JUDGMENTRaja Afrasiab Khan, J.- The petitioners Iflikhar Ahmad, Najma alias Shamah Firdaus and others have moved this constitutional petition praying therein that registration of the case F.I.R. No. 109/88 dated 2.6.1988 against the petitioners under sections 10/11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 at Police Station Nikapura, Sialkot may be quashed by declaring the same without lawful authority. The case is that petitioner No.2 Mst.Najma alias Shamah Firdaus is daughter of respondent No.2 Mst.Sughran Begum wife of Mohammad Tufail. On 2.1.1988 the said petitioner instituted a criminal complaint in the Court of Magistrate 1st Class Sialkot, wherein she made a statement on oath that she being a sui juris wants to marry with her free consent with petitioner No.1. Iftikhar Ahmad. Copy of the statement of petitioner No.2 has been placed on record as Annexure A. Thereafter the said petitioner Mst. Najma alias Shamah Firdaus married with petitioner No.1 on 4.1.1988 in accordance with Muslim law. Copy of Nikahnama has been placed on record as Annexure B. It is further disclosed in para No.3 of the petition that petitioner No.2 also instituted a criminal complaint under section 506 Cr.P.C, before the learned Ilaqa Magistrate, Sialkot, where she made another statement on 7.3.1988 saying that the parties have entered into a compromise and that she lived for 1h months with her mother repondent No.2 in her house. The allegation is that respondent No.2 and her husband subjected the petitioner to pressure for getting divorce from petitioner No.1 and that she did not agree with them and finally she left them and went to her husband's house. In view of this backgroud respondent No.2 has managed registration of the false case agaisnt the petitioners as mentioned above.
2. It is forcefully submitted by the learned counsel that as per the statement of petitioner No.2 before the learned Magistrate she has married with petitioner No.1 with her own free will on 4.1.1988 vide Nikahnama Annexure B in accordance with Muslim law. In other words, the contention is that in view of the statement of petitioner No.2 vide Annexure A, Nikhnama vide Annexure B and vide her statement Annexure F made by her under section 164 Cr.P.C it is established that there was absolutely no legal basis for the registration of the criminal case under sections 10/11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979.
3. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent submits that there is amply evidence to show that petitioners No.1 and 2 are indulging in 'zina' and as such the case has been registered against them in accordance with law.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the retbrd. The statement of petitioner No.2 made by her before the Court of law amply demonstrates that she is sui juris and that she has married with petitioner No.1 with her free will in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to show that the marriage entered into between the parties is the resuIt of some coercion or pressure. The learned counsel has not been able to show any such thing from the statement of petitioner No.2 made by her under section 164 Cr.P.C. In my considered view, petitioners No.1 and 2 are living together as husband and wife and that they have entered into lawful marriage with each other. There is absolutely no evidence on the record to show that the said petitioners have committed any offence under the provisions of the said Ordinance of 1979.
Under the circumstances, the registration of the case, referred to above against the petitioners is obviously based on mala fide on the part of respondent No.2 inasmuch as the petitioner No.2 has married with petitioner No.1 against the wish of respondent No.2. There was, therefore, no legal justification with the police to register the case against petitioners No.1 and 2, who are husband and wife according to law. Consequently the case F.I.R. No. 109/88, Annex-D is quashed being without lawful authority. This petition succeeds and is allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.