This is an appeal against an order of the learned Chairman, Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi, dated September 18, 1972, whereby the learned Court refused to grant the application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (here in after called the Ordinance), for prohibition of partial strike resorted to by the respondents 2 to 42, since 24th August 1972. A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. Obaidur Rehman, the learned Advocate for the respondents that the impugned order not being an award is not appealable. The facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal briefly put are these.
2. It is stated by the appellant-Company in t of application under Section 45 of the Ordinance that the respondents 2 to 42, in violation of the provision of the ordinance, have commenced --- cessation of work", which is still continuing at the Karachi Factory of the company. TheManagement prayed in the interest of industrial peace that the court be pleased to prohibit the continuance of partial strike under section 45(1) of the Ordinance. The learned Chairman of the Labour Court came to the conclusion that there was no "prima facie case for prohibiting the alleged strike" and dismissed the application.
3. Mr. M. A. Khan, the learned Representative for the appellant-Company, contended that the order of the learned Court amounts to an interim award and, therefore, Is appealable. I have given by careful consideration to this question and have come to the conclusion that theimpugned order is not en interim award and, therefore, not appealable.
4. Award is defined under section 2(ii) of the Ordinance to mean "the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award."
5. Industrial Dispute is defined under section 2(xiii) of the Ordinance as under:- "'Industrial dispute` means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employ--ment or the conditions of work of any personal."
6. The question is as to whether refusal to prohibit partial strike is an industrial dispute. Strike or partial strike may be the result of an industrial dispute but not Industrial dispute as defined. Strike is the result of dispute or difference between employers and workmen. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Court by refusing the continuance of the strike has decided any industrial dispute between t: a parties. It was contended by Mr. Khan that partial strike is a matter relating to the industrial dispute pending between the parties. The contention of the learned Representative has been set at rest by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Province of West Pakistan v. Syed Muhammad Ali and 93 others (PLD 1970 SC 292). In that case, it was contended that .the extension of the period of the award by the Labour Court constituted an industrial dispute and, therefore, it was an award. The Supreme Court observed as under:-- "It was contended that the question of the extension of the award was a matter relating to an industrial dispute and as the order of the industrial Court extending the period of --- the award amounted to at: award it was appealable as ouch. The learned Judges in the High Court did not accept this intention and we agree with their reason that the phrase "any matter relating thereto" in this definition is to be read"ejusdem generis"' with the words "industrial dispute" to cover only controversies with regard to the employment or non-employ--ment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person under subsection (5) of section12 of the Ordinance. "
Subsection (5) of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, provides for an appeal against an award. The Court try no stretch of imagination can be said to have decided any indus-- trial dispute between the parties by merely refusing to prohibit something that the workmen were doing 7. Mr. Khan, the learned Representative for the Manage--ment, however, relied on the following observation of the learned Chairman, in support of his conclusion that the learned Court has determined an industrial dispute between the parties. The observation runs as under:- "It appears from the application under section 34 of the industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969, moved by the applicants, that the matter remained under discussion between the parties till June 1972.'
Therefore, for the present, there is no proof that the switching on and off the lights was a part of the normal duties of the Watch and Ward staff or, in refusing to reform that duty, they can be said to have resorted to strike. These questions, however, will be determined in the application under section 34, when it comes up for hearing."
8. Mr. Khan laid emphasis on the sentence that "there is" no proof that the switching on and off the lights was a part of the normal duties of the Watch and Ward staff or, in refusing to perform that duty, they can be said to have resorted to strike."
9. This sentence may be unhappily worded, but to my mind the sentence following it makes it quite clear that the learned Chairman had not decided any industrial dispute between the parties. The next sentence runs as" under:- "These questions, however, will be determined in the applica--tion under section 34, when it comes up for hearing."
10. It is quite clear from this sentence that the Court did not decide the controversy between the parties, which can be said to a determination of an industrial dispute, so as to amount an award.
11. Mr. Obaidur Rehman, the learned Advocate for the respondents, tightly pointed out that the intention of the Legislature was not to prolong the litigation between the parties If the Court passes an order one way or the other under section 45 of the Ordinance, the Legislature, in order to avoid unnecessary litigations, made it flua1, so that industrial peace may be restored to quickly. The intention of the Legislature is clear from the c past history of Legislation on this subject. The Legislature had conferred the same power as under section 45 of the Ordinance on the Labour Court under section 26 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, for prohibiting strike or lock-out. The Legislature specifically made it appealable under section 16(l)(c) of 1968 Ordinance. The emission, to make it appealable, clearly exhibits the intention of the Legislature to confer finality on the orders passed under section 45 of the Ordinance. I would hold that the appeal is not maintainable and it is accordingly dismissed.