' This is an appeal challenging the decision dated 19-3-1988 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 3, Lahore at Ferozewala, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent for his reinstatement in service has been accepted and he has been directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. The services of the respondent were terminated vide order dated 17-11-1986 on the ground that they were no longer required. He was offered one month's pay in lieu of notice. Prior to that a show- cause notice, copy of which is A Exh. P.2, was served upon the respondent complaining that 11 K.V.
Electric cable underground was damaged by the laborers, resulting in damage of two electric control panels and stoppage of supply to I.C. And I.P. And Kohinoor Oil Mills. It was alleged that the respondent was absent from the scene of occurrence. The B allegations made against the respondent do not amount to misconduct. Absence for more than ten days is misconduct but this was not the allegation made against the respondent. Admittedly the respondent had not caused cut the 11 K.V. Cable, so the order of termination of services of the respondent was uncalled for.
3. The order of termination is violate of the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinances, 1968 also, inasmuch as it does not contain explicit reasons. Learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the decision of the learned lower Court only on the point of workman.
According to the evidence on the record, the duty of the respondent was to supervise the work done by the employees of the contractor. Needless to say that mere supervision of work does not oust a person from the definition of workman under exception (b) to section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Supervision over the employees may oust him from the definition of workman if the wages are more than Rs,800 per month. Since the persons, whose work the respondent used to supervise, were not the employees of the appellant, for this reason also no question arises that the respondent was supervisor over them or that they were subordinate to him. R.W. 1 deposed that the respondent used to supervise the construction work of the petitioner establishment. In cross-examination, no doubt, he said that a mason and a helper were working under the respondent and that he used to get the repair/construction work completed by them.
This witness also deposed in cross-examination that the respondent used to check the hills of the contractor initially in accordance with the measurement of work. It is thus clear that the mason and the helper were not the employees of the appellant but were the employees of the contractor, therefore, the duty of the respondent was only to see that they, as employees of the contractor, were doing work properly and upto the mark but he had no supervisory powers over them. This is not the case of the appellant that the respondent used to sanction or forward leave applications of any person. Likewise this is not the case of the appellant that the respondent had powers to recommend, promotion or taking of action against any of the employees of the appellant. The respondent deposed that digging was to be done by the workers of the contractor and that the work was being done by the contractor and no person was working under him. He also deposed that after the completion of work he used to make measurement. Needless to say that making of measurement is manual work. Thus, the respondent was covered by the definition of workman given in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 as well as section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited 1984 PLC 1303, 1984 PLC 1105 and PLD 1986 SC 103 but the rulings are distinguishable. It has not been said in 1984 PLC 1303 or 1984 PLC 1105 that a person who supervises the work and not the employees falls in the exception. In the Supreme Court ruling the question was whether a shift engineer was covered by the definition of workman given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The duties of the shift engineer were quite different from the duties of the respondent.
4. Since the order of termination is violate of the provisions of Standing Order 12(3), it was not maintainable. Again as the allegation made against the respondent did not amount to misconduct, even otherwise the penalty of termination from service was not legal. Learned lower Court thus rightly held the respondent as workman and rightly directed his reinstatement in service with back benefits.
5. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.