SAEED-UZ-ZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.-1. The petitioner has challenged in this petition the vires of Wealth Tax Act, 1963 and the consequential recovery of wealth tax from him under the provisions of the aforesaid Act (for the sake of convenience we will hereinafter refer to the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 as the "Act" only).
It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) is entitled under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan to legislate only in respect of items enumerated either in Federal Legislative List or in the Concurrent Legislative List appended to the 4th Schedule of the Constitution. It is urged that the 'wealth tax' recovered from the petitioner under the provisions of the Act was calculated on the 'net wealth' as defined under the Act which does not fall under any of the items mentioned in Federal or Concurrent Legislative Lists of the Constitution and as such levy and recovery of wealth tax from the petitioner is beyond the scope of legislative power of the Parliament. With regard to entry at Serial No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the expression "capital value of the assets" used in this entry cannot be equated with the expression net wealth as defined under the Act and as such the imposition and recovery of tax on net wealth is not a tax on the capital value of the assets as envisaged by the Constitution and therefore, recovery of this tax is liable to be declared without any lawful authority. Learned counsel for the Respondents as well as the Central Government on the other hand jointly contended that the Act is validly promulgated and is fully covered by the items in entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislatvtive List of the Constitution. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, respondents and the Central Government we are of the view that this petition has no merit.
2. The legislative powers of the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies, respectively, under the Constitution are contained in Article 142 of the Constitution which reads as follows:---
142. Subject to the Constitution---
(a) Parliament shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Dederal Legislative List;
(b) Parliament and a Provincial Assembly also, shall have power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Concurrent Legislative list;
(c) a Provincial Assembly shall, and Parliament shall not, have power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in either the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List; and
(d) Parliament shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters not enumerated in either of the Lists for such areas in the Federation as are not included in any Province.
A reading of the above Article of the Constitution will show that Parliament has exclusive power to legislate in respect of all or any of the items specified in the Federal Legislative List. The Parliament is also entitled to legislate in respect of items enumerated in Concurrent Legislative List of the Constitution along side with the Provincial Assemblies. However, in respect of items not mentioned in either of the above two legislative lists of the Constitution only Provincial Assemblies are empowered to legislate. However, such legislative power in respect of items not specified in either of the two legislative lists of the Constitution is also exercisable by the Parliament, but only in respect of the areas which are not included in any of the Provinces. It is therefore, quite clear, that where a question arises as to the competence of Parliament to promulgate any legislation (not covered by clause (d) of Article 142 of the Constitution), it is to be seen whether the subject matter of legislation is covered by any entry either in Federal or the Concurrent Legislative List of the Constitution. It is common ground between the parties that the only entry in the two legislative lists of the Constitution, namely, the Federal and Concurrent Legislative Lists, which could be said to cover the subject of 'wealth tax' is entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List. We may, however, mention here that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even entry No. 50 of Federal Legislative List did not cover the impugned legislation, namely, the Act. Entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List relied by the learned counsel for respondents and Central Government to support the vires of the Act reads as under:- "50. Taxes on the capital value of assets not including taxes on capital gains on immovable property."
3. The Act was promulgated in the year 1963 by the Central Government under the late Constitution of Pakistan of 1962. Entry No. 43(c) of the III Schedule of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, which enumerated items within the exclusive competence of Central legislature was identical to Entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List of the present Constitution. Therefore, the power exercisable by the Parliament under the present Constitution in respect of item No. 50 is same as enjoyed by the Central Government under the Constitution of 1962. A reading of the preamble of the Act will show that it was promulgated with the object of levying tax on wealth. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very vehemently contended that the 'wealth' and 'net wealth' as contemplated under the Act are totally different from the concept of 'capital value of assets' as envisaged under entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List. The expression 'Capital value of the assets' is neither defined in the Constitution nor in any Act concerning the field of commerce and taxation, where this expression is in vogue. It is not contended before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the expression 'capital value of the assets' has been used by the legislature in any particular sense or meaning. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the meaning of this expression, to first look for its ordinary dictionary meaning and then the manner in which it is commonly understood in the field of commerce and taxation. The words 'Capital, Value and Assets' are defined in the dictionaries as follows:- "Chambers 20th Century Dictionary Capital: relating to the head: involving the death penalty: placed at the head: main, chief, principal: excellent: relating to capital: the chief or most important thing: the chief town or seat of Government: a large letter, in the form used at the beginning of a sentence, etc: the stock (including property and equipment) and/or money used for carrying on a business: possessors of capital collectively, or their political and economic influence and interests: any advantage used as a means of gaining further advantages: excellent.
