1. HAMOODUR R AHMAN, C. J.-This appeal, by special leave, is s directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Peshawar, maintaining the conviction of the f appellant under section 304, Part I, P. P. C. By the Additional Sessions Judge, Mardan, and enhancing his sentence from 7 years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,500 or in default further R. I. For 3 years, to transportation for life along with the fine above-mentioned.
2. The appellant was charged along with his father, Ahmuddin and his two brothers, Ruhuddin and Rehanuddin, for the murder of one, Khewadin, the son of Sahib Din, a brother of Ahmuddin. The latter had another brother called Israruddin, and all the three brothers, namely, Sahib Din, Israruddin and Ahmuddin, jointly owned landed properties. A dispute, however, had arisen between Ahmuddin and Sahib Din over the banna of the land about six months prior to the occurrence resulting in the death of Khewa Din. Ahmuddin and his three sons had allegedly diverted the irrigation water of the deceased's field, for which a complaint had been filed with the Canal Magistrate and process issued against the appellant. Since the appellant was avoiding service of the process, a warrant was also issued to procure his attendance in Court.
3. The parties had also a joint hujra known as the hujra of Khaira Din, who was the elder of the family.
4. On the fateful day about half an hour before the occurrence resulting in the death of Khewa Din, Ahmuddin and his three sons, his uncle Israruddin and his maternal uncle Khewa Khan were all present in the hujra talking when the appellant protested to the deceased for having got a warrant issued for his arrest in connection with the com--plaint in the Court of the Canal Magistrate. Khewa Din replied that there was no other alternative, because, the appellant was avoiding attendance in Court. On this appellant and the deceased exchanged some hot words and abuses with each other, when Ahmuddin, the father of the appellant, ordered his three sons to beat the deceased.
5. The appellant on hearing this took out a dagger from the fold of his trousers and stabbed the deceased with it on the chest dropping him dead on the spot. The appellant, his father, and his brothers then all ran away.
6. Israruddin left the hujra for the tonga stand to proceed to the police station but as it was digerwela and the heat was excessive no tonga driver was prepared to take them there. After about 2i) hours a wagon arrived at the adda which Israruddin and Akram boarded for going to the Takhtbai Police Station. They, however, came across the S. H. O. And a police party at village Sari Behlol, some 2/3 miles away from their own village of Gujar Garhi, and lodged the F. I. R. There at about 9-00 p. m.
7. The report was registered at Takhtbai Police Station, which is at a distance of 7 miles from village Gujar Garhi, at about mid-night.
8. The S. H. O. Muhammad Nawaz, and his police party went to Gujar Garhi on the same wagon and reached there at about 9.45 p. m. They found the dead body of Khewa Din still lying in the hujra.
9. Investigation was taken up forthwith and blood--stained earth was collected from underneath the cot on which the deceased was found lying. His body was sent to the mortuary for post-mortem examination and the investigation was completed on the next day.
10. The appellant had absconded, hence his father and two brothers were sent up for trial but they were acquitted on the 19th of April 1965.
11. The appellant was arrested on the 25th of July 1966, and put up for trial. He denied having caused any dagger injury to the deceased and complained that he had been falsely implicated. He also denied that he had absconded. According to him, he had left the village sometime prior to the occurrence but after coming to know about the charge he voluntarily surrendered himself before the D. M., Mardan, and was released on bail.
12. The prosecution case against the appellant rested mainly on the ocular testimony of his uncle, Israruddin (P. W. 5) and Akram (P. W. 6), the maternal uncle of the deceased. Their testimony was believed, as they were both also related to the appellant. The father of the appellant was the son of Akram's aunt. Never--theless, the trial Court took the view that since the single blow was struck on the deceased after exchange of hot words and abuses during the course of conversation, it was a case of a sudden quarrel and a sudden fight in which the appellant had in the heat of passion struck a single blow without premeditation and with--out taking any undue advantage or acting in any cruel or unusual manner. The offence in the view of the trial Court, therefore, fell under section 304, Part I, and not under section 302. The appellant was, accordingly, convicted under section 304, Part I, and sentenced to 7 years' R. I. And a fine of Rs. 1,500 or in default further R. I. For three years.
