AKHTAR HASSAN J--This Regular First Appeal arises from preliminary decree dated the 20th of January, 1985, passed by the learned Civil Judge Ist Class, Lahore, whereby the respondents- plaintiffs were held to be entitled to 37--1/2 per cent share in the premises known as Ratan Cinema, McLeod Road, Lahore, measuring 12 Kanals 71 Square Ft. The remaining 62-1/2 per cent share was held to vest in the appellants-defendants.
2. It was common case of the parties that this cinema was allotted to them according to the shares mentioned above but later the respondents-plaintiffs leased out their share to the appellants- defendants who allegedly had not been dealing fairly with them, nor had accounted for their share in the income. They added that on the 15th of April, 1977, the building of the cinema was totally burnt due to political disturbances which event justified all the more need for partition thereof but their repeated demands in that behalf, were flatly refused and hence the suit.
3. The appellants-defendants raised a number of objections in their written statement but they conceded that the parties jointly owned the premises according to the shares referred to above.
However, they maintained that after the cinema was burnt they had rebuilt it and reinstalled the machinery, furniture etc. At their own expense. Thus, they denied the respondents-plaintiffs' title to the reconstructed building, machinery, furniture etc. And claimed rateable compensation for it.
They admitted that they had taken the respondents' share on lease but they stated they had been regularly paying them rent and traversed the assertion that they had not been treating the respondents fairly in the matter. Among other various pleas, they urged that a third person had challenged the transfer of the cinema to the present parties and that the proceedings before the Custodian were held up due to a stay order issued by this Court. They observed that due to pendency of those proceedings, parties title to the cinema was still not complete and that the present suit was premature. They assailed the valuation of the suit for court-fee and jurisdiction, pleaded bar of limitation as also indivisibility of the property and claimed that because of dismissal of the previous suit for rendition of accounts, the present one was barred by Order II, rule 2, C.P.C.
4. Quite a number of issues were framed on the above-mentioned pleadings but for the purposes of present appeal, arising as it is from a preliminary decree, there appeared to be no contest between the parties. Both were agreed in regard to their respective shares, burning of the building, its reconstruction by the appellants-defendants at their own expense, and liability of the respondents/--plaintiffs to pay rateable compensation to them on that count. A careful perusal of pleadings of both the parties leads one to think that the trial Court should have outright passed the preliminary decree in view of agreement between the parties in relation to their admitted shares at least in the site of the building. Obviously', the appellants' right to be compensated for reconstruction of the building or its refurnishing or installation of the new machinery etc. Was a matter of detail to be determined in the due course when the final decree was to be passed. We are surprised why this course was not adopted by the trial Court and why the appellants chose to prefer the present appeal when in the written statement they conceded the respondents' share of 37-1/2 per cent, and in their own turn the latter admitted that after burning of the building, it was reconstructed by the appellants at' their own expense. The purport of the preliminary decree as contemplated by Order XX, rule 18, C.P.C., is only to determine the respective shares of the parties in the joint property and since m this case there was no such dispute, the preliminary decree under consideration was rightly passed.
5. Other contentions had no much relevance for the present because more or less those related to either rendition of accounts or award of compensation for reconstruction of the building etc. And had to be settled in the final phase. Neither party pressed any other objection comprised in a long list of issues. Those points had no efficacy when the parties accepted each other's proportionate title. They may, however, be settled in final decree.
6. As a consequence of the above discussion, we dismiss the appeal leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
M.Z.S./E-11/L