Value: worth: a fair equivalent: intrinsic worth or goodness: recognition of such worth: that which renders anything useful or estimable: the degree of this quality: relative worth: high worth: esteem: efficacy: excellence: price: precise meaning: relative duration; relation with reference to light and shade: the special determination pf a quantity: the exact amount of a variable quantity in a particular cases the sound represented by a written symbol: moral principles, standards, etc. To estimate the worth of: to rate at a price: to esteem: to prize.
Assets: the property of a deceased or insolvent person, considered as chargeable for all debts, etc: the entire property of all sorts belonging to a merchant or to a trading association.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary Capital: of or relating to the head: consisting of, serving as, or intended as capital: accruing to or from capital: carried on or conducted by means of capital: of or having to do with capital.
Value: the amount of a commodity service, or medium of exchange that is the equivalent of something else: a fair return in goods, services or money.
Assets: the property of a deceased person that in the hands of his or executor is sufficient to pay his debts and legacies: the property of a deceased person subject by law to the payment of his debts and legacies: the entire property of all sorts of an insolvent or bankrupt or of a person, association, corporation, or estate applicable or subject to the payment of his or its debts.
(The underlinings is by us to supply emphasis).
In Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) the word "Capital" is defined as follows:- "The net amount of property belonging to a merchant, after deducting the debts he is owing. The term, however, is more strictly applied, either to the sum of money which he has embarked in his business at first, or to the available sum he may afterwards have at command for carrying it on."
4. In the light of the above-noted meanings of the words 'Capital, Value and Assets', the expression 'Capital value of the assets' in or opinion means the total value expressible in terms of money of the properties of all kinds possessed by a person excluding his liabilities. We now turn attention to the meaning of word "Wealth" used in the preamble of the Act. "Wealth" is not defined in the Act but "net wealth" is defined therein as follows:- "net wealth" means the amount by which the aggregate value computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, of all the assets, wherever located, belonging to the assessee on the valuation date, including assets required to be included in his net wealth as on that date under this Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the valuation date other than--
(i) debts which under section 6 are not to be taken into account; and
(ii) debts which are secured on, or which have been incurred in relation to, any asset in respect of which wealth tax is not payable under this Act:"
The word Swealth' is defined in dictionaries as follows:-- "Chambers 20th Century Dictionary: Wealth: Prosperity, well-being: valuable possessions of any kind: riches: an abundance.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
Wealth: Weal, welfare, good, happiness: large possessions: abundance of things that are objects of human desire: abundance of word estate: affluence, riches: abundant supply: large accumulation: all property that has a money value or an exchangeable value: all material objects that have economic utility: the stock of useful goods having economic value in existence at any one time.
(The underlinings are by us to supply emphasis).
5. Reading the above dictionary meanings of the words "Wealth and Assets" together it cannot be doubted that they are similar in concept and import. The concept of aggregation of different kinds of properties belonging to a person is common in the meaning of both the words. We are, therefore, of the view that the legislature when promulgating the Act and providing for levy of tax on wealth in its preamble were in fact intending to tax the 'assets' of a person. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, is that 'net wealth' as defined in the Act is different in concept from the "Capital value of the assets" as envisaged in entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List. The argument of the learned counsel has not impressed us. We have already pointed out above that on the basis of dictionary meaning of words 'Capital Value' and 'Assets' the expression 'Capital Value' of Assets' would mean the value expressed in terms of money of the properties of all kinds possessed by a person and it is in this sense that this expression is also commonly understood in commercial and business parlance. The learned counsel has not been able to point out to us anything either in the Constitution or in the Act or in any of the reported cases cited at the Bar to indicate that the legislature had used the above expression in entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative list in any other sense. The only argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner to differentiate between the expression 'Capital Value of the Assets' used in entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List and the expression 'net wealth' as used in the charging section 3 of the Act, is that the tax on the capital value of the assets means, a tax on the gross value of all the assets of an assessee whereas under section 3 of the Act the tax is levied on the 'net wealth' which is determined after deducting all the debts owed by an assessee from the gross value of all the assets owned by him. It is, accordingly, contended that the tax in contemplation of entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List is totally different in nature and character from the tax levied under section 3 of the Act and as such the levy of tax under the Act cannot be justified on the strength of entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List. In support of his above submission the learned counsel mainly relied on the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India v.
