed Rs,4,00,000 as compensation for the construction made by them.
3. The trial Court after recording the evidence of the parties and their witnesses dismissed the suit on 22-5-1984, holding that the appellants had matured their title to the land by adverse possession and that they had raised construction over a portion of the land.
4. In appeal however, the learned Additional District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit passed by the Civil Judge and accepted the appeal, holding that the appellants are the tenants over the suit land and therefore they could not deny the title of the respondents and accordingly decreed the suit.
5. The appellants challenged the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court in the revision in Peshawar High Court which was dismissed giving rise to this appeal by leave. Leave was granted to consider the contention that "the learned Judge in his Chambers has misread the evidente inasmuch as that on the death of Mst. Mughala who was a limited owner the petitioners were shown in possession of the suit land as "bile lagan bawaja rishtadari".
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants had perfected their title to the land by adverse possession and in support relied upon the entries in the Revenue record.
7. Before we consider the contention we may state that the respondents' case was that they are the owners of the land and the appellants are their tenants on 'bitai' and that they have denied their title by stopping payment and have raised some construction over the suit property. The main plea raised by the appellants in their defence was that they were in adverse possession.
Considering this point the learned Additional District Judge found "admittedly as the record reveals the defendants (appellants) and their forefathers were the tenants of the plaintiffs (respondents) which comes under the definition of permissive possession" and in this regard relied on Muhammad Umran v. Malik Aman and others (1979 SCM R 481). The learned Additional District Judge also repelled the contention that after the death of Mst. Mughala, the appellants became the owners as this plea had not been agitated during the trial. Before the Additional District Judge reliance was placed by the appellants on the pedigree table Ex.PW 1/D/1. About it it was said that it does not clearly show the relationship of the appellants with Gul Zarin. Reference was also made to the record which shows that in 1948 the inheritance of Mst. Mughala was devolved upon Amir and Zarin the respondents. It was, therefore, seasoned that tile appellants should have come to the Court at that time for seeking their share under the Muslim Shariat Act but right from 1948 upto the filing of the suit they did not seek the remedy. It was also pointed out that later on a number of other owners have been included in Me claim of ownership by different mutations.
8. In the High Court in support of the plea that the appellants were in adverse possession of the land they relied on the fact that they had raised some construction over some portion of the land to which the respondents did not object, Repelling this contention the High Court observed "when it is proved in the light of the Revenue record that the' defendants are sitting tenants over the suit land, consisting of agricultural and residential, their status regarding the residential property will be the same as is held about the agricultural land." The High Court also confirmed the finding of the Additional District Judge that the record showed that on the death of Mst. Mughala her estate devolved upon respondents.
9. Now, reverting to the contention we may state the only point which is raised before us and which requires consideration is what is the effect of the entries made in the Revenue record showing the appellants in possession of land as tenants but with an entry in Revenue column "bila lagan bawaja rishtadari" which was first made in 1935-36 and which according to the appellants continued right upto 1965-66. In the Revenue record for the year 1961-62 and 1969-70 under the column of 'Name of owner and remarks' inter alia the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents appear. Similarly in the column under the heading 'Name of the cultivator' inter alia the name of the father of appellant No,1 and others appear. Therefore, from the entries relied upon it is clear that the possession of the appellants was permissive and the entry "bila lagan bawaja rishtadari" would not make it less permissive,
10. It is well settled that a tenant, while a tenant, cannot acquire a larger right inconsistent with the real relationship by mere length of possession and assertion of a larger claim. See Muhammad Mumtaz Khan v. Mohan Singh {AIR 1923 P.C.118).
11. It is also settled that a permissive possession cannot be' converted into an adverse possession unless it is proved that the person in possession asserted an adverse title to the property to the knowledge of true owners for a period of twelve years or more. See State Bank of Travancore v.
Arbindan Kunju Panicker (AIR 1971 SC 996). Mere non-payment of rent by the tenant for more than twelve years is not sufficient to entitle him superior rights of ownership. He has further to establish by his conduct that he gave up tenancy, E denied the title of the owners and openly enjoyed the land in his own right, and not as the owners' tenant. See R.Mitra's Commentaries on Limitation Act 5th Edition page 629. In the present case there is no such evidence or finding of any Courts below.
12. Learned counsel cited Mehrab Shah v. Shah Zaman (1985 SCM R 497) wherein it was held that the entries in the column of cultivation take precedence 'over entries in the column of 'laghan' and, therefore, the burden was on the appellant who was claiming adverse possession to produce evidence in support of his plea in defence of adverse possession. This case is, therefore, not relevant. Even otherwise there was no evidence in support of the plea of adverse possession, in that case. In the present case the respondents claim the owners of the land and their claim finds full support from the Revenue record; therefore, the burden of proving adverse possession was on F the appellants and they should have shown as to from which date, how and by which overt act they perfected their title by adverse possession. The appellants in their written statement have not stated as how and by which overt acts they have perfected their title as alleged. They have simply stated therein that they have constructed G some house on a portion of the land without objection from the respondents even without stating time when they made the construction. Mere assertion that they have constructed the house without objection would not by itself establish adverse possession. In this regard the appellate Court rightly relied on Muhammad Umran v. Malik Aman and others (1979 SCM R 481).
13. We, therefore, find no merits in this appeal and accordingly dismiss it with costs.