13. From this order of conviction the appellant came up in appeal to the High Court and one, Mohiuddin, also came up in revision praying for either the retrial of Rehmuddin or the enhancement of his sentence. Both were heard together by the High Court which dismissed the appeal holding that the witnesses on whom reliance had been placed had no reason to falsely implicate the appellant who had not succeeded in attacking their credibility on any relevant ground. The delay in the lodging of the F. I. R. Was also held to have been satisfactorily explained.
14. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed but in the Revision Petition it was held that the trial Court had erred in applying Exception 4 to section 300 of the P. P. C. As there was no evidence that the fatal blow had been struck on the deceased during the course of any fight or grappling between the deceased and the appellant. The only evidence in this case was of exchange of hot words and abuses and this, according to the High Court, could not amount to a sudden fight during a sudden quarrel. According to the High Court, in order to bring the case within Exception 4 it was necessary to show that both parties had used force. The evidence in this case, however, showed that the fatal blow was struck before any grappling took place.
15. The High Court was of the view that the offence committed by the appellant fell, in the circumstances, under section 302, P. P. C. But since no appeal had been filed against the acquittal of the appellant under that section, retrial would not be justified, but the case for enhancement of the sentence appeared to be eminently just. His sentence was, accordingly, enhanced to transportation for life which is the maximum sentence under section 304, Part I, P. P. C. Along with the fine already imposed by the trial Court.
16. Leave was granted in this case only to consider whether the High Court was legally justified in enhancing the sentence in a case where there was no appeal against the acquittal of the appellant under section 302, P. P. C.
17. Learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal has con--tended that the trial Court had clearly found that there was no intention to kill the deceased, because, the learned Judge had stated that "had the accused the intention to do away with the deceased either he would have stabbed him before the arrival of Israruddin and Akram P. Ws. Or he would not have contended himself by giving the deceased only one blow". As such in the absence of an appeal against acquittal this finding could not be assailed. The only question then was as to whether the act was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death or merely with the knowledge that the injury was likely to cause death.
18. Learned counsel has seriously maintained that since there was no clear finding as regards the guilty intent of the appellant, the learned Judges in the High Court should have given the appellant the benefit of that doubt and not enhanced his sentence.
19. It is clear from the wording of section 304, P. P. C. Itself that the first part of this section applies where there is a guilty intention and the second part applies where there is no such intention but there is guilty knowledge. As to how it is to be ascertained whether the act complained of was done with the guilty intention or merely with the guilty knowledge we have to look to the external and visible acts of the person concerned, for, we cannot usually probe into his mind. A sane person does not, as a normal rule, commit a heinous act heedlessly or unintentionally and it is, therefore, said that a person intends the natural and inevitable consequences of his own acts. Thus where a person shoots a another with a gun or stabs him with a dagger at a vital part of the body, the natural presumption is that he intends at least to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Again the manner in which the person committing the illegal act behaves or the circumstances leading to the perpetration of the act may serve as a clue to the intent of the person committing such an act.
20. Where an injury is caused to another person, which is not on a vital part or is per se not sufficient in the ordinary course o nature to cause death but is still inherently dangerous it may well be said that the injury was caused merely with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but there was no intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
21. In the present case, the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Mardan was that the appellant was guilty under section 304, Part I, P. P. C. This finding necessarily implied that the learned Judge held the appellant to have caused the injury at least with the intent of causing an injury which is likely to cause death. Otherwise, he could not have convicted him under section 304, Part I, P. P. C.
22. The facts and circumstances of this case also amply support this finding. The evidence is that with the exchange of hot words and abuses the father of the appellant called upon his sons to beat the deceased. Thereupon the appellant took out a dagger from the fold of his trousers and stabbed the deceased on the chest on the right side between the 8th inter-costal space and the mid- axillary line with such force that the dagger penetrated the pleura and the lung and also injured the liver. Death, which was almost instantaneous, was due to the haemorrhage of the right lung and the liver. The injury, according to the doctor, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The external and visible acts of the appellant, therefore, indicated that he intended to cause such an injury as was clearly likely to cause death. He was, therefore, liable under Part I of section 304, P. P. C. And the maximum sentence under this Part is imprison--ment for life.
23. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the High Court had acted illegally in enhancing the sentence of the appellant to the maximum period of imprisonment allowable by law. The appellant had clearly acted in a brutal and cruel manner and also taken undue advantage of an unarmed person. He was, therefore, rightly sentenced.
24. This Court does not interfere with a legal sentence unless some question of principle is involved.
25. Since no question of principle is involved in this case, no interference is called for.
26. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.