Harbhajan Singh (1972) 83 ITR 582. In fact the observation of the Supreme Court of India in the above case relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the mainstay of his argument before us and as such it needs a careful and detailed examination However, before doing that we would like to deal first with the so-called different concept of taxation under the Act and under entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner. The whole gamut of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is that the authorities while determining the wealth tax payable by an assessee under section 3 of the Act first calculate net wealth of the assessee by allowing deduction of all the liabilities of debts owed by him and then determine the tax on the net assets of the assessee whereas the expression 'capital value of the assets' employed in entry No. 50 of Federal Legislative List of Constitution admits of no such deduction on the value of the assets of a person. Firstly, we are unable to find any material difference between the concept of taxation under section 3 of the Act and entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List of Constitution on the above ground. The underlying object of aggregation of all the properties of an assessee for the purposes of levy of tax is common both in section 3 of the Act as well as under entry No.50 of the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution. The fact that the authorities while providing for-determination of tax liability of an assessee under the Act allowed reduction of all his outstanding liabilities from the aggregated value of his assets has no bearing on the character or nature of the tax. This feature of the Act only indicates a mechanism or a method provided under the Act for calculation of the tax liability of an assessee under it which certainly cannot affect or change the character or nature of the tax. There is no justification for the above reasons to hold that the tax levied under section 3 of the Act on the 'net wealth' is in any manner different from the tax on the capital value of the assets as contemplated by entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List of Constitution. There are no words in entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution which could be interpreted as placing any fetter on the power of legislature while providing for tax on the capital value of assets of a person, to allow deduction of liabilities outstanding against him from the value of his assets. It need not be mentioned here that while interpreting a basic document like Constitution, the Court must adopt a liberal interpretation of its various clauses and articles. The Courts while interpreting an entry in the legislative lists of a Constitution have always given it the widest connotation as there is no presumption that the framers of Constitution have withheld certain powers from the legislature to frame laws. The written Constitution of a country is a living organism which should be interpreted in the widest and most liberal manner so as to advance the objective of its framer. The Constitution is the fountainhead of all powers derived by its various organs, like executive, legislature and the judiciary which are its creature. Interpretation of such a document in a narrower sense would defeat the preservation of powers contemplated by its framers. We now turn to the case of Union of India vs. Harbhajan Singh which is heavily relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submissions. It may be stated on the very outset that the point in issue before us was not directly involved in the case of Union of India vs. Harbhajan Singh. In that case the point which arose before the Supreme Court of India related to the constitutionality of an amendment brought about in the Indian Wealth Tax Act, by the Finance Act of 1969. By the aforesaid amendment the agricultural income and property of an assessee was sought to be included in the 'net wealth', determined under the Indian Wealth Tax Act for the purposes of levy of wealth tax. This amendment introduced in the Indian Wealth Tax Act by the Finance Act, 1969, was first challenged before the High Court of Punjab and Hiryana. A Full Bench of that Court in the case reported as Harbhajan Singh vs. Union of India (1971) 80ITR 248 held that the above amendment in the Indian Wealth Tax Act by Finance Act of 1969 was ultra vires and accordingly struck down the same. The Full Bench of Punjab and Hiryana High Court unanimously reached the conclusion that by including the agricultural land within the scope of Wealth Tax Act the Central legislature exceeded its powers under entry No. 86 of list No. 1 of the 7th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Item No. 86 of list No. 1 of the 7th Schedule of the Indian Constitution reads as follows:-- "Taxes on capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land of individual and companies.
