K. E. CHAUHAN, J.-The appellant by meant -of a com--munication/order dated 29th March 1962, was appointed as a junior Engineer (Reclamation) in WAPDA. He assumed charge of his office on 10th April 1962. He was transferred to Machinery Pool Organisation (shortly known as MPO). On 30th May 1967, and he was working in that Organisation, when his services were terminated as hereinafter explained.
2. On 14th November 1968, a complaint was made by one Abdur Rauf, Workshop Officer, Lahore, against one Ahmad Saeed Malik, Executive Engineer and the appellant, alleging that they tad misappropriated a sum of Rs. 190.00. The petitioner on 25th November 1968 was asked to give his explanation, which he did on the same day denying the allegations. Thereafter an enquiry was held by a Committee consisting of three officers viz., (I) Mr. A. Haleem Senior Officer Administration M. P.
O., WAPDA; (ii) Mr. Nazeer Ahmad Workshop Accountant M. P. O., WAPDA Shalamar and (iii) Mr. A.
Hameed Mirza, Assistant Warehouse Officer M. P. O. WAPDA Shalamar, Lahore, which submitted its report on 16th December 1968, to Sh. Nisar-ul-Haq, Machinery Pool Organiza--tion (D. M. P. O). The said officer thereupon recorded a recom--mendation addressed to Mr. Ghulam Ahmad Chief Engineer, Machinery Pool Organization (C. E. M. P. O.) on 1-1-1969. The said note reads as follows:- "C. E., M. P. O. may kindly see the enquiry report regarding misuse of local purchase powers by Shalamar, Workshop. On receipt of a complaint from the Workshop Officer Shalamar, vide his letter No. LWT (M.P.O.)/Confidential/93, dated 14th November 1968,1 appointed an Enquiry Committee comprising of the following Officers:-
(1) Senior Officer (Administration), M. P. O., WAPDA.
(2) Workshop Accountant, M. P. O., WAPDA, Shalamar.
(3) Asstt. Warehouse Officer, M. P. O., WAPDA, Shalamar.
From the enquiry report, it is quite clear that Mr. Muhammad Sadiq, Ex-Assistant Workshop Officer, Shalamar, drew the amount for the purchase of spare parts but did not purchase the material.
Later on when it was found that he had not bought the material he purchased the material, which he handed over to the Workshop Officer after a month or so. However, there has been no loss to the Authority, but it shows the manner in which the Authority's money has been handled by the then Workshop Officer and Mr. Sadiq, Assistant Workshop Officer and shows clear lack of responsible behaviour on the part of Asstt. Workshop Officer and Workshop Officer.
It is, therefore, recommended that warning to Mr. Muhammad Sadiq and the then Workshop Officer Mr. Saeed Malik may be issued."
As the passage reproduced above will show Sh. Nisar-ul-Haq Director, M. P. O., had recommended that the case be dropped with a warning to the appellant and the then Workshop Officer Saeed Malik. The Chief Engineer, M. P. O. (Mr. Ghulam Ahmad), however, did not agree with the recommendation of the Director, M. P. O. and instead suggested that before issuing a warning both the delinquent officers should be charge-sheeted. As the other co-accused officer was a deputationist whose appointing authority (in his own department) was allegedly the Governor, therefore, the case was then put up to Mr. M. A. Rashid, Member, Water (M. W.) for gutting his sanction for charge-sheeting him. Member Water on 7-1-1969 directed that Malik Saeed may be sent back to his parent Department and "the services of the S. D. O., may be terminated under terms of his agreement", and sent the file back to Mr. Ghulam Ahmad Chief Engineer, P. M. O. In obedience to that order on 25th January 1969, Mr. Ghulam Ahmad, Chief Engineer M. P. O., addressed a letter (Annex `A' with the Letters Patent Appeal) to Mr. S. M. Saeed Chief Engineer, Administration Water and Soil Investigation Division (C. E. A. & WAS D), requesting that the petitioner may be served with a notice of termination of his, services under the terms and conditions as laid down in his order of appointment. Then on the 14th of February 1969, notice of termination of services was issued to the petitioner under the signature of Muhammad Hanif, Assistant Director Establishment 11 for C. E., A & W (i.e., for Mr. S. M. Saeed).
