1. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, ACTG. C. J.-Raja Muhammad Ayub Khan, Advocate, was suspended from practice for one year by the Tribunal of the Bar Council on the finding that he had been guilty of professional misconduct. He filed an appeal from that order before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council under section 41 of the Bar Councils Act, 1965, which is still pending determination.
2. The Committee has refused to suspend the impugned order till the disposal of the appeal. The petitioner seeks leave to appeal from that order under section 42 of the Bar Councils Act.
3. On hearing the petitioner in person we find that no appeal lies from an interim order passed by the Disciplinary Committee refusing to stay the operation of the order suspending the petitioner from practice for one year. Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is confined to hearing appeals from the judgment, decree, or order of a High Court. The jurisdiction to hear appeals from the orders passed by the Bar Council is conferred by section 42 of the Act which provides as under :-- "42. Appeal to the Supreme Court.-Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Disciplinary Committee of the Pakistan Bar Council under section 40 or section 41 may, within sixty days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may pass such order thereon as it may deem fit."
4. Section 40 has no application in the case. Section 41 is to the effect :---- "41.-(1) Any person aggrieved by an order, of a Tribunal made under section 38 may, within sixty days from the date of the communication of the order to him, prefer an appeal to the Pakistan Bar Council.
(2) Every such appeal shall be heard by the Disciplinary Com--mittee of the Pakistan Bar Council which may pass such order thereon as it may deem fit."
5. It is plain that the Disciplinary Committee is empowered to pass orders disposing of the appeal brought before it under sections 40 and 41. An appeal to this Court will, therefore, lie only from the order passed by the Disciplinary Committee by which the appeal has been disposed of and not from an interlocutory order. An appeal is the creature of a statute. No appeal, therefore, lies from an order which is not provided for by section 42.
6. In the above view, this appeal is incompetent and is dismissed. It may at the same time be pointed out that as the period of suspension is one year, it is appropriate that the appeal be disposed of by the Disciplinary Committee at an early date.