Taxes on the Capital of Companies."
6. The above decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Hiryana High Court was challenged by the Union of India before the Supreme Court of India. The Indian Supreme Court by a majority opinion, reversed the decision of High Court of Punjab and Hiryana and held in the cited case that although the amendment brought about in Wealth Tax Act by the Finance Act of 1969 may not be covered under entry No. 86 of the Indian Constitution but it certainly fell under entry No. 97 of the Constitution, which is a residuary entry and provides for power of Central legislature in respect of all such items not provided in list Nos. II & III of Indian Constitution including any tax not mentioned in either of these lists, and read with Article 248 of the Indian Constitution the amendment made in the Wealth Tax Act by Indian Finance Act of 1969 was well within the legislative competence of Federal legislature. It will thus be seen that the validity of the Wealth Tax Act was not at all in issue directly either before the High Court of Punjab and Hiryana or before the Supreme Court of India in the above- cited case. The Supreme Court of India and the High Court of Punjab and Hirjana were concerned with the constitutionality of the amendment brought about in the Indian Wealth Tax Act by the Finance Act of 1969 in the above case whereby the agricultural land which is specifically excluded under entry No. 86 of list No. 1 of Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution was included by virtue of the amendment. We are, therefore, in no doubt that the validity of Indian Wealth Tax Act as such was not in issue before the Supreme Court of India in the above case. However, during the course of discussion Sikri C.J. Who expressed the majority opinion in the case made following observations at page 615 of the Report which is relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention:- "Although it is not necessary to decide the question whether the impugned Act falls within entry 86 List I read with entry 97 List I, or entry 97 List I alone, as some of or brethren are of the view that the original Wealth Tax Act fell under entry 86 List I, we might express or opinion on that point. It seems to us that there is a distinction between a true net wealth tax and a tax which can be levied under entry 86 List I. While legislating in respect of entry 86 List I it is not incumbent on Parliament to provide for deduction of debits in ascertaining the capital value of asset. Similarly, it is not incumbent on State Legislatures to provide for deduction of debits while legislating in respect of entry 49 List II. For example the State Legislature need not, while levying tax under entry 49 List II, provide for deduction of debits owned by the owner of the property. It seems to us that the other part of entry, i.e. "tax on the capital of companies", in entry 86 List I also seems to indicate that this entry is not strictly concerned with taxation of net wealth because capital of a company is in one sense a liability of the company and not its asset. Even if it is regarded as an asset, there is nothing in the entry to compel Parliament to provide for deduction of debits. It would also be noticed that entry 86 List I deals only with individuals and companies but net wealth tax can be levied not only on individuals but on other entities and associations also. It is true that under entry 86 List I aggregation is necessary because it is a tax on the capital value of assets of an individual but it does not follow from this that Parliament is obliged to provide for deduction of debits in order to determine the capital value of assets of an individual or a company. Therefore, it seems to us that the whole of the impugned Act clearly falls within entry 97 List I. We may mention that this Court has never held that the original Wealth Tax Act fell under entry 86 List I. It was only assumed that the original Wealth Tax Act fell within entry 86 List I and on that assumption this entry was analyzed and contrasted with entry 49 List II. Be that as it may, we are clearly of the opinion that no part of the impugned legislation falls within entry 86 List I."
7. It is quite clear from the above-quoted passage that the learned Chief Justice was quite conscious that it was not necessary for him to decide the question whether the Wealth Tax Act fell within entry No. 86 List No. I of the Indian Constitution but he expressed himself on the controversy for the reasons that some other members of the Bench in the case were of the opinion that the Act fell within the purview of entry No.86 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. We are therefore, of the view that the above observations relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not a decision on a point involved in the case but are in the nature of an obiter. Our above conclusion is also supported by the observations made by the learned Chief Justice in another paragraph of the same judgment which followed immediately after the above-quoted observations, which reads as under:- "However, assuming that the Wealth Tax Act, as originally enacted, is held to be legislation under entry 86 List I, there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent Parliament from combining its powers under entry 86 List I with its powers under entry 97 List I. There is no principle that we know of which debars Parliament from relying on the powers under specified entries 1 to 96, List I and supplement them with the powers under entry 97 List I and Article 248 and for that matter powers under entries in the Concurrent List."