4. The appellant filed a writ petition against the aforesaid proceedings and orders, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 29th November 1971. The appellant has come up 1n Letters Patent Appeal.
5. Before the learned Single Judge from the side of the respondents it was argued that the relationship between the ' parties being of a master and servant, a writ petition at the instance of the servant against the master was not maintainable under Article 98 of the late Constitution of 1962. The contention was repelled and the, learned Judge held that in cases where a writ was based on violation of a statute or statutory rules, It was not barred from the point of view of the objection hereinbefore mentioned. This part of the judgment A of the learned Single Judge is not being seriously disputed before us by tile learned counsel for the respondents and because on our part we too are in respectful agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge as recorded in para. 8 of his judgment, we need not take the matter any further. In a recent case decided by one of us (K. E. Chauhan, J.) on 22-12-1971 (W. P. No. 661-S/71) Lt. Col. j. D. Malik (Retired) v. Government of the Punjab and another, ample discussion has been made about the status of employees of corporate bodies. We reiterate the same position here.
6. Before the learned Single Judge, from the side of the petitioner it was argued:-
(a) that the petitioner was eligibly to such constitutional safeguards which are generally available to civil servants under Articles 177 and 178 of the Constitution and which have not been kept in view qua him;
(b) that even otherwise the services of the petitioner had been terminated in violation of the statutory rules on the subject:
(c) that actually "three months' notice" clause was attracted to simple termination of service, whereas this was a case of turning out the petitioner for a default and, as such, the aforesaid clause was used only as a cloak and the whole action was male fide and illegal
(d) that the services of the petitioner were not terminated by a competent authority.
7. As regards the point at (a) above, the finding of the learned Single Judge was that direct employees of WAPDA (as distinct from those Government Servants who were there on deputation) were not civil servants and therefore, were not eligible to such constitutional safeguards as were available to civil servants.
8. As regards the point at (b) above, though the reply of the respondents was that as at the time of appointment no statutory rules existed, therefore, the case of the petitioner, was not to be considered under the rules which came into force later, but the learned Single Judge did not specifically answer this question and held that even otherwise there was no violation of rules.
9. As regards the point at (c) above, the learned Single Judge held that it was open to the employer that even in cases of default of a servant, he could fall back on "termination of service by notice" clause and merely because this clause was resorted to, it could not be said that the order of the master, in terminating the services of the servant, was male fide. Before us however, it was agreed to that in case the order was a cloak or otherwise mala fide then it could be quashed.
10. As regards the point at (d) above, the learned Single Judge held that though the petitioner was appointed by a Deputy Chief Engineer, but his services were terminated by Chief Engineer (Administration) who was an officer competent to do so. He further held that the Chief Engineer (Administration) had in his own turn brought the matter to the notice of his superior i.e., Member Water who agreed with the Chief Engineer that the services of the petitioner should be terminated in terms of his appointment order. After giving that finding the learned Single Judge held "hence no infringement of the 1968-Rules has been established before me and consequently, no fault can be found with the impugned notice of termination on this score as well" and dismissed the writ petition.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the order terminating services of his client in the instant case was neither valid and nor had it been passed by a competent authority. The contention seems to have force and our reasons for so holding are as follows:-
(a) Water and Power Development Authority (hereinafter called WAPDA) (or also called as Authority), is a statutory corporation constituted under section 3 of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act XXXI of 1958 (hereinafter called the Act). This Corporation is to consist of a Chairman and not more than two Members appointed by the Government. Section 17 of the Act authorises the Corporation to appoint such officers and servants as It may consider necessary for the performance of its functions on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit.
