' Facts relating to this revision petition are not complicated. This revision has been filed by Ghulam Mehdi judgment-debtor against the order of Additional District Judge dated 2-1-1986 by which he dismissed appeal filed by Ghulam Mehdi and upheld the order of Civil Judge, Chakwal dated 19-2- 1984. The salient features of the petition are that one Abdul Aziz, the predecessor-in-interest of Mst.
Bhagan and others, filed a suit for pre-emption in respect of suit land (completely detailed in the orders of both the Courts) against Ghulam Mehdi. A consent decree was passed in aforesaid suit on 20-11-1972. One Ghulam Jafar filed another suit for pre-emption entitled as Ghulam Jafar v.
Ghulam Mehdi. The suit was dismissed vide judgment and decree of the learned trial Court on 25- 6-1976.
2. Abdul Aziz filed application for execution of decree dated 25-6-1976. The said application was dismissed on account of non-prosecution on 13-9-1982. Abdul Aziz again submitted application for execution on 20-1-1983. Ghulam Mehdi took up objection in objection petition that application was barred by time under section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. Civil Judge vide order dated 19-2-1984 repelled the objection and came to conclusion that application was within time on the ground that the decree dated 20-11-1972 was passed in violation of section 28 of Punjab Pre-emption Act and secondly that the proceedings in subsequent suit Ghulam Jafar v. Ghulam Mehdi had the effect of interrupting the period of limitation for the purpose of execution of decree dated 20-11-1972. The appeal filed by Ghulam Mehdi also failed before learned Additional District Judge who upheld the order of the learned Civil Judge. Hence this revision petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners/judgment-debtors (the heirs of Ghulam Mehdi) contended vehemently that the order of learned Additional District Judge as well as the order of the learned trial Court was in clear violation of section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was contended that suit in favour of Abdul Aziz was decreed on 20-11-1972. The application was filed on 25-2-1982, that it was filed after the lapse of six years. It, was, therefore, clearly time-barred. It was further contended that the proceedings in subsequent suit (Ghulam Jafar v. Ghulam Mehdi) were of no consequence to running of limitation under section 48 of Civil Procedure Code. The period of six years had to be reckoned from 25-6-76. Reliance was placed on PLD 1973 Lah.
806.
4. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the limitation for execution in decree dated 20-11-1972 had to commence from 25-6-1976 when the suit filed by Ghulam Jafar was dismissed. It was urged that the proceedings in the subsequent suit had the effect of running the execution of decree dated 20-11-1972 impossible. It was further contended that the decree dated 20-11-1972 in suit Abdul Aziz v. Ghulam Mehdi was violative of section 28 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act that Ghulam Jafar was not impleaded as party in the aforesaid suit.
Therefore, the decree was a nullity. It was suggested that section 28 of Punjab Pre-emption Act is to be read into section 48 of Civil Procedure Code.
5. I have considered the arguments of the parties with care.
' The facts of the case are not disputed between the parties. There is no dispute that the decree sought to be executed was passed on 20-11-72, that the rival suit for pre-emption filed by Ghulam Jafar was dismissed on 25-6-1976 that the application for execution was lodged before Executing Court for the first time on 25-2-1982, that the said application was dismissed for non-prosecution on 13-9-1982. Again the application for execution was lodged on 20-1-1983.
6. The only question calling for determination is what is the date for the computation of limitation in section 48 of Civil Procedure Code. Whether the period of limitation of six years prescribed in section 48 is contingent upon the provisions of section 28 of Punjab Pre-emption Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents loses sight of the fact that the provisions of Section 28 of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and section 48 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are meant for different purposes. Section 28 of Punjab Pre-emption Act provides for concurrent hearing of the suits. It provides that when more suits than one in respect of same sale are pending, the plaintiff shall be joined as a defendant in each of the other suits and the Court is directed to state in each decree the order in which each claimant is entitled to exercise his right. As already indicated this section provides for the hearing of suits for the purpose of consistency in the decree. It does not deal with limitation at all. Section 48 deals with the maximum limit of time for execution. The decree-holder is entitled to present in succession any number of applications for execution within the time fixed by this section. The section 48 ibid is as follows:- "Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of six years from-
(a) the date of decree sought to be executed, or
(b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed-
(a) to preclude the Court from ordering the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the said term of six years where the judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within six years immediately before the date of the application; or
(b) to limit or otherwise affect the operation of Article 83 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908."
