1. MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, J.--The facts forming the background of this constitutional petition, briefly stated are these. The petitioner is Inspector Excise & Taxation Department (District) South, Karachi, under suspension. On 24th June, 1986 he lodged F.I.R. No. 32/86 at Sub-Division City-I in respect of commission of an offence under Article 4 of Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd' Order, 1979 by one Jagat Ram. The said accused was duly tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Karachi (South), who convicted and sentenced the said accused to 5 years, R.I. With whipping of ten stripes and a fine of Rs. 5,000, in default of payment of fine he was to suffer 6 months, R.I. Further. The convict Jagat Ram filed an appeal against his conviction before the Federal Shariat Court (Appellate Jurisdiction), being Criminal Appeal No. 116-K/86. The learned Federal Shariat Court vide its order dated 2-7-1987 allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and the sentence and acquitted the appellant of the charge against him.. The learned Federal Shariat Court at the same time in exercise of the powers vested in it under Article 203-DD of the Constitution, directed that the statement of the appellant shall be treated as a complaint and a case under the provisions of the law shall be registered against Ghulam Hussain Baluch, P.W. 2, (the petitioner above named) to be investigated and dealt with in accordance with law. It also at the same time ordered that the petitioner shall be asked to show cause as to why he should not be punished under the law of contempt of Court for having interfered with the course of justice in either withholding the information that an appeal had been filed or surreptitiously interpolating the particulars of the present case in the list of case properties meant for destruction. The petitioner had also registered another case vide F.I.R. No. 59/84 on 30-7-1984 at the Police Station Excise City Sub-Division, Karachi, against Raja Muhammad Yaqoob Akhtar, accused, under sections 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The accused above named was tried by the learned Sessions Judge (South) Karachi, who by his order dated 15-3-1986 convicted and sentenced him to 10 years, R.I. With whipping -of ten stripes and a fine of Rs. 5,000, in default of payment of fine he was to suffer one year's R.I. Further.
2. Aggrieved by the order of his conviction Raja Muhammad Yaqoob Akhtar also carried an appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 32-K/86 to the Federal Shariat Court (Appellate Jurisdiction). While allowing the appeal setting aside the conviction and sentence and acquitting the appellant vide its order dated 2-7-1987 the learned Federal Shariat Court also passed the following order:- "5. The learned Assistant Advocate-General had further suggested that as Mr. Ghulam Hussain Baloch Excise Sub-Inspector made a wrong statement before the learned Sessions Judge that the material has been destroyed under the order of the Hon'ble Minister and as he suppressed the fact before the competent authority proceedings under section 201; P.P.C., be taken against him. We quite agree with the suggestion and direct that the Director-General shall lodge a complaint of the facts constituting the offence."
3. We have heard Mr. Raja Oureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner. He urged with vehemence that the entire action taken against the petitioner including the service of final show-cause notice proposing to impose one of the major penalties including dismissal from service has been initiated by the respondent No. 2, consequent to the directions contained in the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in appeals, bearing No. 116/x/86 and 32/x/86. Consequent to the suspension of the operation of the judgments of the Federal Shariat Court, so far as they relate to the petitioner above named. The respondent No. 2 is in no way legally entitled to execute and implement the directives of the Federal Shariat Court through departmental proceedings. The stay order granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, according to Mr. Raja Oureshi, is intended to safe-guard the petitioner, inter alia, from departmental enquiries, based on the alleged misconduct of the petitioner. The action taken by the respondent No. 2, the learned counsel for the petitioner so contended, would completely defeat the purpose for filing the petition before the Supreme Court.
4. The learned counsel also invited our attention to Article 190 of the Constitution and contended that all executive and judicial authorities throughout Pakistan are bound to act in aid of the Supreme Court.
5. We are not impressed by any of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Despite our repeated enquiry, the learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to state that after the receipt of the reply to the show-cause notice given by the petitioner through his Advocate's letter dated 9-8-1988 any further action had been taken by the respondent No. 2 pursuant to the final show--cause notice issued by him. At any rate if the respondent No. 2 is in any manner acting in defiance of the stay order granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Petition for Special Leave (Criminal Petition No. 62-R(S)/88) Filed by the petitioner, the petitioner may approach the Supreme Court for appropriate relief. The petitioner has thus a more efficacious alternate remedy available to him.
6. The submission made on the basis of Article 190 of the Constitution is also wholly fallacious and untenable. By virtue of this Article, the Legislature has undoubtedly made it obligatory on executive and judicial authorities throughout Pakistan to act in aid of the Supreme Court. By no standard of reasonings it can be interpreted to mean that it confers a right on any person or party, other than the Supreme Court, to request any executive or judicial authority to act in aid of the Supreme Court in any manner muchless in the manner and circumstances as it has been sought in the instant case by the petitioner. It is in our opinion the privilege of the Supreme Court alone to call upon or ask any executive or judicial authority to act in aid of it accordingly. It is only upon being so ordered or required by the Supreme Court that the executive or judicial authorities are bound to act in aid of Supreme Court as required. The use of the words "in aid of by itself clearly suggests that "aid" is to be so requited before it is rendered by any executive or judicial authority. A reference to the provisions of Article 187(1), ibid reproduced below in our opinion throws sufficient light on the intent and purpose of Article 190 of the Constitution.
7. "187. (1) Subject to clause (2) of Article 17 the Supreme Court shall have power to issue such directions orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, including an order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person or the discovery or production of any document."
8. The petitioner has thus no right to invoke the provisions of Article 190-of the Constitution and hence the above-noted contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is hereby repelled as being devoid of any force.
9. This petition is, in our opinion, wholly misconceived and- it is dismissed accordingly.
10. We may also put it on record that the petitioner has filed only one order of the Supreme Court dated 23-7-1988 (Annexure `N') passed on appeal from judgment of Federal Shariat Court in Criminal Appeal No. 116/x/86. No such order in respect of the appeal, if any, filed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in Criminal Appeal No. 32/K/86 has been filed.
11. These are the reasons in pursuance of the short order of even date.