Section 18 lays down that the Corporation shall prescribe the procedure for appointment and the terms and conditions of service of its officers and shall be competent to take disciplinary action against them. Section 20 states that the Corporation may by general or special order delegate to the Chairman, a Member or Officer of the Authority, any of its powers, duties or functions under this Act, subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose. Section 29 provides that for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, the Authority (i. e., the Corporation), may with the approval of the Govern--ment frame such regulations an it may consider necessary or expedient. On 25-7-1968, in exercise of the powers conferred on it, by section 18 of the Act, as amended, and all other powers enabling it in that behalf, the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority was pleased to make the rules known as the West Pakistan WAPDA (Water Wing) Service of Engineers Rules, 1968, regulating a procedure for recruitment to the West Pakistan WAPDA (Water Wing) Service of Engineers and the terms and conditions of service of persons appointed thereto. According to rule 3(2) "appointing authority" means "the Authority competent to make appointment to a post in the Service by initial recruitment or by promotion as prescribed in rule 8 of these Rules or as may be prescribed by the Authority from time to time by general of special order in each case for the purpose of all or any of these Rules". Rule 8 reads as follows:--- "8. Appointing Authority.-Except as otherwise decided by the Authority at any time by general or special order, the Appointing Authorities in respect of the various posts included in the service shell be as indicated In column 3 of the table hereunder:- Table missed of pag. No. 275 S. No.Name of the PostAppointing Authority Constitution of the Selection Board 1 2 3 4 1 2.(i) Chief Engineer Deputy Chief Engineer.
(i) Superintending Engineer.Authority Authority after obtaining the advice of the selection board mentioned in column 4.(i) Member Concerned {Chairman of the Board.}
(ii) Chief Engineer. Incharge of administration. {Member}
(iii) Other Chief Engineer of Division in the Water Wing. {Member} 3.Chief Engineer.Chief Engineer neer concerned on the advice of the Selection Board in column 4.(i) Chief Engineer (Administration).
(ii) Other Chief Engineer of Division in water Wing. {Senior most out of Engineer will be chairman of the Board.} Rule 12, which deals with "termination of service", reads as follows:- "
12. Termination of service and resignation.---(I) The services of a member of the Service may be terminates by the appoint--ing authority, without assigning any reason, on giving him three months' previous notice in writing to that effect or three months' pay in lieu of such notice. Likewise, a member of the Service may, without assigning any reason, tender his resignation on giving to the appointing authority three months' previous notice in writing to that effect or three months' pay in lieu of such notice; provided that the resignation shall not be accepted by the appointing authority if the member of the Service is being proceeded against for mis--conduct or corruption.
(2) The services of a member of the service may be terminat--ed by the appointing authority without giving any previous notice to that effect if in the opinion of the appointing authority he has been proved guilty of insubordination, interference or misconduct or continuous absence from duty for 15 days without permission."
A perusal of the above material will show that the officer competent to terminate the services of the petitioner was the "Chief Engineer concerned" who, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted, in the instant case was Mr. Ghulam Ahmad (Chief Engineer M. P. O.) and not Mr. S. M.
Saeed (Chief Engineer Admn. and WASID). From the detailed facts given in the beginning of this judgment, It will be evident that the basic order, however, which was operated upon by all concerned here, was not passed by Mr. Ghulam Ahmad. The events in a table form in a chronological order to excuse repetition happened as follows:- S.R No.Date Order 1.1-1-1969Mr. Ghulam Ahmad ordered that the peti--tioner should be put on a charge-sheet.
2.7-1-1969 Mr. M. Rashid, Member Water did not agree and directed that the services of the petitioner should be terminated.
3.25-1-1969Mr. Ghulam Ahmad then said that in keeping with the order of Mr. Rashid, terminate the petitioner's services.
4.11-2-1969On a representation by petitioner, Mr. Ghulam Ahmad ordered that till the decision of that representation, the peti-- tioner should continue in Service.
5.12/14-2-1969Services of the petitioner were terminated by a communication issued under the signatures of Muhammad Hanif, Director, Establishment 11 for Mr. S. M. Saeed Chief Engineer (Administration), Water and Soil Investigation Division (C. E.
