' AJMAL MIAN, ACTG. C.J.-- The petitioners through this petition have prayed for the following reliefs: (a)to declare that the penalty order in respect of the three years, namely, 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1979-80 as also their accompanying notices of demand are illegal, bad in law and of no legal effect:
(b) to grant to the petitioners the consequent remedy by quashing the said penal orders and or demands thereunder and each of them, and to direct respondents and each of them, all persons working under or through them to refrain from enforcing the said penalty order and/or their notices of demand referred to hereinabove or any of them;
(c) to grant cost of this petition with special exemplary cost for the mala fide, vexatious and frivolous action, which compelled the petitioners to run to the Court;
(d) to grant such other further additional relief or reliefs this Hon'ble Court may deem fit or otherwise proper in or about the circumstances mentioned hereinabove.
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that the assessment orders for the years 1976-77, 1978 and 1979-80 were passed. However, the respondents' department issued notices under section 65 of the Income-tax ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as to Ordinance) in respect of the above three assessment years, in pursuance whereof fresh assessm ent orders were made whereby the amount of income-tax paid by the assessee was excluded from the item of admissible expenses. Against the above orders, the petitioners filed appeals before the Income-tax Commissioner, which were dismissed by order dated 13-9-1987, Against the above order, the petitioners have filed appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It seems that respondent No,6 after issuing notices under section 111 of the Ordinance has imposed the amount of penalties for the above three assessment years through the impugned orders and raised demands in respect thereof. The petitioners being aggrieved by the above orders and notices have filed the present Constitutional Petition.
3. It has been contended by Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders are without jurisdiction as section 111 of the Ordinance is not attracted to them. If we were to express ourselves on the above contention, it may prejudice the petitioners. Since we are of the view that the petitioners have adequate alternate remedy in the form of appeals before the forums provided under the Ordinance, we have refrained ourselves from expressing on the merits of the above contention. However, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders are ex facie without jurisdiction. We may also observe that the impugned orders are directly linked with the appeals filed by the petitioners before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. If the above appeals are to be allowed in favour of the petitioners the impugned orders would be of no consequence as they would become redundant. It will not be proper to have two proceedings before two different forums in respect of the same subject-matter.
4. We, therefore, dismiss the above petition in limine.
' These are the reasons in pursuance of short order of even date.