' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, C.J.--This appeal, by leave, is addressed against the judgment of the High Court, dated 8-2-1987, whereby acquitting one Muhammad Ayub Qureshi of the charges levelled against him under section 5(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act, read with section 409, Penal Code, an observation to which the appellant now seeks exception was made against him.
2. Brief facts leading to the above grievance are: ' It appears that the appellant was serving as Assistant Entomologist in the Agriculture Department of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government. During the period some misappropriation in the Department was made. At the time of misappropriation the appellant, in addition to his duty, was also working as Drawing and Disbursing Officer. In this capacity, the appellant made a F.I.R. On 21st September, 1980, against Muhammad Ayub Qureshi, Accountant of the Department. It was alleged in the report that Muhammad Ayub has prepared some fictitious pay bills and thus managed to obtain over-payment and misappropriated the amount. After investigation, Muhammad Ayub was put to trial in the Court of Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Muzaffarabad, under section 5(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act read with section 409 of the Penal Code. After the trial, he was convicted and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs, 10,000. On appeal to the High Court his conviction and sentence were set aside vide order, dated 8-2-1987.
' While passing the judgment in the aforesaid case, the learned Chief Justice of the High Court made an observation to which the appellant now seeks exception. The observation is to the effect "This suggests that the Drawing and Disbursing Officer was responsible for the whole mishap but intelligently enough, he chose to become a witness of the incident by implicating the appellant".
The appellant, who was Drawing and Disbursing Officer at the time of misappropriation, now wants expunction of these remarks.
3. It has been argued by Sardar Rafique Mahmood, the learned counsel for the appellant, that remarks referred to above are uncalled for and violative of the principle of 'audi alteram partem', i.e,, nobody should be condemned unheard. Thus, the learned counsel has argued that the above observation is uncalled for in the circumstances of the case, especially so when it was the appellant who had moved the Investigation Agency to take action against Muhammad Ayub Qureshi, Accountant of the Department.
4. As against this the learned Advocate-General has argued that these remarks are based on the statements of the appellant and one Mir Abdul Aziz, P.W., and, therefore, it would not be proper to expunge them in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. It was further contended that the remarks are drawn in a reasonable way from the circumstances and evidence; and so they do not call for expunction.
5. We have given our dispassionate thought to the arguments advanced at the Bar. Let us first determine the extent of the authority of the Supreme Court to exercise its inherent powers to expunge remarks. No doubt the Supreme Court has inherent powers to expunge the portions of the judgment of the High Court which the Court thinks are not called for. We also believe that the power is unbounded by law which expressly gives to the Courts: especially Supreme Court, authority to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, the jurisdiction being one of an extraordinary character is to be exercised with care and caution and only in exceptional cases. The reason is that it is of utmost importance to the administration of justice that Courts should be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by the superior Courts. Besides, it is always desirable that a judgment once delivered should remain in the shape in which it was originally published, nevertheless at times there may be good reasons to exercise inherent powers to delete passages which are not based on evidence or which are irrelevant to any point in issue and which have unnecessarily been included in a judgment. This view prevailed in Panchanan Banerji v. Upendra Nath Bhattacharji AIR 1927 All. 193, K.S. Mahomed Hussain v. Emperor AIR 1929 Sind 243 and Tajumal Naraindas v. Emperor AIR 1933 Sind 91.
6. It, thus, follows that it is the duty of this Court, in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice, to delete passages commenting adversely upon a person when he was not a party to the proceedings and has had no fair opportunity of being heard and also to delete such passages when they are based upon no evidence. In the absence of any one of the above situations, expunction of any remark is neither permissible nor advisable. It is noticed always that in weighing evidence and in arriving at conclusion on a question of fact, lower Courts have often to make remarks on the character of a witness which is always permissible and in such a case no valid grievance can be made.
7. It may be observed that there is a cardinal principle in the administration of justice that the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates are to be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. But at the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. Sweeping generalisations in a judgment should be avoided as they defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before the Courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider--
(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or had an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and
(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to bring on record certain observations bearing with conduct of a person.
' It is also a settled law that judicial pronouncements are to be judicious in nature, and should not normally depart from moderation and reserve.