A. & W) or (C. E. A. WASID).
This will show that so far as Mr. Ghulam Ahmad is concerned, left to his own, he himself was not prepared to terminate the appellant's services, inasmuch as, at one stn p i.e., 1-1-1969, he said that a charge-sheet should be issued o the petitioner and at another sage, I.e., 11-2-1969, he said that till the decision of his representation, the services of the appellant should not be terminated, but in spite of all this the others hastened and put an end to the appellant's services. This was all illegal. In the order of the learned Single Judge, the assumption that "appointing authority" (or in other words competent authority for terminating services of the petitioner) was the Chief Engineer, Administration and WASID (Mr. S. M. Saeed) is not correct. This factual inaccuracy was conceded to by the learned counsel- for the respondents. It appears that the mistake probably cropped up from a suggestion in a letter dated 25-1-1969, written by Mr. Ghulam Ahmad, in which he appointed by wrote that "Mr. M. Sadiq was probably appointed by C. E. (Admn.). Previously, he was working on deputation to land and Water Management Board. On return, he was posted in Reclamation Division and was transferred to M. P. O., vide Chief Engineer's (Development) Letter No. MPO./C. E. P.
F/467, dated 3:-5-1967'. According to section 15 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act V1 of 1956, the competency of authority concerned is to be seen not with reference to the date of initial appointment but with reference to the date of any impugned order of termination of service.
Section 15 reads follows:--
15. Power to appoint to include power to suspend or dismiss.---Where, by any West Pakistan Act, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then unless a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by Itself or any other authority in exercise of that power."
Acting on the above principle, we have no hesitation in holding that since at the time of the passing of the termination order the appointing authority for a Junior Engineer in M. P. O. was Chief Engineer M. P. O., therefore, he and not any other Chief Engineer could pass the relevant order.
Similarly, there was no authority vesting in Member Water (Mr. M. Rashid) to direct termination of the petitioner's services. This also disposes of the objection alluded to in paragraph 8 of this judgment.
(b) Law is well-settled that it is the competent authority who himself should apply his own independent mind to the facts and circumstances of each case and the operative decision should be his own. Reference may be made to Mian Gul Muhammad v. West Pakistan Government and another (1966 Law Notes 22), Muhammad Alam v. Pakistan (PLD 1965 Kar. 100), Azamuddin v. The Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1955 Sind 357), Mirza Afzal Baig v. Government of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1957 Lab. 467) and Nazir Ahmad v. The Province of West Pakistan (1969 Law Notes 16)
Examining, the case in the light of the above la v, since as per rules 8 and 12, the Authority competent to make appointment of a Junior Engineer in M. P. O.on the date of action was the Chief Engineer M. P. O., therefore, he alone and not the Chief Engineer Administration and WASID (Mr. S. M.
Saeed) was competent to issue termination notice. No doubt these are cases of civil servants and even though WAPDA Employees are not civil servants, but these cases are being cited for the general proposition that in the matter of termination of service regulated by Statute or rules, it should be the independent opinion of the competent authority himself. Reference may also be made to a recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court (Sardar Muhammad Tqbal and Zaki- ud-Din Pal. JJ.), S Fayyas Hussain Kadri v. Administrator, Lahore Municipal Corporation etc., W. P. No. 722-S-70, decided on 14-2-1972 where Administrator, Lahore Municipal Corporation terminated the services of certain Legal Advisor not of his own but on directions from the Government. It was held that the termination order was illegal. Certain other cases can also be quoted on the general proposition that where an officer simply writes on the noting of others as, "seen" or "approved", and there .is nothing to show that he applied his own independent mind to the facts of the case concerned, then his orders are not maintainable in law. See Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (Pakistan), Lahore and others (PLD 1964 SC 829), Abdul Hamid v. Malik Karam Dad and others (PLD 1959 Lah. 753) and Mirza Afzal Baig v. Government of West Pakistan and others. Some--what similar is the position of the facts and circumstances involved herein.
Here too, Mr. Ghulam Ahmad's own view was to put the petitioner on a charge-sheet but his superior Mr. M. Rashid (Member Water) issued directions to the contrary which actually were carried out just in obedience thereto.
(c) The services of the petitioner, it is amply demonstrated from the record, were terminated not in the form of a simple innocent termination but for default and misconduct on his part, for, which an Enquiry Committee and later on another Agency "Director C 8t I" secret enquiries and made adverse reports against him The appointing authority (i.e., the competent authority) had directed to charge-sheet the petitioner but then the order of that authority was set aside by an incompetent authority, namely, Member, Water and it was that order which was ultimately given effect to. The basic for termination of services was the reported misconduct. Even in his Annual Confidential Report for the period 1-1-1968 to 31-12-1968, it was written .
