1. MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-The dispute in this petition for special leave relates to the transfer of house No. S. E. III. 21 S. I. Prem Gali, Fleming Road, Lahore, which arises in the circumstances set out below :- The petitioner herein is a claimant displaced person who was in possession of a part of the disputed house. He submitted C. U. Form for the transfer of the entire house in his favour, and also entered into an agreement of association on 30-5-60 with Mst. Musharaf Sultana, respondent No.
3. The agreement stipulated that the transfer price of the disputed property will be adjusted entirely against the deferred payment due on the basis of the compensation book of respondent No. 3 who will also be liable to pay the balance, if any, of the transfer price. In con--sideration of the aforesaid payments by respondent No. 3, the petitioner surrendered his entire rights in the house in favour of respondent No. 3. Pursuant to the above agreement P. T. O. No. 530975 was issued in favour of respondent No. 3 on 10-6-1960.
2. One Barkat Ali who was also living in another portion of the disputed house filed an appeal against the transfer of the house in favour of the petitioner and respondent No. 3. The Additional Settlement Commissioner by order dated 8-12-60 remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision. The latter set aside the transfer in favour of respondent No. 3 and instead transferred the house in favour of Barkat Ali. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the above order filed an appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner who by order dated 18-7-61 set aside the transfer of the house in favour of Barkat Ali and transferred it in favour of the petitioner in whose favour P. T. O. No. 791895 was issued. Barkat Ali filed a revision followed by a review petition before the Settlement Commissioner which was dismissed on 13-2-62. Having failed before the Settlement Authorities, he filed Writ Petition No. 1750/11 of 1962 which was dismissed in limine on 23-5-1963.
3. It is noteworthy that throughout these contentious proceed--ings before the Settlement Authorities, curiously enough respondent No. 3 was not made a party and the contest remained confined to the petitioner and Barkat Ali although, as pointed out already, P. T. O. Dated 10-6-60 had issued in favour of respondent No. 3 on the footing of the agreement of association, For the first time she was made respondent in Writ Petition 1750/11 of 1962, which as pointed out already was dismissed fn limine. After the dismissal of the writ petition, a P. T. D. Was issued in her favour on 28- 9-63.
4. Feeling aggrieved by the issuance of P. T. D. In favour of respondent No. 3, and on a miscellaneous application made by the petitioner, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cancelled the P. T. D. In favour of respondent No. 3, by order dated 29-11-63. An appeal by respondent No. 3 against the above order was accepted by the Additional Settlement Commissioner on 16-5-64 and the case was remanded to the Deputy Settlement Commis--sioner for a fresh decision. The latter once again cancelled the P. T. D. In favour of respondent No. 3 against which she filed an appeal for the second time before the Additional Settlement Commissioner who vide order dated 5-12-64 accepted the appeal and approved the transfer of the disputed house in favour of respondent No.
3. A revision filed by the petitioner against the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner was dismissed by order dated 1-7-67. The petitioner then challenged the validity of the last mentioned order by Writ Petition No. 753-R of 1967 which was dismissed 10- a learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 23-2-73 and thus the final order of the Settlement Authority transferring the disputed house in favour of respondent No. 3 was upheld.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged before us that the initial order of transfer in favour of respondent No. 3 having been set aside on 8-12-60 against which she did not file any appeal, that order had attained finality and it is no longer open to her to claim the house and the P. T. D. In her favour was therefore devoid of legal basis, It was also urged that the agreement between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 on 30-5-60 was not an agreement of association ; it was a mere agreement to associate which did not receive the proper approval of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and therefore it was inchoate.
6. The first part of the argument overlooks the all-important fact, that neither Barkat nor the petitioner cared to implead respondent No. 3 as a party in the proceedings before the Settle--ment Authorities. This was despite the fact that she held P. T. O. In respect of the house. In the face of these facts, on no dis--coverable principle of law she can be bound by the orders in the proceedings between the petitioner and Barkat Ali ; nor she was otherwise under an obligation to file an appeal so long as the P. T. O. Dated 10-6-60 was not cancelled.
7. As to the argument that the agreement dated 30-5-60 was an agreement to associate and not agreement of association within the contemplation of Settlement law, the distinction is wholly fictitious rather than real. The fact remains that no appeal was taken by the petitioner against the issuance of P. T. O. In favour of respondent No. 3 on the footing of the agreement. Therefore as against the petitioner the P. T. O. Had attained finality.
8. Moreover, as rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge m the High Court, the petitioner having entered into agreement of association with respondent No. 3 and on the basis of that agreement having caused her to pay the entire transfer price, the petitioner is clearly estopped from controverting the title of respondent No. 3 on the basis of the P. T. O. And the P. T. D. Issued in her favour which rests on the foundation of the agree--ment of association. Indeed the learned counsel for the petitioner was frank enough to concede that the entire transfer price of the house was adjusted against the unutilised claim of respondent No. 3. That being so, it is not understandable on what principle of law can the petitioner turn round to claim the transfer of the disputed house in defeasance of the agreement of association.
9. There is no merit in this petition which is dismissed.