This judgment will also dispose of Regular Second Appeal No. 454 of 1974 as both the appeals involve the same questions for determination between the same parties.
2. The R.SAs. Arise from the judgments/decrees dated the 14th of October, 1974, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Layallpur, whereby the appellant-plaintiff's first appeals were dismissed.
3. It is a case relating to inheritance of one Kammu dying issueless in India before Partition.
Mutations Nos. 54 and 55 both dated the 10th of August, 1953, relating to his property situate in two different Chaks were attested. By Mutation No. 54 the appellant Ghulam Muhammad and his teal brother Meraj Din were given land in equal shares as sons of his real brother Bagga. By the other Mutation, namely, No. 55 of even date, Meraj Din was totally excluded on an assumption that he had died earlier in time than Kammu deceased. The appellant Ghulam Muhammad brought a suit to challenge the devolution made in mutation No. 54 claiming that he alone was entitled to inherit Kammu as his nephew while Meraj. Din having died earlier in time than him was excluded from his inheritance. Correspondingly Meraj Din's successors brought the other suit maintaining that they too were entitled to inherit Kammu as he died later than him.
4. Both the suits were contested by both the parties taking the above--mentioned pleas.
Appropriate issues were framed. The trial Court dismissed the appellant Ghulam Muhammad's suit while the other suit brought by the progeny of Meraj Din, namely, Muhammad Din etc; was decreed.
5. Ghulam Muhammad preferred two separate appeals against decrees in both the suits. Both ere dismissed and hence the present R.SAs.
6. Mr. Jari Ullah Khan, Advocate for the appellant advanced an arguments which indeed went against his interest. He maintained that both the suits were not maintainable in so far as both were brought to impugn orders of the Rehabilitation Authorities in attesting the two mutations in regard to heirs of the; deceased right-holder. He relied upon Ahmad Din v. Muhammad Shafi etc. PLD 1971 SC 762, which, according to him, was on all fours with the present cases, as there too the right- holder had died in India and his successors were contesting each other's claim to succeed him.
The order passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities, of course, in the shape of a mutation was held not amenable to the jurisdiction of Civil Court. In the cases in hand, the right-holder Kammu admittedly had died in India and his two nephews were trying to get land in Pakistan in lieu of his claim left there. The mutations were obviously attested in assertion of their being `claimants in place of the right-holder and were not open to be challenged in Civil Court. Consequently both the suits did not lie. This will have the effect of upholding dismissal of the appellant's own suit. The R.SA.
(No. 453/74), is accordingly dismissed. However, the other R.SA. (No. 454/74) will have to be accepted as the suit which was decreed in favour of the -respondents was not entertainable according to the rule referred to above.
7. Ch. Qadir Bakhsh, Advocate for the respondents, in reply, tried to defend the decree passed in their suit pointing out that the appellant was estopped from assailing the same as he too had availed the plenary jurisdiction of Civil Court by filing his own suit He relied upon Ghulam Mohi-ud- Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner etc. PLD 1964 SC 829 emphasizing that once acquiescence was made to the jurisdiction of a particular Court, it could not be subsequently argued that such a Court was not competent to entertain the lis. This rule may have been helpful to the respondents but there was no estoppel against a Statute. An illuminating discussion on the point may be found m Muhammad Sulaiman etc. v. Javed Iqbal etc. PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 64 where it was quite succinctly enunciated that there was no estoppel against a Statute. Likewise, Ghulam Mohi-ud- Din's case was equally of no help because the rule was formulated in a writ petition which was brought on the ground that the orders passed by the Tribunal at the behest of the writ petitioner were bad in law. The writ petitioner was held to be barred by his own acquiescence to the Tribunal's jurisdiction in the case sponsored by him. The case of plenary jurisdiction of Civil Courts was a bit different. If the Statute barred their jurisdiction, a party could not confer the same by its consent.
Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. The Governor-General-in-Council PLD 1947 Privy Council 19, was directly on the point that jurisdiction could not be conferred on a Court by the consent of a party.
Relying upon Mst. Ghulam Fatima v. Muhammad Hussain etc. PLD 1976 SC 729, counsel for the respondents lastly urged that the Civil Courts were competent to decide about mutations attested in regard to a claimant's inheritance. This case was distinguishable inasmuch as the mutation related to the inheritance of a person who had been given land in allotment in Pakistan and had died here. It was obvious that after the allotment in his favour was confirmed, he was subject to ordinary law including a civil suit before an ordinary Court of civil jurisdiction
8. As a result of the above discussion, while R.SA. No. 453/74 is dismissed, the other one (No. 454/74) is allowed. The judgment of the lower appellate Court impugned therein is set aside and the respondent's suit is dismissed. The effect shall be that both the mutations (Nos. 54 and 55) will remain intact notwithstanding that those are inconsistent with each other over the same point of devolution of the property of the propositus. Parties are left to bear their own costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.