1. This 1s an appeal against the decision dated 12-7-1972 of the learned Chairman, Punjab Labour Court, Central Zone, Lahore passed under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 whereby the petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. The fads of the case are that the appellant was employed as electrical supervisor in the year 1953. On 184-1972 his services were terminated vide order Exh. P-1 dated 19-3-1972 issued by the Manager, Punjab Textile Mills Limited, Multan, which is the following effect:- "This is to inform you that your services are not required by this organization, hence you are served with a one month notice valid up to 18th April 1972. You war be entitled to have all benefits according to Rules and Regulation. You are further advised to produce no-demand certificate on 18-4-1972 duly signed by all the concerned -departments for the purpose of finalisation of your account."
2. Aggrieved by the above order the appellant sent a grievance notice to the respondent on 123-5- 1972; to which no reply was received. He thereupon tiled a petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations ordinance, 1969, which was dismissed.
2. The respondent raised the following cross-objections namely:-
(i) That the appellant was not an employee of the respondent.
(ii) That the appellant was not a workman.
3. Cross Objection No. I---The learned counsel for the respondent contended that Punjnad Textile Mills Limited, Mullah were the employers of the appellant and not the Manager, who is just an employee of the management like the appellant. Therefore, the petition should' have been filed not against the Manager but against the Punjnad Textile Mills Limited, Multan. This conten--tion has no force because according to section 2(c) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, employer means an owner of an Industrial or commercial establishment and includes in a factory any person named under clause (e) of subsection (i) of section of the Factories Act. 934 (XX of 1934) as manager of the factory. Thus a manager of a factory is included in the definition of employer.
4. Cress Objection No. II -The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the. appellant was a foreman and his duties were supervisory in nature and, therefore, he was not a workman within the meaning of section 2 (xxviii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In this connection he relied on the admission made by the appellant in cross-examination. They are as follows:- "I was the head of electrical section. It is incorrect that I was a foreman in the establishment.
5. Application Exh. R-1 wag submitted by me for leave. Is this application I have described myself as a foreman. One Abdul Ghani was Assistant foreman under me. I had charge-Sheeted one Ashraf Julani under the direction of the employer. I had also charge-sheeted Muhammad Ramzan and Allah Ditta under the direction of the employer. I had no authority to appoint a person in the respondent's mills."
6. Section 2 (xxviii) of industrial Relations Ordin4nce, 1969 reads as follows:- "'Worker' and `Workman' mean any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry fur hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute retrenched, laid cu` otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay off, or removal has led to that dispute.
7. Explanation.-',supervisor' means a worker immediately above the lowest level of workers in an establishment or industry who has supervisory duties but no power to engage or remove, or take any other discipline action against another worker by ;his own authority."
8. From the above it is clear that the employees who performed these supervisory duties have now been added in the definition of workman by the Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance,1972. The mere fact that the appellant had cl arse-sheeted some workers under the direction of his employer would not exclude him from the definition of a worker. 7'he respondent in this case failed to produce reliable evidence such as the duty list of the appellant is order t,) show that the appellant had power to engage or remove, or take any disciplinary action against another worker by his own g authority. Therefore, the mete fact that the appellant was performing the supervisory duties will not take him out of the definition of a workman. Under these circumstances I find no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent.
9. On merits.-The learned counsel for the appellant con--tended that Exh. P-1 was merely a notice that hits services would be terminated on 18-4,1972 and not an order of his termina--tion of service.
10. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of termination came into effect on 19-3-1972. According to the learned counsel in view of the Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 which came into force on 13-4-1972, services of a workman could not be terminated unless the reasons for the action taken explicitly mentioned in the termination order and since termination order became effective on 18-4-1972, the order of termination of services of the appellant without giving any reasons was bad in law. -
3. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the order of termination of services of the appellant came into effect on 19-3-1972 when it was passed and, therefore, at that time it was not necessary to give the reasons for terminating the services of the appellant, because the Labour Lags (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 had not come into force.
4. I have gone through the order Exh. P-1 and find that it is not an order terminating the services of the appellant on 19-3-1972 but only a notice that his services would he terminated on 18-4-1972.
11. This notice before 18-4-1972 could also have been withdrawn, it the management so desired find, therefore, it cannot be said that it was the final order of termination of his service. T s n fortified in this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case, and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1961 PLC 1127) wherein it was observed "Where the services of a workman are terminated by payment of one months wages in lieu of notice, his services come to an end on the date on which it is terminated. If, on the other hand, the workman had been given one month's notice and after that month his services are terminates, his services would come to an end only after the notice period. "
12. In view of the above I hold that the order of termination of services came into effect on 18-4-1972, when it had become necessary to mention the reasons for terminating the services in that order.
13. Since it was not done, the order of termination of the services was bad in law.
14. I, accordingly, accept the appeal, set aside the decision of the learned lower Court and direct that the appellant be re-instated with full benefits.