8. This now brings us to the controversial observation. To appreciate the controversial issue, it would be proper to reproduce the relevant portion of the para. In extenso in which the above observation has been made by the learned Judge. The para runs as under:- "In present case, the Drawing and Disbursing Officer, Inam-ur-Rahim Shah appears to be careless and negligent of his duty or suffering from lack of aptitude or acumen in the job. This is so, as he never cared to have satisfied himself with the accuracy and correctness of the pay bills at the time of their signing and at occasions he signed blank pay bill forms as is the case of Exh. D.1. In answer to a question in crossexamination, he admitted that Exh. D.1 was a blank pay bill form and it was signed by him. It was equally conceded that the pay bills were not verified or checked by him at the time of signing. Mir Abdul Aziz, Assistant Accounts Officer, Accountant General's Office, P.W.1, narrated the details as to how the incident of the alleged offence transpired. It was testified by this witness that it was the responsibility of the Drawing and Disbursing Officer to certify that the pay bill was properly prepared, was entered in the cash book and the pay was disbursed accordingly. If any excess amount was received or found, it was equally to be entered in the cash book and deposited into treasury under rules. He further stated that on discovery of the misappropriation, he called the Drawing and Disbursing Officer (Inam-ur-Rahim Shah) and asked him to deposit the amount received in excess. As he wanted to inform the police, the Drawing and Disbursing Officer told him that the amount would be deposited by him within a day or two but in the meantime, he himself informed the police.
' This suggests that the Drawing and Disbursing Officer was responsible for the whole mishap but intelligently enough, he chose to become a witness of the incident by implicating the appellant.".
9. Let us now see as to whether the case is visited by any circumstances calling upon us to exercise our inherent powers in respect of the observation complained of.
' In the case before us, the reading of the above impugned para. Would show that there is no sweeping or general observation against the appellant. The objectionable para. Only conveys the sense that in the circumstances the appellant, who was Drawing and Disbursing Officer, may be responsible for the whole mishap. The examination of the para as a whole shows that the observation is based on the evidence of Mir Abdul Aziz and the appellant himself. The appellant, in his statement, admits that he signed the blank pay bill forms. In the context, he also admitted that Exh.
0.1 was a blank pay bill form and it was signed by him. It was also conceded by him that pay bills were not verified or objected by him at the time of signing. In context of the appellant Mir Abdul Aziz, Assistant Accounts Officer, P.W.1, in evidence throws the entire responsibility on the appellant.
He states that the appellant was to satisfy himself that the pay bills were properly prepared, entered in the cash book and disbursed. He also says that on discovery of the misappropriation, the Drawing and Disbursing Officer undertook to deposit the amount received in excess.
10. The combined reading of the statement of the appellant and that of Mir Abdul Aziz would show that the observation to the effect that the circumstances suggested that the Drawing and Disbursing Officer was responsible for the whole mishap but intelligently enough he chose to become a witness of the incident by implicating Muhammad Ayub Qureshi (appellant in that appeal) is not unwarranted. The observation is the fair comment arising out of the statements of the appellant and Mir Abdul Aziz and calls for no interference. Somewhat identical law was enunciated in Emperor v. Ch. Muhammad Hassan AIR 1943 Lah. 298, Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmed AIR 1945 PC 18, Lala Jairam Das v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 94, The State of Bombay v. Nilkanth Shripad Bhave AIR 1954 Born. 65, State v. Chhotey Lal 1955 All. L.J. 240, Balit Kumar v. S.S. Bose AIR 1957 All. 398, In re, Pechimuthu Pandithan Ramaswami Pandithan AIR 1958 Mad. 305 and Sardar Lal Singh Kang v. The State AIR 1959 Punjab 211.
11. As said earlier, the inherent powers should not and cannot be used to delete the passages which are based on evidence though they may damage the character of a person unless, of course, such an observation is irrelevant to any point in issue. Since the observation is the outcome of the evidence and is relevant to the point in issue, we do not feel advisable to delete the same.
12. The upshot of the above discussion is that the only passage or passages are to be deleted if they are irrelevant and do not form an integral part of the judgment and not otherwise. In the instant case we find that there is evidence on the record that the appellant grossly failed to discharge his duties efficiently and the remark is the fair outcome of his and that of Mir Abdul Aziz statements. Thus, we decline to expunge the above remarks. The observation is warranted by the record which can amply be read in support of the observation.
13. For the above stated reasons we hold that the High Court has not abused the powers in making the observation and there is, therefore, no justification to delete the aforesaid passage commenting upon the conduct of the appellant.
' For the above stated reasons the appeal fails and we dismiss the same hereby.