8. Apart from it the reasons which persuaded Sikri, C.J. To hold in the above quoted passage that the tax under the Indian Wealth Tax Act is different from the tax which could be levied under entry No. 86 of the Indian Constitution may be stated as follows:-
(i) that while legislating in respect of entry No. 86 of List I of Indian Constitution it is not incumbent on parliament to provide for deduction of debits in ascertaining the capital value of assets;
(ii) that the other part of entry No. 86 of Constitution which provides for tax on "Capital of Companies" seems to indicate that this entry is not strictly concerned with taxation of net wealth because capital of a company is in one sense a liability of a company and not its assets; and even if it is an asset, there is nothing in entry 86^ to compel parliament to provide for deduction of debits; and that
(iii) entry 86 of Constitution deals with individuals and companies only while Wealth Tax can be levied not only on individuals but on other entities and association as well.
9. Out of the above-noted reasons, the last two reasons are not relevant before us as they proceed on the particular wording of entry No. 86 of the Indian Constitution. However, we may examine here the first reason as it may be relevant on account of similarity of entry No. 86 of Indian Constitution with entry No. 50 of Federal Legislative List of or Constitution to the extent that both contemplate tax on 'capital value of the assets'. The above reasoning proceeds on the assumption that the parliament while legislating in respect of tax on capital value of assets is not obliged to provide for deduction of debits in ascertaining the capital value of assets. With utmost respect the above reasoning cannot lead to conclusion that the parliament while legislating in respect of entry No. 50 of Federal Legislative list of or Constitution could not allow deduction of debits in ascertaining the capital value of assets. On the contrary this shows that there are no such fetters on the powers of parliament while legislating in respect of tax on capital value of assets under entry No. 50 of Federal Legislative List of or Constitution. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the contention that because it was not incumbent on the parliament while legislating in respect of tax under entry No. 50 of Federal Legislative List of Constitution to provide for deduction of debts in ascertaining the capital value of assets and that they did allow such deduction under the Act, therefore, the nature of tax levied under the Act should be held different from the concept of taxation under entry No. 50 of Federal Legislative List of the Constitution. The effect of allowing deduction of debts in ascertaining the value of assets under the Act has been dealt with at length earlier in this order by us and need not be repeated here again. Suffice it to say that the fact that the legislature had allowed deduction of debts under the Act in ascertaining the capital value of assets could in no way change the nature of tax which is contemplated under entry No. 50 of the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution. Before ending this discussion we would also like to refer here the following observations in the minority view of three other learned Judges of Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India vs. Harbhajan Singh, expressed in the opinion of Shelat, J., which has an important bearing on the issue raised before us and with which we also agree "
To ascertain where it is, it becomes necessary at the very threshold to know that nature of the impugned tax. The Act is designated by its first section--the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. Though it. Is the substance and not the form or designation which matters, the Act was passed, as conceded by Mr. Setalwad, in exercise of the power contained in Article 246(1) read with Entry 86 of List I. Under section 3, what was originally changed was the capital value of the net wealth of an assessee, such net wealth having to be arrived at by taking into consideration the total assets excluding the agricultural land held by him as defined by section 2(e) and section 2(m). The fact that it is the capital value of the net wealth, computed after deducting from the gross wealth the debts and liabilities of the assessee or the fact that it excluded agricultural land from out of the total assets, prima facie, did not render the tax anything else than the wealth tax as the Parliament legislatively declared it to be. A legislature may, either as a matter or policy or because its power is restricted one, exclude or not include within the ambit of a tax which it enacts, certain assets and may tax the rest. It may also decide that in fairness and justice to the assessee the tax shall be imposed not on the gross amount but on the net amount arrived at after deducing his debts and liabilities. That fact by itself would not mean that it is a tax any the different from what the Legislature itself declares it to be. Fortunately, we do not have to consider in details the nature of the tax contemplated by Entry 86 in List I and that under the impugned Amending Act in the fight of works on Public Finance and other allied subjects, as the Act has on more than one occasion been upheld by this Court as one falling under Entry 86 of List I. Even counsel for the Union conceded that the Act as originally passed in 1957 was a tax falling under that entry. Since, however, the question as to the nature of on tax on the capital value of assets was debated at one stage of the hearing of the appeal, we may briefly set out the views of some of the writers on public finance brought to or notice.