"This Officer has been involved in a case of misappropriation of store purchased locally. He has been issued a termination notice by the Authority."
All the correspondence which exchanged between the various officers made a bold mention of the petitioner's misconduct and now when the matter has been brought to Court, it is not fair on the part of the WAPDA to contend that it wash a case of simple termination of service. The notice clause, in the Instant case, it is thus obvious was passed into the field just as a cloak to shield the real nature of the order passed or action taken. From that point of view, it was a mala fide design and could not be called a simple innocent act of termination of service. It is pertinent to point out that after issuance of termination notice to him, the petitioner called upon the Chairman of WAPDA.
What happened then and how the case was routed through and dealt with, is clear from the following noting :- C. P. 3 (PUC) Mr. Muhammad Sadiq J. E. who has been served with a notice to termination of his services by the C. h. (A& W) In compliance to M. (W)'s orders on M. R. 2 para. 6 ante had represented to Chairman, WAPDA, for his re-instate--ment and the Chairman has ordered to put up his case. As per verbal orders of the C. E. M. P. O. case has been obtained from Director's Office (through Director) and is placed below.
(Sd.)-20/2.
Assistant. (Sd.)-20/2 As desired by Chairman, complete case, regarding the termination of Mr. Muhammad Sadiq Junior Engineer, is placed below for perusal.
(1) Enquiry report against the J. E. is flaged at A.
(2) Report of XEN Shalamar Mr. Raus at (B).
(3) Report of D. (M. P. O.) and orders of M (W) are Raged (C).
(4) Appeal of Mr. Sadiq is at fiaged (D).
Chairman.(Sd.)
9. Through M. W.(Sd.)
1-3-1969.
From, overleaf.
Mr. Muhammad Sadiq has seen me and has vehemently urged that he is innocent. In the circumstance I feel that it would be fair if the case is entrusted to the Director C&I for enquiry and report within a fortnight.
(Sd.) Member (W)19-3-69 (Sd.) 20-3-69.
(Sd.) Z5-3-69.
CW(Sd.) 31/3.
My report is attached. (Sd.) D C & I M. Water. 6-5-69 Chairman is aware of the previous history of the case. On a report by Departmental Enquiry Committee forwarded through C. E. (M. P. O.), I had ordered (vide para. 6) summary action that Mr. Saeed Malik, XEN be sent back to his parent department and toe services of Mr. Muhammad Sadiq S. D. O. be terminated under the terms of the agreement. However, both the officers have been agitating that the allegations against them are not correct. It was, therefore decided that the case should be gone into by an outside agency, namely Director C&I. He has enquired into the matter and his report may kindly be seen at flag `W'.
As a result of the aforesaid investigations it has been established conclusively that cash memos.
Nos. 541 and 542 for the purchase of spares worth Rs. 190 and Rs. 74 respectively are b and in face the firm, in whose name the vouchers have been issued, does not exist. The question for consideration is whether the XEN incharge Mr. Saeed Malik, the S. D. O. Mr. Muhammad Sadiq and the Overseer Mr. Gulzar are individually or collectively responsible for the misappropriation involved. I have obtained the original documents from the officer who investigated the case and would like to bring to the Chairman's notice the following facts:-
(i) In the register the movement into and out of the Work, shop an entry about spare parts has been made at serial No. 32 at flag 'X'. This entry purports to have been signed by the S. D. O. Mr. Muhammad Sadiq. The Investigating Officer has informed that the signature has been admitted by the officer. If no purchases were made, it would be a fair conclusion to draw that Mr. Muhammad Sadiq was prima facie a party to the whole affair when he signed the bogus entry in the register, whatever be the date of making the entry.
(ii) Mr. Gulzar Ahmad, Overseer, signed on the back of the purchase vouchers but later on him signature was scored. Here again a fair conclusion would be that he is a party to the transaction.
(iii) The money for the purchase was drawn by the XEN Mr. Saeed Malik and his evasive reply as to whether he gave the money for purchase to the S. D. O. or the overseer is in my view a prima facie indication of his complicity.
There is also other evidence implicating these officers but in view of the documentary evidence referred to above, the need not be gone into detail.