7. It is very clear from the aforesaid section that period of six years is provided for filing the application for execution of the decree sought to be executed. The period is to be reckoned from the date B of the decree. The moment decree is signed the period of limitation starts running.
Section 15 of Limitation Act has the effect of interrupting the period of limitation. Section 15 is as follows:- "Subject to the provisions of section 14 the right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest-
(a) where the sale is by a sole owner or occupancy tenant, or, in the case of land or property jointly owned or held, is by all the co-sharers jointly, in the persons in order of succession, who but for such sale would be entitled, on the death of the vendor or vendors, to inherit, the land or property sold;
(b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property, and is not made by all the co-sharers jointly,- ' firstly, in the lineal descendants of the vendor in order of succession; ' secondly, in the co-sharers, if any, who are agnates, in order of succession; ' thirdly, in the persons, not included under firstly or secondly above, in order of succession, who but for such sale would be entitled, on the death of the vendor, to inherit the land or property sold; ' fourthly, in the co-sharers:
(c) if no person having a right of pre-emption under clause (a) or clause (b) seeks to exercise it,-- ' firstly, when the sale affects the superior or inferior proprietary right and the superior right is sold, in the inferior proprietors, and when the inferior right is sold, in the superior proprietors, ' secondly, in the owners of the patti or other sub-division of the estate within the limits of which such land or property is situate; ' thirdly, in the owners of the estate; ' fourthly, in the case of a sale of the proprietary right in such land or property, in the tenants (if any) having rights of occupancy in such land or property; ' fifthly, in any tenant having a right of occupancy in any agricultural land in the estate within the limits of which the land or property is situated.
8. The combined effect of section 48 of Civil Procedure Code and section 15 of the Limitation Act is that the limitation is only interrupted ' by the circumstances mentioned in section 15 ibid, i.e, the decree sought to be executed is stayed by the issuance of injunction or order from the Court.
9. It is a well-settled principle of law that the Limitation Act is based upon equity and common sense and must be strictly construed. It was held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath v. Suresh (AIR 1932 PC 165), "The fixation of the period of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary and may frequently result in hardships. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is only safeguarded."
10. Calcutta High Court in Sarat Kamini Dasi v. Nagendra Nath Pal (29 C.W.N.1973) held:- "In applying the principles of limitation the Indian Courts are not permitted to travel beyond the provisions of Limitation Act. There is no principle which can legitimately be invoked to aid or to supplement its provisions."
11. The same rule was reiterated by the Privy Council in Kirtyanand Singh v. "Prithi Chand Lal (1933 A.L.J 359) and (AIR 1933 P.C.359).
12. The circumstance of concurrent hearing mentioned in section 28 of Punjab Pre-emption Act cannot be read into section 48 of Civil Procedure Code. The proceedings in subsequent suit were neither relevant nor operated as a stay of running of limitation pertaining to the decree, dated 9- 10-1972. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondent are of no help to him. The learned Additional District Judge as well as the learned Executing Court had committed error of law by misconstruing the provision of section 48 of Civil Procedure Code. I have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the application for execution dated 25-2-1982 was barred by time. I accordingly accept this revision petition. Set aside the order of Additional District Judge dated 2-1- 1986 and order of the Civil Judge, Chakwal, dated 19-2-1984 and sustain the objection of judgment-debtor and dismiss the application for execution. The revision petition has been accepted with costs throughout.