97. Entry 86, in List J, as aforesaid deals with a tax on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land of an individual, Hindu Undivided Family or a company. Tax on the capital of a company, which is the other tax mentioned there, is left out from consideration as we are not concerned with such a tax for the present. The question is, whether the tax imposed under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 is a tax on the capital value of the assets? The tax is imposed on the net wealth (section 3) which means value of assets, an assessee holds on the valuation date (section 4). The net wealth is arrived at by computing the value in the manner provided in the Act and deducting therefrom all debts and liabilities. The tax is on the capital value of the total assets and though each asset is valued separately, the tax is assessed on the value of all the assets (except agricultural land) as a whole. It was, however, said that the tax levied under the Act is different from the tax on the capital value of the assets as contemplated by Entry 86 in List I for two reasons: (a) that it does not take in all the assets inasmuch as it excludes agricultural land, and (b) that it computes net wealth by deducting the debts and liabilities of the assessee. The fallacy in such an argument lies in the confusion between the basis of the tax and its incidence. The basis of the tax is the capital value of the assets except agricultural land. Agricultural land had to be excepted from the tax by reason of the restricted legislative power granted in respect of the subject matter in Entry 86. The power in respect of that subject matter in its turn was restricted by a definite policy in distributing power under which the field of legislation in agriculture was left to the States as was also the case under the Government of India Act, 1935. The exclusion of agricultural land from Entry 86 would not by itself, therefore, mean that the tax is not one on the capital value of assets. In determining the incidence, the legislature may as well take into account various factors such as fairness to the assessee and tax the capital value of his net wealth by allowing deduction of his debts. That again would not change the character of the lax. Prof. Nicholas Kaldor, who is regarded as the person on whose recommendations in his Report on Indian Tax Reform, 1956 the wealth tax was imposed, himself, thought that the tax fell under Entry 86 in List I. His recommendation was that on the ground of both equity and administrative efficiency, the tax would be comprehensive i.e., extending to all forms of property, but that such a tax which would include agricultural land would necessitate a constitutional amendment. He would not have stated so, if he thought the tax, he was suggesting did not fall under Entry 86 in List I. According to Tanable, the term "Net Wealth Tax" is a tax annually imposed on the net value of all assets less liabilities. Such a deduction distinguishes the tax from property Tax in that it is not directly on the property and unlike taxes, such as death duties and capital levy, it takes into consideration the taxable capacity of the assessee by deducting his debts and liabilities from the gross value of his assets. The tax, therefore, is on the person of the assessee as against the property tax which is imposed on the property itself directly.
In Sweden also, where the wealth tax has been feature of the tax structure, taxable wealth is defined, as the capital value of an assessee's assets at the end of his income year to the extent that value exceeds the capital value of his debts. The basis of the wealth tax thus is the capital value of the assets held by an assessee on the relevant valuation date. The fact that a particular tax excludes for one or more of, the assets or allows from its incidence certain deductions, such as debts and liabilities, pertains to the field of computation and not the basis of the tax which is the capital value of assets. Indeed , in all cases which have so far come up before this Court or before the High Courts, it was never the contention of the Union of India that the Wealth Tax Act did not fall under Entry 86 in List I."
10. The minority decision in the case-of Harbhajan Singh also referred to the cases of Sudhir Chandra vs. Wealth Tax Officer, Calcutta, AIR 1969 SC 59; Banami Dass vs. Wealth Tax Officer AIR 1965 SC 1387 and Assistant Commissioner, Madras vs. B & C Co. AIR 1970 SC 169; wherein Indian Wealth Tax Act was held valid under entry No. 86 of List No. 1 of Seventh Schedule of Indian Constitution.
11. In view of above discussion the writ petition is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we will make no order as to costs.