' Faza1 Beg, petitioner, who was employed as a Security Jamadar with the Pakistan Engineering Company Limited-respondent No, 1, instituted a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore, calling in question the order dated 4-1-1977 whereby he was dismissed from service for alleged misconduct involving theft of Module Hob Cutter and seeking a direction for his reinstatement in service with all back benefits. The respondent-company contested the grievance petition inter alia on the grounds that the petitioner was not a workman in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance 1968 and no right guaranteed to him under any law, award or settlement, was either infringed or denied; that the petition was not within time and that the same was otherwise incompetent as grievance notice was not served. On merits, it was asserted that on account of involvement of the petitioner in a theft case, he was departmentally proceeded with and after serving the charge-sheet, the petitioner was dismissed on account of misconduct.
2. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court dismissed the grievance petition vide order dated 28-2-1980 holding that the grievance petition was incompetent as grievance notice was not given and that even on merits, the petitioner was rightly dismissed for misconduct after holding a departmental inquiry. The petitioner was, however, held to be a workman and that the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the petition.
3. The petitioner assailed the order dated 28-2-1980 before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore in appeal which was dismissed vide judgment dated 24-11-1981 recording the findings as under:- #TBS (i) #TBE That in the present case, the service of grievance notice was not necessary and the present grievance petition was not incompetent for want of grievance notice;
(ii) that since the petitioner does not come under the definition of workman as given in the Standing Orders Ordinance, no right had been guaranteed to him under the said Ordinance. It has not been shown that any other law has guaranteed any right to him. Though the appellant comes within the ambit of definition of workman as given in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 but as he was not a workman as defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, no right had been guaranteed to him by law and as such the Labour Court cannot redress the wrong.
(iii) that the Inquiry Officer as well as the Labour Court were not justified in finding the petitioner guilty of abetting the commission of theft.
' This led to the filing of the present constitution petition.
4. The findings that in the facts and circumstances of the case grievance notice was not necessary and that the Inquiry Officer and learned Labour Court were not justified in finding the petitioner guilty of abetting the commission of theft were not challenged before me. The parties were also in agreement that the petitioner was a workman as defined in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The dispute, thus raised was whether the petitioner was a `workman' within the meaning of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. It may also be noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner did not controvert the proposition that where relief is sought with reference to the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, it is incumbants upon the petitioner to show that he is a `workman' under the said Ordinance, as otherwise a Labour Court cannot grant the relief under the Standing Orders Ordinance even if such a petitioner is a `workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the finding of the learned Labour Court that the petitioner is a 'workman' within the meaning of Standing Orders Ordinance is correct and that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal misconceived the law in holding that the petitioner does not fall within the ambit of the said definition. Learned counsel for the respondent/company, on the other hand, supported the judgment of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal and relied on the judgments cited in the said judgment as well as on Muhammad Sadiq v. Messrs Cotton Export Corporation of Pak. Ltd., Karachi 1982 PLC 228, Noor Hussain v. Pakistan Machine Tool Factory Ltd.
1983 PLC 227, Muhammad Sharif v. Messrs Rafhan Maize Products Co. Ltd. 1983 PLC 273 and Syed Zahoor Haider v. Messrs Allwin Engineering Industries Ltd. 1987 PLC 587. In Shahzar Khan v. Sind Labour Court and others PLD 1976 Kar. 139 it was held that since the Chowkidar does not perform the duties of manual or clerical nature, therefore, he is not a 'workman' within the meaning of the definition given in the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following judgments:
(i) Shahzar Khan v. Sind Labour Court and others 1977 SCMR 103,
(ii) Organization of Karachi Port Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust, Karachi and others 1988 SCMR 922.
(iii) Rehmat Ali v. The Security Papers Ltd. And another PLD 1982 Kar.
913.