Besides the case mentioned above, the Directorate of C & I have also investigated allegation of unauthorised and free repairs of the engine on the private car of Mr. Saeed Malik. Here again the finding is against him and according to the Directorate of C&I the car was got repaired unauthorisedly and gratis from the Workshop and for this a WAPDA vehicle was also misused for bringing Into the Workshop and taking out from there the repaired engine.
The S. D. O. and the Overseer are WAPDA Employees and the XEN is a deputationist. Chairman may kindly decide whether we should be content with the summary action proposed by - me, i.e. the terminations of the services of direct employees and reversion of the deputationists to the parent department, or some further action e.g. registration of a case with the police in the case of the bogus purchase be alto taken. For the unauthorized repair to the private car and departmental enquiry after reversion of Mr. Malik may be taken against him and others involved. I&P Department has already issued orders of his reversion.
It is also for consideration whether we should not have a probe into the other sundry purchases made during the tenure of theme 0100m, particularly whether One are many other purchases in the name of the bogus firm, Messrs Delux Automobile, Neela Gumbad Lahore, involved in the first case mentioned above.
(Sd.) Member (W)
(By name)7-5-69 Discussed with M. W.
The services of S. D. O. & Overseer be terminated. The XEN may be reverted to Irrigation Deptt. and a charge-sheet forwarded to that department for inquiry. The case may also be reported to A.-C. E.- D. C. & I may also be required to check other purchases of this type for the year 1968 and see if any of the vouchers pertain to this bogus firm.
(Sd.) 7-5-1969 In the face of the above record of the Department to contend that the services of the petitioner were not terminative for default or that it was a case of simple termination is not correct. In these circumstances, there has thus taken place e p clear violation of the West Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1966, which renders the entire action as without lawful authority and of no legal consequences against the petitioner.
12. Another point argued by the learned counsel eras that the appointing authority which was competent to make appoint--ments under rule 8 was "Chief Engineer concerned on the advice of the Selection Board in column 4". In column 4, the Selection Board is indicated, to consist of:- (i)Chief Engineer (Admn.).(Senior-most Chief Engi--neer (ii)Other Chief Engineers of will be the Chairman of the Board.
Divisions in Water Wing: Learned counsel submitted that the Chief Engineer concerned (i.e., Chief Engineer M. P. O.), was to function, for example at the time of initial appointment on the advice of the Selection Board which consisted of the Chief Engineer (Administration) and about eight other Chief Engineers (the total number of Chief Engineers of various Divisions in the Water Wing was given as ten by the learned counsel for the respondents in Court. Learned counsel further submitted that the same should be the process in which the Chief Engineer concerned should have functioned at the time of the termination of the petitioner's services. Learned counsel further clarified that he should not be under-- stood to contend that the Selection Board, due to the fact that its advice was to be taken at the time of the appointment became a part of the appointing authority as such, (a) proposition which stands amply negatived by Abdul Rashid Abbasi v. The Superintendent of Police, Muzaffargarh and others (PLD 1967 Lah. 1093) and S. Qamar Ali Shah v. The State (PLD 19656 C 50). All he meant to state, he submitted was that the taking of its advice, however, remained a necessary part of the manner in which the appointing authority was to function and, therefore, if that advice was not taken then the order of termination of service would be illegal. Support for this pro--position was sought from Capt. Muhammad Azhar v. Commis--sioner of Karachi and another (PLD 1966 SC 253) where failure to consult Public Service Commission in the case of the Civil Servant concerned was held to have vitiated the order impugned therein. Though that was a case of a civil servant and the present is a case of a servant of a corporate body, but on principle, the result, he argued, will be the same whenever there is a provision in the Statute or in the rules to act on the advice of a separate Board of Commission, etc. When confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the respondents argued that the words 'on the advice of the Selection Board in Column 4", were meant for and restricted only to the matter of filling up of the posts or making initial appointment, and were not attracted to the stage of termination of services fn the form of dismissal, removal or otherwise. Since what has been written by us in para. 11 above, is sufficient to grant relief to the petitioner, we do not deal with the point hereinbefore mentioned and leave it for answer in some other more appropriate case later.
13. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order of the learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition, is set aside and the appeal and the writ petition are accepted. The orders impugned in the writ petition are consequently quashed. The petitioner shall get his costs throughout.