' CH. HASAN NAWAZ (MEMBER).--The appellant was appointed as LDC/Meter Reader on 15-4-1981 by the respondent, on the accepted condition that he shall remain on probation for a period of one year in the first instance and that his services are liable to termination without previous notice, irrespective of whether the period of probation had not expired, if it is found that his work or conduct during that period is unsatisfactory. (Annex. R-I).
2. On 12-1-1982, he was served with a notice where it was alleged that on checking of his area it had been found by the S.D.O. Concerned that the meter readings were defective; that large number of units had been put in accumulation against the interests of the Authority and that his work had not been satisfactory. (Annex. A).
3. The explanation given by him was that he was a stranger to the area and that he recorded the meter readings on the basis of the previous consumptions because he failed to locate the meters.
He admitted that the S.D.O. Concerned had carried out the necessary checking. (Annex. B).
4. The explanation was found to be insufficient and the competent authority terminated the appellant's services on 27-1-1982, after giving him a personal hearing, on the basis of the terms and conditions of his service regarding probation mentioned in para. 2 of the letter of his appointment.
(Annex. C).
5. He has challenged the validity of the impugned order in the present appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, primarily on the ground that his services were terminated without proper inquiry and without affording him an opportunity of defending himself.
6. As we have seen, the order regarding termination of services was passed by the competent authority on 27-1-1982. The present appeal filed on 20-5-1984 is A evidently time-barred. The explanation for this delay given by the appellant in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is that he had been prosecuting his cause before the Labour Court in good faith and that the time spent by him there, should be excluded in computing the period of limitation.
7. The record shows that on 20-5-1982, the Labour Court concerned set aside the impugned order, in consequence of a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 filed on 15-2-1982. The respondent went in appeal to the Punjab Labour Appellant Tribunal which was dismissed in limine on 31-8-1982. The respondent challenged the validity of the Labour Court's orders before the High Court in a writ petition which was accepted on 21-4-1984 on the ground that the appellant is a civil servant by virtue of the provision of section 17(1-B) of the WAPDA Act and that the orders passed by the Labour Courts were without jurisdiction on the strength of Supreme Court's ruling in the case of F.U. Malik 1983 SCMR page 663. On 14-5-1984, the appellant filed a petition for review of order dated 21-4-1984, which was dismissed on 16-5-1984. The present appeal was filed on 20-5-1984.
8. The question of limitation does not require a detailed analysis and facts are enough to establish that the appeal is time-barred. The law regarding jurisdiction had been finally settled by the Supreme Court in the case of F.U. Malik which was decided on 5-12-1982 and then published in March issue of SCMR 1983. No ambiguity or confusion was left after the Supreme Court's decision and the appellant should have had recourse to the Tribunal for a proper relief soon after this decision. If this was not done, he should have come to the Tribunal after the High Court decision on 21-4-1984, as soon as it could be reasonably possible. He filed a petition for review of this order on 14-5-1984, which made it clear that he had become aware of the High Court's decision by that date. There was no justification for the review petition and he should have instituted the present appeal without further delay. As we see from the application for condonation of delay, no explanation has been rendered by him for the delay which came about after he had come to know of the High Court decision before 14-5-1984.
9. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed as being time-barred. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
10. Parties to be informed.