' The case of Shahzar Khan (supra) is a case of Chowkidar and Assistant Manager Security employed at monthly salary of Rs,350. He besides working as a chowkidar was also supervising three other chowkidars. He was held to be a workman and worker within the meaning of definition given in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. In this case reference was made to the case of Organization of Karachi Port Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust etc. Decided on 19th of January, 1970 reported as 1988 SCMR 922 wherein "chowkidars" and "Havildars" in the Watch and Ward Department of the Karachi Port Trust were held to be workmen within the meaning of definition given in section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. In the case of Rehmat All v. The Security Papers Ltd. And another PLD 1982 Kar. 913, the question whether security guard and shift Jamadar are workers or workmen as given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance as well as in the Standing Orders Ordinance, came to be considered. It was held that the definition of 'worker' and 'workman' as given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance is much wider in scope as compared with the definition given in the Standing Orders Ordinance. The definition of the term "workman" given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance reads as under: "Workman" means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or un-skilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward."
' The Supreme Court in the case of Organization of Karachi Port Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust and others 1988 SCMR 922 held Havildars and Chowkidars to be falling within the definition of workman given in section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. This clause reads as follows: "Workman means any person including an apprentice employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes etc."
' The definition of workman given in the two statutes i,e, the Industrial Disputes Ordinance and Standing Orders Ordinance is almost the same and as such the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Organization of K.P.T. v. K.P.T. 1988 SCMR 922 was rightly pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner while interpreting the definition of workman given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the afforested case held chowkidars and havildars as workmen because of the amendments introduced later on and the definition of 'workman' ultimately given in the I.R.O. It is true that the reference to the latest development in law was also made but the fact remains that havildars and chowkidars were held to be covered by the definition of word "worker" given in section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. The reference to the later development in the law was an additional reason given to show that the confusion, if any, stood clarified by these changes brought in the law. Even in the Karachi case of Rehmat Ali, the learned Judges observed that where a person admittedly belongs to labour class, he cannot be excluded from the definition of workman given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance on the ground that performance of duties by him involves insignificant use of hands or manual work takes a fraction of time as compared to hours of duties. The learned Judges further observed as under:- "We cannot be unmindful of the fact that the labor laws are beneficial laws provided for the labour class with the object to provide inexpensive and expeditious remedy before a Labor Court and, therefore, the Ordinance being a beneficial enactment is to be construed liberally in favour of the labour class and no restriction can be placed on the scope of the definition of workman given in section 2(i) of the Ordinance We are inclined to hold that the words any manual" and "work" employed in section 2(i) of the Ordinance are susceptible to a very vide connotation, and, therefore, they will cover a person who performs any, manual work while discharging his duties irrespective of the quantum of such manual work, provided he belongs to a labor class."
It cannot be said that chowkidars or Security Jamadars do not perform manual labour. The word "manual" means done, made or operated by or used with hand or as manual labour i,e, labour performed by hand or by the exercise of physical force, with or without the aid of tools and of horses or other beasts of burden, but depending for its effectiveness chiefly upon personal muscular exertion rather than upon skill, intelligence or adroitness. (See Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edition). The Security Jamadar and Chowkidar undoubtedly perform their duty by exerting physical and mental faculties in addition to the use of hands.
6. It will be noted that in the judgments delivered by the worthy Chairmen of the Appellate Tribunals and even in the judgment of the Lahore High Court, and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-company, very restrictive and narrow meaning has been assigned to the definition of the term "workman" given in the Standing Orders Ordinance. This is obviously contrary to the scheme and spirit of the labour laws. In any case the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Organization of K.P.T. Workers (supra) was not brought to the notice of the worthy Chairman Appellate Tribunal in all these cases referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent-company. For all these reasons an also being in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Benc of Sind High Court, Karachi in the case of Rehmat All (supra), the finding of th learned Appellate Tribunal to the extent that Fazal Beg petitioner does not corn within the definition of 'workman' as given in the Standing Orders Ordinance C which was the basis for refusing relief to the petitioner, cannot be sustained Accordingly the judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 24-11-1981 t that extent is hereby declared to be without lawful authority and hence of no legal effect. The petitioner has already been held by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal to be a 'workman' and 'worker' within the meaning of section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and as such entitled to maintain the grievance petition and to have been dismissed illegally and thus the net result of the direction made by this Court is that the matter shall stand remanded to the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal for affording the necessary relief to the petitioner by passing the appropriate order in accordance with law. The petition in the above terms is accepted with cost.